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Preface
In January 1992 the author took on the position as operations manager
heading the Bygnes Control Center at Karmøy, Norway. This center is
currently responsible for approximately 90% of the Norwegian natural gas
transport operations. Following this position, which lasted for about five years
the author started working with business development of the transportation
systems.
At that point in time – in early 1997 – when the author moved into the
latter position, the development of the European Union’s Gas Directive was
rapidly approaching its hectic finalization stage. The author, who became a
member of a Statoil internal working group on the issue got quite involved in
commenting – on behalf of Statoil – the different drafts that were released
from Brussels.
The Gas Directive initiated many questions – but few answers were
found. A growing recognition thus developed in the company and in the
author’s mind as well, that a thorough study was needed in order to find
solutions on how to respond to the forces of change introduced by the Gas
Directive. From January 1998 and up till now, this has been the author’s full
time job.
The story presented here documents this study. It aims to fill a gap in
knowledge by answering some questions of how liberalization in the European
gas market may affect Norwegian natural gas transport operations. The
ultimate goal of the story is to find out how the Norwegians shall govern and
conduct the natural gas transport operations in the North Sea in the near
future.
As the author will show the story draws upon accumulated knowledge
from several disciplines such as those applied by engineers, economists and
lawyers. A core task of the thesis is thus to combine and utilize the knowledge
of the different disciplines. This is done in such a way that the suggested
solutions are adjusted and aligned to satisfactorily represent possible future
“real world” applications – and in such a way that all major stakeholders’
needs are met as far as possible and feasible.
This is a challenging task, indeed and the only way found feasible by
the author to comprehend it was to have the work conducted and governed by
a recognizable systems approach – an approach designed for engineering
complex systems. This approach thus represents a new and modern way of
solving tasks as specified here. The fruit that such an approach is bearing, are
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results that go beyond – to some extent – those results that are obtained by
traditional and less multidisciplinary approaches.
Authors occupying themselves with handling complex issues may find
writing about it difficult. So it apparently was for one of the authors of the old
Apocrypha, the author of The Second book of the Maccabees, way back in
year 161 B.C. 1 That author was writing about complex issues in the old
Hebrew society at the time and he was describing how to handle them.
Finding the writing difficult the author reveals for the reader his own thoughts
and evaluation of his work by the following words:
“If it is well told and to the point, that is what I myself desired; if it is
poorly done and mediocre, that was the best I could do.”
Having revealed such an honest statement the author from the distant
past eventually expressed his hope that the reader would appreciate his work
of describing complex issues and finding appropriate solutions by the
following metaphor:
“For just as it is harmful to drink wine alone (i.e. the wine at that time
was quite strong), or, again, to drink water alone (i.e. the water was often of
poor quality), while wine mixed with water is sweet and delicious and
enhances one’s enjoyment, so also the style of the story delights the ears of
those who read the work. ”
These wishes and words of the old writer communicate this author’s
intentions as well. And finally then – for the sake of completeness – the
analyses, opinions, and conclusions expressed in this work are entirely those
of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views or positions
of the supporting organizations and institutions.
   Trondheim, April 2001
      Hans Jørgen Dahl
                                          
1 Chapter 15.38-39
Acknowledgement
        iii
Acknowledgement
There are many persons that deserve my deep thanks for their support,
encouragement and valuable contributions in the form of comments,
suggestions and answers to my many questions and draft documents. As it is
impossible to mention them all by name my general gratitude is meant for
them all.
There are however some few persons and organizations that should be
mentioned specifically here:
· My employer, Statoil for its kind and generous support and financing of
the work. The author is also thankful for all the assistance given to me
by many colleagues.
· Professor Odd Andreas Asbjørnsen at NTNU who so sadly passed away
in the spring of 1999. His stimulating and encouraging discussions in
the early stages of the work were quite important to me.
· Adjunct Professor and Chief Engineer in Statoil, Karl Sjøen who
challenged me in the first place to take a “Dr. ing.” study at NTNU.
· Academic advisor Professor Otto K. Sønju at NTNU for his genuine
interest in the work and for his professional advising. The many fruitful
and encouraging status meetings, carried out during the last four years,
have contributed much to the work.
· Main thesis supervisor Adjunct Professor Ole Jørgen Hanssen at NTNU
for his professional support on systems theory, methodologies and
research approaches. It has been a very stimulating and fruitful
experience to draw upon his many years of research experience and
scientific knowledge.
· Thesis supervisors Professor Kåre Petter Hagen at Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and Dr. juris. Ulf
Hammer at the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law. I am very
grateful for the excellent support that has been given me over the last
three years and the many interesting and instructive discussions we have
had on complicated issues related to economics, regulation and law.
· My gratitude also goes to Executive Director Dr. Denny Ellerman and
staff of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology for all the assistance, support and
informative discussions that were offered to me during my one year stay
as a visiting researcher. The excellent research working conditions and
Acknowledgement
        iv
facilities, the many meetings and courses attended proved to be very
valuable and fruitful for the work.
· My thanks also go to the many representatives of various companies
and institutions visited in North America who so kindly shared their
valuable experiences with me.
· My thanks also go to Siv. ing. Lars Bjarne Rørvang in Statoil who
assisted me in the gas flow optimization simulations and to Dr. ing.
Thor Bjørkvoll at The foundation for Science and Industrial Research
(SINTEF) for interesting discussions.
· Finally, the author is also thankful to the anonymous reviewers of
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) for comments
offered on the first two papers and to the company Ascent Logic for
letting me using a free copy of the RDD-100 computer program.
This book is dedicated to my wife Hellen and my four children, who
made it all possible with their patience and co-operation.
Abstract
        v
                             Abstract
The main hypothesis tested in this work is:
“It is possible to operate future Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems at a level that is approximately optimal, technically and economically,
with major stakeholders duly attending to requirements specified in the
Norwegian statutory framework and in the implemented “Gas Directive.”
In order to test this hypothesis a multidisciplinary systems approach has
been applied that includes analyses based on fluidmechanics and
thermodynamics, economic theory and constrained by the prevailing and
future legislative requirements. Operational experiences and empirical data
also support the analyses.
It is assumed in this work that the introduction of the European Union’s
Gas Directive will result in some new or altered legal requirements for how to
conduct future Norwegian natural gas transport operations. The work has
identified these new requirements and the work has suggested realistic
solutions for how to conduct future operations. The author therefore concludes
that the main hypothesis above is true provided five recommendations are
observed.
The first recommendation is to implement into the Norwegian
legislation provisions that make possible two core requirements of the Gas
Directive. The first provision is to allow domestic gas sellers to compete in the
downstream market by marketing and selling their gas individually. The
second provision is to allow access to the transportation systems for those
stakeholders who according to the Gas Directive are defined as “eligible
customers” and “natural gas undertakings”, i.e. the future shippers.
The second recommendation follows as consequence of the latter
provision and it recommends the future Norwegian regulatory regime to
incorporate three main features. First, the transportation system is to be
operated by an organization unit that has a transparent account on its
transportation services or alternatively by an organization (i.e. the operator)
that is functionally separated from and does not participate in any gas
marketing and sales activities.
Secondly, and due to the fact that the Norwegian natural gas
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transportation systems are highly physically integrated it is recommended to
have one and only one transportation system operator. Only one operator will
be in the best position to enhance cost efficiency in daily operations, energy
efficiency, resource management in daily operations, optimized utilization and
optimized gas blending.
Thirdly, new and altered transportation services must be designed to
meet the future needs and requirements of the shippers and these services must
be offered to all shippers. The latter feature is elaborated in the third
recommendation.
The third recommendation is to redefine and develop new transportation
services that support shippers’ elastic demands for transportation services,
both during periods of sufficient capacity as well as during peak load periods.
The above recommendation will imply that the future transportation
services must comprise firm services i.e. booked and guaranteed
transportation, and interruptible services i.e. transportation being interrupted
either during off-peak periods or during peak periods as well as peak load
services i.e. transportation services offered during peak load periods. The
services must be offered to all shippers in an equal and impartial manner and
be supported by a transparent and feasible tariff and toll regime. The toll
regime must feature several properties that ensure recovery of fixed costs, cost
efficiency in operations and maintenance, and rationing efficiency and this
work recommends that the future toll regime shall be reasonable and fair and
cost-based.
This work has identified that the existing toll regime does not feature all
of the above properties and this work therefore suggests that the existing toll
regime is re-designed and extended to include new elements. The first
recommendation is to re-design the existing toll formula so that it acts as a
two-part toll for firm capacity.
The fixed part of the toll shall act as a booking charge or capacity
charge and it shall cover the financial costs based on the historic investment
costs for the pipeline systems. It shall also include the fixed (annual)
operations and maintenance costs, and any new costs for incremental new
investments. The variable part of the toll may be set equal to average marginal
costs per unit of gas, or be paid “in kind” as done in the current regime.
Further, a unitization of the fixed part of the firm toll is suggested here.
The unitization shall include all pipelines that comprise the dry gas system.
This means that the fixed part of the firm toll shall be calculated as an average
fixed toll based on the historic investment costs for all the pipelines included.
The unitization schema shall include the existing ship-or-pay contracts and
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any new firm contracts in the dry gas system.
The unitization will accomplish a possibility for eliminating specific
shipper’s preferences for where to physically route gas in the dry gas system.
This will subsequently improve rationing efficiency at high levels of
utilization of the system when there is a concurrent need for auctioning of
spare capacity. This is due to the physical behavior of the integrated system as
any “internal” pre-booked routing in the system effectively may reduce the
total throughput and thus a rationing efficient utilization of the system.
The above recommendations mean that the firm toll shall be charged as
a “postage-stamp” toll for all pipeline systems comprising the dry gas systems.
This means in practical terms that the dry gas system is to be considered as
one zone only and pre-defined entry points and exit points must be
established.
As a consequence of unitizing the toll for firm capacity either a
unitization of the ownership structure must be done or a payment mechanism
must be in force that secures the pipeline owners no extra profit or loss due to
the introduction of unitization.
A new two-part toll formula that in its form is equal to the firm capacity
toll is recommended for covering interruptible off-peak services. It is
recommended to set the fixed part of the toll lower than the fixed part of the
firm toll.
A new toll must be developed and be based on auctioning principles for
allocation of spare capacity in the system during peak load periods. In order to
facilitate the auction a tool is required for predicting the level of spare capacity
that is available from time to time. This tool is also needed for optimizing the
total throughput based on the different auction bids. In a similar manner as for
the firm toll, the auction bids shall refer to a unitized dry gas system and the
bids shall refer to transportation requests between any of the pre-defined entry
and exits points. No shipper shall thus have a right to specify “internal”
routing in the dry gas system.
The total revenues for the pipeline system owners shall not yield higher
profits than the allowable regulated return and the balance shall be levied – at
least in theory – the firm transportation shippers only. It is recommended to
conduct such reallocations of revenues periodically.
The fourth recommendation is related to the necessity of changing
documents and requirements, altering organizational forms and working
processes, and how current incentive structures will be affected. All these
issues will be influenced by an implementation of the Gas Directive. The work
has briefly discussed these issues, but due to the many uncertainties no
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detailed assessments are conducted or recommendations given. The work has
however indicated that a majority of the documents assessed in this work must
be revised and updated to reflect the new requirements caused by
liberalization. It is recommended here that the governing documents more
clearly specify which new responsibilities the independent transportation
system operator shall be assigned. A vital area of concern is how the
transportation system operator and the shippers’ and sellers’ dispatching
representatives shall communicate and perform their duties in the future. To
day these functions are highly integrated, but liberalization will make them
counterparts.
Further, a detailed specification of the future working processes for the
independent transportation system operator must be clarified. This applies
especially for the how to optimize the operations in a liberalized context. New
and carefully designed incentives are needed for enhancing optimal usage of
the network during capacity constraints.
The last recommendation regards allocative and dynamic efficiency in a
liberalized context. In the prevailing regime the individual company acts
normally both as shipper and pipeline system owner. This regime ensures
proper incentives for cost efficient development of new capacity and cost
efficient operations and this regime may continue to exist in a liberalized
context. This regime will continue to create proper incentives for allocative
and dynamic efficiently in a liberalized context as well.
Further, in order to enhance allocative and dynamic efficiency on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf a centralized planning and development system
must be in force in order to secure resource management and utilization of the
significant conditions for economy of scale. The transportation system
operator must have a close liaison with these functions in order to share
information about operational experiences, capacity constraints and shadow
prices on capacity of constraints.
Finally, the work has provided several observations that show how a
systems approach is quite attractive for finding solutions to complex and
multidisciplinary problems as considered in this work. The systems approach
applied here consists of two engineering processes comprising well-defined
activities. These activities comprise assessment of information, definition of
effectiveness measures and creation of information models. Trade-offs are
identified between contradicting requirements and the outcome of the
processes is accurate descriptions of the systems operations in the prevailing
context and to some extent also in a future context. The systems engineering
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processes have included several methodologies to solve specific tasks. Several
analyses based on economic and technical theories are included, as imperative
activities required for solving the problems.
The ultimate results of a systems approach are solutions that go beyond
traditional and non-disciplinary approaches. This is particularly true if the
objective is to find concrete and sound solutions applicable in a “real-world”
context where specific stakeholders’ needs and legal requirements are present
and well defined. Several observations are provided in the work showing how
economic analyses are improved by combining them with technical theory,
empirical data, operational experiences and last but not least: legal
requirements.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The European Union (EU) approved the Gas Directive on the 11th of
May, 1998, for member states to introduce and implement through their
national legislation by summer of the year 2000. 2 The directive suggests a
new regulatory regime, which could influence the natural gas industry in any
of a number of different ways. 3 It is not immediately clear to the industry
stakeholders how to interpret and implement the directive4, as its elements are
open to a wide variety of interpretations and subsequent compliance measures.
For some time now stakeholders have focused on research and strategic
considerations in order to prepare for uncertain changes to come.
Norway is a major supplier of natural gas to Europe, and Norwegian gas
sellers have signed a number of gas sales contracts with foreign customers. In
light of these contracts, the Norwegian market share is expected to increase in
all Norwegian natural gas markets in the years to come (for example, in
Germany and France, Norwegian gas market shares are forecast to grow from
17% and 29% in 1996 to 28% and 37%, respectively, by year 2005). 5 The
agreements specify how the parties involved share the significant financial
business risks inherent in natural gas production, transportation and sales. One
main provision is the “take or pay” (TOP) clause, specifying the sellers’ long-
term delivery commitments and the buyers’ paying obligations. Such
arrangements make the sellers and buyers largely and mutually dependent
upon one another. 6
The only feasible way to transport natural gas from the Norwegian
Continental Shelf (NCS) to customers in Europe is through subsea pipeline
systems. For the last 24 years, transportation system owners have been
developing and constructing a transportation network that will soon comprise
approximately 5500 km of pipelines. Pipeline diameters range typically from
28 to 42 inches in diameter 7 and maximum internal working pressure is
limited to approximately 190 bar. By October 2000 the last of the current
                                          
2 Norwegian White Paper  46 (1997-98)
3 Reference to Gundersen (1999), Statoil at GTS in Haugesund, Norway
4 Such views are expressed by some authors; see, for example, J. P. Stern (1998)
5 Source: Statoil; see also Appendix 11.1 and the Fact Sheet (1999)
6 See Brautaset et al. (1998)
7 Fact Sheet (1999) and St.prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001).
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major transportation system was on stream. 8 Statoil operates approximately
90% of the Norwegian natural gas transportation system. The transportation
system operator has predicted that in the years to come, the technical
operations of this network will become increasingly complex. 9
One cardinal question is how the Gas Directive influences Norwegian
natural 10 gas transport operations. Little available research focuses on this
issue, and limited documentation exists clarifying the potential impact or
suggesting new business possibilities. 11 A recently issued Norwegian White
Paper 12 emphasizes the importance of having operators on the NCS engaged
in activities to better utilize the total natural gas transportation and production
systems. One such activity is the present research program. 13
The main objective of this research is to explore the new regulatory
regime, suggest, and then test some approaches to align future operations with
new requirements. This task requires first an assessment of the current regime
in order to obtain an accurate description and understanding of current
operations. The next step is to scrutinize new regimes, derive some plausible
requirements for change, and identify those adjustments in current operations
that would be called for. The adjustments must comply with sound economic
and technical requirements.
This work addresses Norwegian national interests overall and does not
pertain directly to any individual stakeholders’ preferences. It therefore
suggests actions to optimize Norwegian natural gas operations as a whole
without seeking near-optimal solutions for any individual stakeholder of this
industry. The work, however does employ Statoil operations as its object for
the analyses conducted. The dissertation investigates ways to cope with
changes forced by new legislation. It provides a systematic approach to
analyze, consider and discuss these topics based on systems theory, economic
and technical theories.
                                          
8 Source: Statoil, see Appendix 11.2 for a schematic of the systems
9 Fact sheet (1998) and information from Statoil
10 Throughout this work the entire natural gas transportation system is subject for analyses.
However, in order to simplify the discussions and the modelling work, several parts of the
work has limited the analyses to the dry gas system only.
11 See Dahl (1999-B)
12 White Paper 46 (1997-98), page 34
13 The author’s doctoral program was initiated by Statoil in 1997.
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1.2 Main hypothesis
The main hypothesis tested in this dissertation is:
“It is possible to operate future Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems at a level that is approximately optimal, technically and economically,
with major stakeholders duly attending to requirements specified in the
Norwegian statutory framework and in the implemented “Gas Directive.”
The main hypothesis emphasizes the importance of multidisciplinary
understanding and skills. It proposes that all major conditions for future
transport operations must be analyzed and all systems requirements derived
from technical, economic, and legislative needs must be identified,
understood, and adhered to by all stakeholders. Included here is the
assumption that the Gas Directive will affect future operations, necessitating
actions to maintain optimal profits and a technically sound, adequate
operation.
The academic definition of “a level that is approximately optimal,
technically and economically”, as applied in this dissertation, is an operation
that satisfies three conditions:
· Optimization of the of the pipeline network’s physical utilization, based
on the theory of fluidmechanics and thermodynamics.
· Optimization of economic considerations, based on microeconomic
theory and economic theory for regulating natural monopolies.
· Identification of and response to all stakeholders’ major needs and
systems requirements, based on systems engineering theory.
In Norwegian natural gas transportation agreements and gas sales
agreements, the term “reasonable and prudent” describes an optimal
operation. 14 The term, defined below, must be understood to describe the
industry’s best practice. However, the current definition does not offer an
adequate (a priori) measure for defining an optimal level of operations since
the definition is ambiguous and difficult to test in an academic sense.
"Reasonable and prudent” when used to describe the standard of care
to be exercised by a Party in performing its obligations hereunder shall mean
that degree of diligence, prudence and foresight reasonably and ordinarily
exercised by experienced operators engaged in the same line of business
                                          
14 Source: Statoil
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under the same or similar circumstances and conditions having due
consideration to the interests of the other Party.
A “Party” in this context refers to any of the following major
stakeholders: gas buyers, gas sellers, shippers, transportation system owners,
or transportation system operators. “Reasonable and prudent” transport
operations shall optimize utilization of the transportation system in a cost-
effective manner with high regularity, giving priority to safety in order to
protect life, health, environment, and property. 14
The present dissertation faces the challenge of balancing the different
objectives of the work to develop models and methods that are approved at a
high academic level. At the same time, the industry being subject to this
research must understand and recognize the models and methods and
acknowledge their validity in practice.
In the main hypothesis, the word approximate underpins the assumption
that no single optimal operating condition is believed to exist, but rather a set
of alternative operating solutions, each improving or worsening the probability
of attaining a given stakeholder preference. An approximate or near-optimal
solution must therefore be based on trade-offs between alternatives. 15 The
near-optimal solution may also be a rule of conduct found satisfactory by a
given stakeholder, without necessarily considering all possible alternatives and
choosing the best, a task simply impossible. 16
The research and test cases are complicated by the fact that
implementation of the Gas Directive is still pending in Norway. 17 The
outcome of the implementation process as well as possible industry response
remain open questions. 18 A vast diversity of outcomes are possible in
European industry, so the present research has had to choose among the most
probable options. Research issues have been selected, therefore, and test cases
designed to minimize uncertainties. The dissertation aims thus to provide
some answers to essential questions concerning the liberalization process
currently under way in the European natural gas industry.
1.3 Disposition
The dissertation comprises nine main sections. The first presents the
background of the work and the main hypothesis. The second gives a short
                                          
15 See Bahill & Dean, (1996) and Oliver et al. (1997)
16 This rule of conduct is called satisficing according to Black (1997)
17 As per February 2001.
18 Stern (1998)
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review of relevant literature and identifies the need for the present research.
The third section identifies and elaborates on the scientific theories applied.
The forth applies the systems approach principles and develops two systems
engineering processes and the sub-hypotheses of this work. The fifth assesses
the prevailing regulatory regime. The sixth assesses regulatory regimes in
transition elsewhere in the world. The seventh section derives on regulatory
and operational consequences for Norwegian operations. The section develops
test case scenarios and new methods for handling new operational modes and
modifies information models and effectiveness measures. The eighth section
discusses results and the ninth section offers some overall conclusions.
1.4 Definitions
In order to ease the reading of the thesis an illustration is provided in
Figure 1 below. The figure defines and displays several of the institutional
issues discussed in the work and it indicates how these issues are related. This
figure will be referred to at several occasions throughout the work.
Figure 1.  Definition of the institutional structure of the Norwegian natural
gas industry
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2 Status of recent research and work objectives
2.1 The problem statement
This Section aims to answer the following four questions 19 pertinent the
future Norwegian natural gas transport operations:
· What is the problem?
· Why is this problem important?
· What have others done?
· What must be done?
In Section 1 the answer to the first question above was briefly
identified. The problem can be summarized as follows: If we assume that the
Gas Directive will be implemented into the Norwegian legislation, some new
requirements will be enforced on how to conduct the Norwegian natural gas
transport operations. The core problem identified in this work is thus first to
identify these new requirements of change and secondly to find solutions on
how to implement the new requirements so that the future operations comply
with the Gas Directive.
A specific condition yielding for the latter problem is that the solutions
suggested shall be feasible and appropriate in such a way that they may be
implemented realistically in a “real world” context. This requirement means
that the solutions identified must be compatible with the specific technical
characteristics of the Norwegian pipeline systems. The solutions will also be
constrained by the prevailing legal regime to a large extent as many of the
existing legal and institutional requirements and political objectives as well as
stakeholders’ agreements, likely remain unchanged – or stakeholders will at
least seek to keep them unchanged.
This constraint to the solutions domain is based on the assumption that
the stakeholders will adjust to the forces of change “one step at the time” and
not jump into dramatic and paradigmatic changes unnecessarily or
unmotivated. Another way of putting it is that the solutions suggested here
should be minimum solutions for fulfilling the Gas Directive and these
solutions should cause the least distortions possible into the existing regime. A
core concern is that the prevailing regime has been carefully designed and it
                                          
19 Professor Jon Steinar Gudmundsson at NTNU specified this definition of a problem
statement.
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functions satisfactorily and it yields good results. These facts make the
stakeholders reluctant to change the system unless it is deemed necessary.
Of course, it can be of interest to open up the research domain in such a
way that all possible and thinkable solutions for how to comply with the Gas
Directive are studied given that the existing legal framework can be altered
unconstrained and quite substantially. In this work such research scenarios
may be identified to some extent. It will not be a prime priority however to
conduct in-depth analyses of any specific issue if it can be verified that the
outcome of the analysis or any condition for its solution will alter the
legislative requirements paradigmatically and unrealistically. Nor will such
analyses be conducted if the outcome evidently contradicts a specific technical
and legal requirement that has to be obeyed.
The author recognizes that it may be difficult to make such distinctions
as described above especially because there are many uncertainties related to
how the Norwegian authorities will actually implement the Gas Directive into
the Norwegian law.
Why is it important to identify how to implement the Gas Directive into
Norwegian natural gas transport operations? Again, in Section 1 this question
was partly addressed and it was stated that it is important to optimize the
Norwegian production of oil and gas. The transportation system plays a
crucial part as a means to enhance the resource management on the NCS and
any changes in how to conduct the operations of the transportation systems
may inevitably affect the resource management.
Further, new requirements will probably affect the organization
structures, incentive structures and the working processes in different ways.
The current organization is complex and comprises many stakeholders. The
working processes are based on many formal documents and requirements and
changes to be introduced must be carefully designed to prevent adverse effects
from occurring.
Having now identified the problem and having argued that the problem
is important, the next question is to study what others have done to solve it.
This is the topic of the next two sub-sections.
2.2 Status of recent research
It is a broad and comprehensive scientific knowledge base available
regarding the regulation and organization of natural monopolies and public
utility industries in particular. For some decades now these industries have
been de-regulated or liberalized in many regions of world. This fact has
triggered research activities and policy studies at many universities and
research institutions. As the research has advanced relevant courses and
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textbooks have been developed, and journals, papers and conference
proceedings are many.
The literature identified here is particularly relevant in a Norwegian
context. The more general type of relevant literature and the literature
comprising the basic theories are referred to in the proceeding text where
appropriate. The references below are organized into three major fields being
legal, economic and technical issues respectively.
Legal aspects
· Brautaset et al. (1998) offer a comprehensive and descriptive
assessment of the Norwegian gas sales arrangement. This work includes
descriptions and assessments of such topics as the gas sales contracts,
the Gas Negotiation Committee (GFU) and the Gas Supply Committee
(FU) and related issues. This work offers useful information and
background knowledge and it is often referred to in this work.
· Nielsen (1999) offers a descriptive assessment of the Norwegian
Transportation Agreements and this work provides useful insights into
important aspects such as the tariff and toll formulas.
· Dyrland et al. (2000) offer a descriptive and useful assessment of the
Gas Directive.
Economic aspects
· Bjørkvoll (1994) offers a doctoral thesis dealing with costs, the setting
of tariffs and the determining of investments in the offshore natural gas
pipeline industry. One important goal of his work is to find an optimal
level of investment in pipeline capacity under different situations. The
focus of Bjørkvoll’s work is different from the present research, as the
former work to a large extent is occupying itself with investment
decisions, while this work primarily is focusing on the operational
aspects of existing systems. Bjørkvoll’s work identifies some useful and
essential technical equations related to gas transportation. Bjørkvoll’s
work does not focus on empirical data and legal aspects or on the
special implications caused by integrated systems and operations.
· Bjørkvoll (1996) offers a review and analysis of different tariff and toll
regimes again with an optimal investment decision in mind. This work
provides a useful overview of these formulas and the different tariff
notions and it offers some interesting discussions on the topic.
· Brottemsmo et al. (1993) offer a study of how pipeline and processing
tariffs are influencing on issues such as exploration, timing of
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development, transportation alternatives and so on. They discuss the
basic notions applicable in this field such as monopolistic tariffs and
sub-optimal adaptation by stakeholders. The work applies some very
few empirical data from the transportation systems, but does not address
operational and technical aspects.
· Brottemsmo (1994-A and 1994-B) discuss whether the joint venture in
field licensees is beneficial to the infrastructure provisions and related
topics. Brottemsmo has developed an analytical approach that has been
adapted to some extent in the present work in order to discuss some
similar, but different problems.
· Nese (1998) offers a study regarding pricing of natural gas
transportation in a Norwegian context. One ultimate goal of Nese’s
work is to suggest some auctioning principles for allocation of scarce
capacity. This author has carefully assessed these principles and
evaluated their usefulness in light of technical considerations and
physical constraints. Nese’s work presents a brief overview of some
European and Norwegian institutional aspects but offers no in-depth
analyses of legal, operational and technical issues relevant for the
discussion.
Some few other publications of particular interest must also be
mentioned.
· Mansell et al. (1995) offer a particularly relevant book and it is based
on the Canadian experience. This book applies experiences, empirical
data and industry knowledge for assessing many issues that are relevant
for the present research. Such issues are cost evaluations, the
applicability and usefulness of different tariff and toll regimes under
given situations, allocation of costs and much more. This book focuses
less on analytical theory but is mostly descriptive by nature.
· Armstrong et al. (1994) offer a fairly theoretical approach assessing
different tariff and toll formulas and notions. The authors apply the
British experiences in the utilities as reference cases.
· IEA study report (1994) offers a useful overview of the different
regulatory regimes around the world as well as a detailed overview and
assessment of different tariff and toll notions.
· Hope (2000) offers a comprehensive collection of research reports
basically from a related industry, namely the power industry in Norway.
Hammer (1999) offers a legal research of the same Norwegian industry
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and market. There are many similarities when it comes to the theoretical
and conceptual notions.
The last issue discussed here – for the sake of completeness – are two
particularly relevant documents dealing with systems thinking, systems
engineering processes and information modelling in particular.
· Oliver et al. (1997) offer a textbook on the issue of engineering
complex systems and information modelling. This book comprises a
foundation for the systems approach of this work. The systems
engineering processes conducted here follow largely the conceptual
thinking of Oliver et al.
· Purves et al. (1998) summarize the conceptual approach of information
modelling in particular. The information modelling conducted in this
research follows largely the principles discussed in Purves et al’s work.
2.3 Discussion of recent research
Even though there is a rich literature related to regulation of utility
industries in general and for specific regions as well, limited research exists on
the regulation of the Norwegian natural gas industries in particular. This lack
of research is especially observable in four dimensions.
· First, quite limited research is conducted analyzing how the industry
must respond in order to comply with the EU’s Gas Directive. This
statement is specifically true regarding Norwegian natural gas transport
operations and very little research is available clarifying how to change
the operations in order to meet future requirements.
· Secondly, the research conducted on regulatory issues is often based on
economic considerations alone and there is little research available
combining economic analyses with operational and technical
knowledge from the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems.
· Thirdly, a complex legal setting governs Norwegian natural gas
transport operations and many stakeholders are involved. Very little
research is available combining legal aspects and economic and
technical analyses in order to derive comprehensive, relevant and
adequate solutions to the problems identified.
· Lastly, little research is available combining analytical discussions with
relevant empirical data.
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The Norwegian natural gas transportation systems are installed sub-sea,
they are highly pressurized and run over very long distances and they are
physically highly integrated. This leads to the observation that many
experiences from elsewhere may prove inadequate or less relevant for the
Norwegian system operations.
Based on the observations listed above several objectives for the present
research can be stated in order to fill the gap in knowledge. These objectives
constitute the research objectives for this work and they are described in the
next sub-section.
2.4 Objectives of present research
Based on the literature assessment above and the status and discussion
of recent research in this field, some few but essential objectives and
constraints are defined for this work as follows:
Legal foundation
· The dissertation shall be based on and be constrained by the Norwegian
legislative framework, including the potentially implemented Gas
Directive.
· The work shall analyze how to change natural gas transport operations
from a Norwegian national point of view and not narrow the analysis to
individual or specific company preferences.
Conduct of work
· The dissertation shall conduct the work in a recognizably systematic
manner. A systematic approach shall be applied to assess the current
and future regimes and to derive and test new methods, operational
modes and solutions in order to secure consistency among solutions and
trade-offs between contradicting requirements.
Main objectives
· The work shall identify and assess the main economic principles of
regulatory regimes in transition – in theory and by assessing
experiences from selected and relevant countries.
· The dissertation shall identify and analyze the potential impact of the
Gas Directive on Norwegian natural gas transport operations and
requirements of change caused by the Gas Directive shall be identified
and inferred.
· Based on the economic principles, the results of the assessment of
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regulatory regimes in transition, and identified requirements of the Gas
Directive, the dissertation shall analyze and infer new operational
modes for the future Norwegian natural gas transport operations.
· In order to comply with the new operational modes solutions shall be
suggested for how to change the transport operations. Such suggested
solutions will typically comprise legal and documental changes, new
transportation services, revised and new tariff and toll regimes,
organizational implications, amended working processes and incentive
structures.
· The dissertation aims to distribute general knowledge and research
results to the oil and gas industry, and to authorities and research
institutes in Norway and abroad.
Empirical data
· The work shall apply operational experiences from the Statoil-operated
pipeline network in the North Sea as its empirical background material.
· The work shall apply typical and representative empirical physical data
from the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems, to the extent
such data are available in the public domain. If proprietary data must be
applied the data shall be made anonymous and they shall normally not
be published.
Solutions shall be realistic and be adaptable to “real world” problems
· The suggested solutions shall be constrained in such a way that they are
verified to be technically and economic feasible and sound and
compatible with the legal framework assumed to exist in a Norwegian
liberalized context.
The latter constraint follows from the discussion in Section 2.1 above.
The next step is now to derive some main scientific assumptions that shall
govern the work.
2.5 Scientific assumptions
In order to conduct the work some basic assumptions are made. The
major scientific fields drawn upon by this work are defined as well and
referred to collectively as the master strategic approach as shown in Table 1
below.  The main principles on which the strategic assumptions and
constraints are based upon are, to some degree, discussed in the “INCOSE’99”
paper.
Status of recent research and work objectives
        13
 Table 1. The master strategic approach
ID Basic assumptions, strategies and constraints of the
dissertation work
Related
papers 20
A.1 The academic fields of engineering, economics, and
Norwegian law are most significant for analyzing the
work, which is based on these fields.
INCOSE’
1999
A.2 The work of identifying future Norwegian natural gas
transport operations can be organized into a systematic
set of hypotheses and research activities.
Disser-
tation
A.3 A systems approach can be developed encompassing two
systems engineering processes. The first process assesses
transport operations in the current regulatory regime
while the second process assesses operations in a
possible future regulatory regime. These processes
provide a systematic framework and enable the
suggested solutions to be validated as consistent with the
“real world.”
INCOSE’
1999
INCOSE’
2000
A.4 The commercially available systems engineering
computer program “RDD 100” adequately facilitates the
systems engineering processes and the information
modelling in practical manners.
INCOSE’
2000
Based on the “scientific assumptions”, the work applies different
scientific theories to accomplish the goals, in an integrated and well-balanced
manner. The work does not however aim to develop new incremental
scientific theories within the academic fields applied. The scientific
contribution of this dissertation consists of methods and ways the different
scientific fields are mutually applied in order to find solutions to the specified
problems.
2.6 Test cases for the work
During the initial stage of the work, some test-case scenarios were
suggested. The proceeding work shall validate the test cases or adjusted them
as deemed necessary. The test scenarios provide the work with relevant
problem descriptions and act as test cases for the models and methods
developed. Two test-case scenarios are identified below:
                                          
20 The present dissertation together with papers specified here, documents all relevant
research and results of the work. Please note that some degree of overlap exists between the
text in the dissertation and the papers.
Status of recent research and work objectives
        14
· Scenario 1: The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible means to
include short-term sales agreements in addition to the existing take or
pay agreements, taking into consideration the effect of possibly varying
natural gas market prices.
· Scenario 2: The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible means to
incorporate access of “third party shippers” in the transportation system.
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3 Theoretical foundation and research domain
3.1 Introduction
The work has a multidisciplinary nature and it applies theories from
different scientific fields. The scientific field first reviewed in this section is
systems theory. Systems theory provides a systematic framework for the
activities and it outlines rules for how to specify complex systems
unambiguously. The systems engineering processes and the information
modelling are essential features and the generics of these features are
reviewed.
The next part of the section recaptures the main elements of the theory
of fluidmechanics and thermodynamics applicable for calculation of gas flow
and compressor work. The work briefly reviews the Weymouth’s flow
equation and related theory.
Classic microeconomic theory, based on market economy, comprises
the economic foundation for the legislative provisions of Norwegian
regulation of natural gas transportation. The work reviews relevant elements
of the microeconomic theory. The work also reviews the economic principles
of new regulatory regimes, later utilized in the work, when new operational
modes are suggested for the Norwegian transport operations.
3.2 Systems theory
3.2.1 Development of systems theory
According to Blanchard, 21 the evolution of systemology (the science of
systems) can be traced back through an examination of cybernetics. Later a
broader unifying concept of general systems theory was defined. Norbert
Wiener first used the word “cybernetics”, coming from Greek and meaning
“steersman”, in 1947. Cybernetics deals with self-regulation both in a narrow
view such as servo theory in engineering or in a broader view encompassing
much of natural science. The concept of feedback is central to cybernetics
theory. Feedback is also central to all goal-seeking behavior, which is
controlled by correcting information regarding deviation from a desired state.
The science of cybernetics has contributed to the area of regulation and
control by stressing the concept of information flow as a distinct system
component, distinguishing between activating power and the information
signal and given feedback mathematical expression.
                                          
21 See Blanchard et al. (1990)
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The phrase “general systems theory” was first used around 1950. 22 The
idea was to find and describe basic principles common to all systems that went
beyond the concepts of cybernetics and self-regulation. General systems
theory is concerned with the development a systematic framework for
describing general relationships in natural and man-made systems. System
theory aims to bridge the communication gap between various disciplines and
different scientific methods. These communication difficulties can be
experienced between various disciplines, for example between the physical
sciences and the life sciences. 23 Efforts were made to develop a common
ground for interdisciplinary relationships and unified scientific principles for
analyzing complex systems. The concept of hierarchy of levels was developed
and the concept led to a systematic approach of defining systems with broad
applications.
Throughout the subsequent evolution of systemology other expressions
were applied, such as reductionism, mechanism and expansionism. 24
Reductionism consists of the idea that everything can be decomposed or be
disassembled into simple parts. The deterministic view of mechanism was that
effects are completely determined by causes. Expansionism focuses on the
whole of which everything is a part.
Later, the systems approach has been developed as a way of thinking to
cover the observation that despite the fact that each part is performing as well
as possible, the system as a whole is not performing as well as possible. A
systems approach seeks to overcome the often-observed predisposition to
perfect details and ignore system outcomes. The properties of the systems
outcomes are often called the systems’ emergent properties and emergent
properties depend on interactions between components comprising the
system.25
3.2.2 Development of systems engineering
The science of systems, World War II production experience, the US
Air Force nuclear missiles programs and the efforts of the US Department of
Defense in systems engineering education and standardization contributed to
the development of the systems engineering discipline in the USA. 26 Systems
                                          
22 By Ludwig von Bertalanffy according to Blanchard et al. (1990)
23 These type of challenges are also discussed in more recent work, as for example papers
discussing innovation, science and technology policy such as by Rosenberg (1991) and
Rosenberg (1994).   
24 Blanchard et a. (1990)
25 Stevens et al. (1998)
26 Malcolm (1993) and INCOSE (1998)
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engineering as a discipline has experienced both a rise and decline throughout
the last 35 years. The discipline has been shaped and influenced by different
events such as governmental funding for military missile development,
commercial company needs in a competitive climate and a general recognition
that many complex systems often failed or become very expensive to develop.
In the late 1980s and in the 1990s systems engineering has had a
revival. In 1990, an International Counsel on Systems Engineering (INCOSE)
was founded 27 and an increasing number of universities are offering systems
engineering courses and education. 28 During the 1990’s, systems engineering
activities have been supported by a number of computer programs tailored to
systems engineering applications. Software developers are continuously
improving these programs to incorporate systems engineering computer-aided
programs with other engineering and management specialty tools. 29
In recent years, several books and an increasing number of papers have
been issued on systems engineering and the literature indicates or approaches
in many cases a common understanding of systems engineering. In order to
illustrate the observation some definitions or explanations of “systems
engineering” are compared with each other, based on different books and
publications. As an example of the comparison, INCOSE (1998) defines
systems engineering as “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the
realization of successful systems”, while Stevens et al. (1998) wrote: “Systems
engineering is about creating effective solutions to problems, and managing
the complexity of the resulting developments. At the outset, it is a creative
activity, defining the requirements and the product to be built”. 30
INCOSE has developed a systems engineering handbook, with the
objective of providing a description of the key process activities performed by
systems engineers. 31From this handbook the definition of a “system” is
quoted: “An integrated set of elements to accomplish a defined objective.
These include hardware, software, firmware, people, information, techniques,
facilities, services and other support elements”. This definition is applied in
this work. The same publication specifies system architecture as: “The
arrangement of elements and subsystems and the allocation of functions to
                                          
27 Oliver et al. (1997) and INCOSE (1998)
28 Asbjørnsen (1992)
29 Malcolm (1993).
30 Other examples are Bahil et al. (1996): “Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary
process that ensures that the customer’s needs are satisfied through a system’s entire life
cycle”, or Hitchins et al. (1999): “The structure and ordered creation of a System that
achieves the required Emergent Properties”.
31 A guide is also provided by Hitchins et al. (1999).
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them to meet system requirements”.
One important activity, normally recognized in all systems engineering
literature, is the “systems engineering process”. Many of the activities dealt
with in this work are parts of a systems engineering process and the next sub-
section is thus devoted to explain this process in more detail.
3.2.3 Systems engineering processes
The systems engineering process plays a crucial part when bringing a
complex system into being, 32 but the process is also useful for analyzing
existing systems. In order to bring a complex system into being, many basic
functions must be established such as project management, planning, cost
control, acquisition strategies and so on. There are many different
philosophies to choose among to set up these functions. Normally all large
scale development projects are compiled by several distinctive and common
project actives that can be conceptualized, see the Blanchard et al., Stevens et
al. and Oliver et al. These activities typically consist of: 33
· Identification of stakeholders and their needs (what actually is needed)
· Definition of system requirements
· Design of system architecture
· Component development (design and manufacturing)
· Integration and verification (system testing)
· Installation and validation (acceptance testing)
· Operation
Systems engineering and the “systems engineering processes” are most
active during the three first activities from the list above while project
management covers all actives. Feedback and change control activities are
taking place between all activities. The actual performance of the systems
engineering activities are often referred to as a systems engineering process,
defined as follows: 34 “A logical, systematic process devised to accomplish
system engineering tasks”. The systems engineering process is thus often
applied in connection with creating a new complex system from the very
beginning. The systems engineering process is a main activity that secures a
                                          
32 Blanchard et al. (1990)
33 Stevens et al. (1998), this list is a significant simplification of the many activities
required, however it is useful to indicate where systems engineering efforts are most
dominate during the development of a system.
34 INCOSE (1998)
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successful new project development.
If there is a need to assess an existing system or a part of it, the systems
engineering process is an appropriate approach. 35 “Re-engineering” or
“reverse” engineering are terms used to describe this type of activity. 36 In this
work, two systems engineering processes are carried out. The first is a systems
re-engineering process and the second a systems engineering process. These
processes are defined by the B-activities and the C- activities accordingly, (see
Section 4) and specified as the dissertation’s hypotheses.
3.2.4 Effectiveness measures 37
“Effectiveness measures” are defined in the systems engineering
literature. Oliver et al. suggest that effectiveness measures are “the small
subset of requirements that are so important that the system will fail if they are
not met and will be a huge success if they are met”. Sproles 38 defines
measures of effectiveness (MOE) as “standards against which the capacity of a
solution to meet the needs of a problem may be judged. The standards are
specific properties which any potential solution must exhibit to some extent.
MOEs are independent of any solution and specify neither performance nor
criteria.” The stakeholders are responsible for establishing the effectiveness
measures.
Effectiveness measures are thus not supposed to be quantified directly.
When a given problem shall be solved, different solutions may exhibit
different levels of capabilities of fulfilling the effectiveness measures. The
different solutions must be evaluated and quantified by means of different
economic and technical efficiency criteria.
An example of an effectiveness measure already mentioned is the
requirement that operations shall be “reasonable and prudent” (see Section 1).
This measure is not directly quantifiable and different operational solutions
will yield different quantitative properties if evaluated by technical or
economic efficiency criteria. A given operational mode for example, will
result in a given “mechanical efficiency” related to the ratio of physical flow
output (work) versus energy consumption or a given “rationing efficiency”
related to economic efficient allocation of transport capacity between shippers.
                                          
35 Dahl (2000-A).
36 This is discussed by Oliver et al. (1997)
37 In this work “effectiveness measures” and “measures of effectiveness” are synonyms and
the term is a noun and it expresses a measure of success or is simply a success criteria.
38 Sproles (2000)
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3.2.5 Information models
3.2.5.1 Flow diagrams
Several recent papers and books discuss the concept of information
models and they identify reasons for why to use them. 39 Models can enhance
multidisciplinary communication of ideas and concepts. They can be applied
to check the information for completeness and consistency and as a means to
ease the engineering process by reducing time and efforts expended. All these
reasons are prime objectives of this work.
The concept of Entity-Relationship-Attribute (ERA) information
models has been recognized as one successful approach for several years. 40 In
the Figure 2 below, an ERA model is illustrated showing the basic language
applied.
Figure 2.  Conventional ERA modelling language
The Entity, or the object, identifies the “thing” or “element” of
importance. An entity can be a document such as the Norwegian Petroleum
Act, a physical component like a pipeline or a gas terminal, or an
organizational unit such as the gas dispatchers. According to Purves, 41 an
entity corresponds to a “noun” in the English language. Entities have attributes
and they have relationships to other entities. Relationships define associations
between the entities and correspond to “verbs” in the English language. For
example, a given document specifies a requirement, a dispatcher issues a
request or the pipeline receives natural gas. The entities may also have
attributes. Attribute corresponds to “adjective” in the English language.
Attributes define properties and characteristics of entities. A document’s name
and status are attributes or the intensive and extensive properties of the natural
gas at a given location in the pipeline may be defined as attributes.
                                          
39 See Oliver et al. (1997), Oliver (1999) and Purves et al. (1998).
40 Blanchard et al. (1990)
41 Purves et al. (1998)
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Based on the concept of ERA, different modelling notations are
developed, such as Object Modelling Technique (OMT) or Functional Flow
Block Diagrams (FFBD). Oliver et al. 42 apply both of these notations and
these notations are constituting the base for the modelling applications of this
work.
Further, in complex systems, it is often an advantage to apply several
types of information models, each focusing on different aspects of the system.
Modern systems engineering theory suggests that one possible approach is to
describe the system in four different ways – the four information models. One
may think with this approach as if one should describe the shape of a three-
dimensional object. A single two-dimensional drawing would not suffice; at
least two drawings are required. Similarly, several models are required to
specify a complex system, each model focusing on different aspects of the
system. In this work four different types of information models are created and
the following sub-sections outline the basic principles of these four models.
3.2.5.2 Requirement traceability information model
The first information model is the requirement traceability information
model. The main purpose of the model is to show the flow down from the
initial source documents to the appropriate entities. All requirements must
start somewhere and they must have a purpose. The main purpose of the
model is to create an unambiguous identification, clarification and traceability
between documents, requirements, facilities, personnel, functions and
processes.
The model applies a specific convention or language so that different
entities, relationships and attributes are accurately defined. The main words
used in this work for describing and defining entities are: 43
· Source.  The source documents are of the highest level. These
documents initiate or “trigger” lower levels of documents and
requirements. All source documents belong to the identified
stakeholders.
· Requirement. The requirements are specified and identified
requirements derived from the source documents and lower tiers of
documents.
· Component (and stakeholder). The components are all the physical
parts of the transportation system. Due to the convention of the systems
                                          
42 Oliver et al. (1997)
43 The list presented here is not all inclusive, see the results for a complete list.
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engineering software program applied in this work, stakeholders are
also referred to as “components”. 44
· Interface. The term “interface” identifies different natural gas pipelines.
This word is used due to the convention of the systems engineering
software program applied.
· Itemlink. The term “itemlink” identifies the different flows of natural
gas streams in the pipelines. This word is used due to the convention of
the systems engineering software program applied.
· Function. The word “function” identifies all functions performed by the
stakeholders. Much of the main focus of this work relates to the
functions and processes performed by stakeholders in the current and
the future legislative regimes. An accurate and comprehensive
identification and modelling of functions are thus emphasized
throughout the work.
The words used for relationships are:
· Documents. This word is applied for describing the fact that a source
document documents requirements. Typically source documents require
that the stakeholders concerned must create lower tiers of documents.
· Incorporates. A requirement will typically incorporate lower tiers of
requirements. Such break down of requirements will be conducted
throughout the modelling work as far as is deemed necessary (see next
bullet point). The lowest tier of requirements is referred to as the “leaf-
level” requirements. 45
· Specifies. The leaf-level requirements specify functions. Throughout
this work all leaf-level requirements specify one, and only one,
function. The requirements are broken down into such a detailing level
that the lowest requirement may be characterized as a leaf-level
requirement.  In other words, there is no need to break down a given
requirement any further if the given requirement unambiguously
specifies one and only one function.
· Allocated to. The expression “allocated to” allocates an identified
function to an identified stakeholder. All functions identified are
allocated to stakeholders, and visa versa.
                                          
44 It may be somewhat confusing to allocate the term “component” to “stakeholders”, but
throughout the actual modelling, pre-fixes are used to prevent misunderstandings. For
further details, see the results.
45 RDD-100 User manual (1996), page 228
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Based on this convention and use of words a (relatively) large model is
developed. A systems engineering software program is applied to conduct the
modelling. In Section 5, the results of the work are presented together with
further details pertinent the software program and the modelling work.
3.2.5.3 System architecture information model
According to INCOSE (1998), a system may be broken down into lower
levels of systems and components. The top level is defined as the system and it
consists of “an integrated set of elements to accomplish the defined objective”.
In this work, the top level is “the total Norwegian natural gas system”. The
next level is the subsystem “applied to apparatus, which performs a cleanly
separated function, such as communication, structures or control”. This level
comprises the main facilities, such as terminals and riser platforms.
The next level is the assembly, defined as “an integrated set of
components and/or subassemblies that comprise a defined part of a
subsystem”. These assemblies are the input valves and output valves installed
on each sub-system. The component is defined as “comprised of multiple
parts, a cleanly identified item”. In this work, this level equals the pipeline
segments connecting an input valve and output valve. The lowest level is the
part, defined as “the lowest level of separately identifiable items”. In this
work this level is equal to the physical gas streams flowing in the pipelines.
The architecture information model introduces some additional types of
relationships between entities. These relationships give the architecture
information model its specific features and qualities. The new relationships
are:
· Built from.  The term is used to identify that a higher level component is
built from lower level components.
· Connected to. The term “connected to” is applied to show that the
lowest level component is connected to an interface. In the models
applied here it simply means that the pipelines are connected to either
an input valve or an output valve.
· Contains. The term is applied here to show that the pipeline contains a
stream of natural gas flowing through the pipelines.
3.2.5.4 Behavior information model
Behavior can be abstracted as functions, inputs and outputs to the
functions, ordering of the functions and how inputs trigger functions. The
main purpose of the behavior information model is to order the functions into
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processes. The processes specify the sequence of functions and identify the
individual functions by assigning a unique identity number to the functions.
The model identifies the input and output from the functions. In the case of
this work, only those functions performed by the stakeholders are considered.
Stakeholders conduct their functions in different manners for example as
sequential or concurrent (in parallel) work tasks. The model captures these
properties and it identifies iteration loops, decision trees and trade-off among
different potential options and solutions.
3.2.5.5 Context information model
The last conceptual model is the context information model, also
referred to as the interface model and it identifies interfaces crossing the
system’s boundary. It is considered imperative to clearly define a systems
boundary in the modelling work. As all systems normally interfere with its
surrounding environment, it is important to clarify such interactions. The basic
principle of the context model is to clarify such interactions.
Finally and generally, one should remember that an entity or a
relationship defined, always remains the same. All information is thus
specified only once. The difference between the four information models
consists of which entities and relationships that are viewed. One may think of
the models as different types of “mirrors” or cross-section pictures, viewing
the system from different perspectives or facing angels.
Another feature of the models is the fact that there is coherence between
the models, provided the modelling work is properly done. The models are
“mapped” to one another throughout the modelling process. If an amendment
is introduced into one of the models, a “warning” or a call for amending the
other models will immediately be flagged, ensuring that all changes are dealt
with in a consistent manner and that no “loose ends” are left unsolved.
3.3 Theory of fluidmechanics and thermodynamics
3.3.1 Gas flow equations
In the following sub-sections some relevant parts of the theory of
fluidmechanics and thermodynamics are reproduced in order to specify the
theoretical foundation required to perform technical, commercial and
operational analyses of the transportation network. This theory is required in
order to understand, assess and analyze a number of critical questions. These
questions are related to cost functions, optimizing operations, evaluating
potential measures for profit and revenues; designing potential auctioning
principles, confining regulatory regimes and so on. This theory represents the
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“law of nature” and it constitutes inevitably the foundation governing the
physical operations of the network.
The theory presented here is derived from relevant textbooks and
teaching literature and the compilation of the theory and formulas presented
here is to a large extent derived and collected from the author’s earlier work,
see Dahl (1998-A and -B). 46 The basic sources applied are those listed in the
footnote below. 47
The first topic reviewed is how to calculate flow and input or output
pressures in a given pipeline for a given gas composition. Throughout this
dissertation the typical task is to calculate the value of the one of these three
parameters, given the other two and assuming that all other conditions are
known. In order to do so a simplified flow equation has been derived, known
as the Weymouth’s equation. In the author’s previous work it has been shown
that provided the gas composition is known, as well as the different pipeline
dependant specific parameters, the equation produces results within acceptable
limits for the analyses of this work.
Two particularly difficult tasks are how to calculate the given gas’
deviation from an ideal gas (specified as the Z-factor), and how to calculate
the friction occurring between the gas molecules and the pipeline wall
(specified by the friction factor). The values applied for these parameters are
largely based on empirical data derived from the Statoil operated pipeline
systems in the North Sea. By applying such empirical data and the
Weymouth’s equation it has been shown that results have a tolerance typically
within a range of a few percent from actual true values. In relation to
hypothesis C.5 (see Table 2 on page 61) a further discussion of the accuracy in
calculations is presented.
The Weymouth’s equation is specified as follows:
( ) 5,052221310*44,1
8 ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é -
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
= -
TZLfM
RdPP
P
T
Q
gasSC
SC
SC
p
 (Eq. 3.3.1)
The terms have the following meaning:
                                          
46 Dahl (1998-A, -B)
47 Sjøen (1998), Albrechtsen (1998), Katz et al.(1990), Kotas (1995) and Bjørkvoll (1994).
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QSC  is the throughput (or flow rate), MSm
3/day48
P1 is the pipeline inlet pressure, bar
P2 is the pipeline outlet pressure, bar
d is the pipeline diameter, m
L is the pipeline length, m
Mgas is the molecular weight = 21,38 kg/kmol 
49
T is the ambient temperature of gas = 280 K
TSC is the temperature at standard conditions = 288,15 K
PSC is the pressure at standard conditions = 1,01325 bar
= 1,01325 *105 Pa
R is the gas constant = 8314,34 J/(kmol*K)
The average compressibility factor is calculated by means of the theory
given by Katz et al. The value calculated has been compared, adjusted and
verified by empirical data. The typical value applied throughout the
calculations of this work is:
Z is the average compressibility factor = 0,7
The friction factor f is calculated based on the “AGA method” 50 (see
Katz et al.), 51 by applying the following equations:
e
74,3
log4
1
=
f
(Eq. 3.3.2)
d
e
=e     (Eq. 3.3.3)
Here,
e is the relative pipeline roughness
 e is the absolute pipeline roughness = 10*10-6 m
                                          
48 The correct expression is 
·
Q , but for simplicity the flow is simplified as Q several places
throughout this work. The term Q is usually applied as a term for flow in many agreements.
49 The molecular weight listed here represents a typical “rich” gas. The “dry” gas has
normally a lower molecular weight.
50 American Gas Association.
51 Katz et al. (1990)
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3.3.2 Pipeline inventory calculations
In order to calculate pipeline inventory at standard conditions, the gas
volume at standard conditions must be calculated. At a given ambient
temperature, the gas volume at standard conditions can be calculated
according to the equations below:
Z
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SC **= (Eq. 3.3.4)
Here the terms have the following meaning:
VSC = is the gas volume at standard conditions, MSm
3
VPIPE = is the metric volume of the pipeline, Mm
3
PPIPE = is the average pressure in the pipeline, bar
The average pipeline pressure is calculated according to the following
equation, which is a minor simplification of reality, still providing acceptable
results in relation to the questions discussed here:
2
21 PPPPIPE
+
= (Eq. 3.3.5)
3.3.3 Calculation of compressor work and power
Another important field of interest is to clarify compressor power
requirements needed for transporting the natural gas in the transportation
system. The variable costs are directly linked to the fuel consumption in the
compressor drive motors. Such motors are either gas turbines or electric
motors. These relationships will also clarify marginal costs of transportation as
being the marginal cost function, defined as the derivative of the variable cost
function.
The compressor work can be found based on an isentropic analysis: 52
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52 Katz et al. (1990), p. 260, eq. 6.27b. See also Dahl (1998-B) and Bjørkvoll (1994) page
34.
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As the isentropic analysis disregard irreversibility, the above equation
must be corrected for these losses in order to reflect reality. The compressor
power requirements can thus be found by the following equation:
h
·
· *
= SC
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W (Eq. 3.3.7)
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In the two equations above the terms have the following meaning:
W is the compressor work, J/kg
·
W is the compressor power, W
SCr is the density of the gas at standard conditions, kg/Sm
3
v
p
c
c
=c   is a ratio between specific heat capacities = 1,4, where:
cp,  cv are the specific heat capacities at constant pressure and constant
volume
Ps is the suction pressure at the compressor inlet, bar
SCm
·
is the mass flow at standard conditions, kg/s
h  is the isentropic compressor efficiency = 0.75 (the efficiency also
includes corrections for irreversibilities caused by mechanical
friction etc.) 53
The above equations will provide theoretical values of compressor
power requirements. The efficiency specified is assumed to be an average
efficiency over the entire operation range of the compressor. Further, it is
assumed in all calculations that the compressor is working only as a one-stage
compressor. This assumption may not necessarily reflect reality under all
conditions, especially when the relative difference between the suction
pressure and delivery pressure is high. However, and once more, the results of
                                          
53 Based on Katz et al. (1990), see page 265, figure 6-20.
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the calculations are compared with empirical data, basically applying the
Kollsnes compressor unit as a reference case. By applying the efficiency rate
as indicated, the accuracy of the calculations are shown to be well within what
is needed in relation to this thesis.  Further, some of the calculations done are
verified by using an expert software system provided by MIT Energy
Laboratory with satisfactory results as well as by means of a similar program
developed by Statoil.
The final power requirement is obtained by correcting for
irreversibilities caused by the drives:
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Here the terms have the following meaning:
gth is the gas turbine efficiency = 0.33 
54
elh is the electric motor efficiency = 0.98 
55
3.3.4 Technical efficiency criteria
The last issue to be discussed here is whether it is possible to suggest a
suitable technically based criteria of performance. The objective sought here is
to derive a possible means to measure the performance of the transport
operations in technical terms. From the thermodynamics literature we know
that a simple and much applied criterion is the mechanical efficiency. This
measure is normally formulated in such a manner that the performance of a
given plant (for example a power plant) is specified as the ratio between
mechanical work produced by the plant divided by the energy consumed by
the plant.
In the thermodynamics literature many different efficiency criteria are
defined taken into account the Second Law of thermodynamics in
sophisticated ways. However, as the main task in this work is to suggest how
to optimize transport operations, one feasible approach may be to measure the
                                          
54 See Bjørklund (1994), page 35
55 Kotas (1995), page 205
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ratio of gas volume being transported through a given pipeline at a given
operating mode versus the compressor energy consumed. This “quasi”
efficiency criterion has some similarities with the mechanical efficiency
criteria mentioned above. As the variable costs are directly related to the
energy consumption, this approach will constitute one possible criterion for
energy cost-effective operation.
In mathematical terms such a “quasi” technical efficiency criterion may
be expressed as follows:
·=
W
QSC
techh (Eq. 3.3.12)
3.4 Economic theory
3.4.1 Microeconomic theory of transportation systems
3.4.1.1 The natural monopoly argument
Economists have for a long time considered the utility industries and
related networks as natural monopolies. Joskow and Schmalensee 56 point to
this fact when discussing transmission in connection with electricity utilities.
The IEA (International Energy Agency) natural gas transportation study 57
concludes the same in relation to natural gas transportation. In microeconomic
theory, a monopoly market is by definition a monopoly if there is only one
supplier and this supplier chooses to produce at a price level that is
substantially above that under competitive conditions. Other firms find it
unprofitable or impossible to enter the market and barriers to entry is thus the
source of monopoly power. As pointed out by Nicholson 58, there are two
general types of barriers to entry, technical barriers and legal barriers.
Technical barriers may occur due to the technical nature of an industry and
legal barriers may occur because of regulation or legal requirements.
Economic barriers may exist as well if the industry has large sunk costs.
Natural gas transportation in subsea pipeline networks exhibits technical
barriers since an expansion of capacity results in a reduction of costs per unit
transported. The technology of the transportation system (and in the case of
natural gas; also the distribution systems) 59 exhibits decreasing short-term
                                          
56 Joskow and Schmalensee (1983), page 65.
57 A general description on natural monopoly in natural gas transportation is given by IEA
(1994).
58 Nicolsen (1995)
59 IEA natural gas distribution study (1998)
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average costs and increasing short-term marginal costs over the whole range
of the output levels. The marginal costs are below the average costs within the
entire output level. These economic conditions presuppose that transportation
demand in the short-term is within maximum capacity restrictions of the
transportation system.
The natural monopoly argument is that a transportation system, in
theory, will exercise market power and collect monopoly profit if left
unregulated. The transportation system will seek to maximize its profit at a
throughput level where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. At this given
level of output, the demand curve will specify the transportation toll, which
may be set at a price above average costs. As there are shippers in the
transportation market with a willingness to utilize the system if tolls were set
below the monopoly level but above the marginal cost, welfare loss is
occurring. Monopoly profit (or monopoly rent) is a “super profit” above
ordinary profits based on normal rate of return requirements on investments
undertaken by the transportation system owners.
These economic facts create in theory the technical barrier for potential
competitors. If a competitor attempts to enter the existing market by
constructing a new pipeline, the incumbent transporter will enjoy the
possibility of expanding the output and reduce the toll until it eliminates
potential willingness to construct a new competing pipeline. Another
important contribution to limit competition is the fact that investments in
utility industries are significant sunk cost. If the investor withdraws from the
market, there is no alternative usage of the investments. There is today no
alternative usage of the subsea natural gas transportation system, other than
for the purpose of transporting natural gas.
A last notion here is that the sunk costs are irrelevant for the incumbent
for the question of whether it is profitable to continue operations. For the
newcomer however, they are highly relevant if the newcomer must establish
his own pipeline.
3.4.1.2 Economy of scale and scope
Natural monopolies exercise some specific economic conditions known
as economy of scale and sometimes economy of scope, as pointed out by IEA
(1994). Economies of scale are normally defined as changes in long-run
average cost with an equal proportional change in all input factors. In terms of
natural gas transportation, economy of scale refers to the fact that the average
unit cost for transporting one unit of physical gas is declining as the pipeline
diameter is increasing.
Theoretical foundation and research domain
        32
The definition of a natural monopoly is that the cost function is
subadditive. 60 This means that the cost of production will be minimized if
there is only one firm in the industry. A decreasing average cost function 61
may thus be a sufficient condition for a (single product) natural monopoly.
A condition for economy of scope 62 exists, in general terms, if the same
producer produces more than one output unit from the same production plant
and the cost of producing several units jointly is less than the cost of
producing them separately. In relation to natural gas transportation, economy
of scope exists for example, if a given organization performs several different
transportation related tasks cheaper than having several organization units
performing the tasks individually.
3.4.2 Regulation by public authorities
Public authorities normally regulate public network utilities. The basic
philosophy is that private firms will exercise market power, if left unregulated,
due to the natural monopoly characteristics of the industry. This will cause
consumer welfare loss. In many countries, such as for example Norway, the
traditional regulatory regime has thus specified state ownership, control and
operations in many of the utility sectors such as railways, mail, electricity,
highways and telecommunication. Statutory regulations and state ownership
are quite significant, pertinent to the Norwegian petroleum industry as well, 63
a topic that will be looked into in a later sub-section.
The EEA64 agreement and the Norwegian legislation are basically based
on market economy, and microeconomic theory, 65 normally constitutes an
analytic basis for the regulation. But as discussed above, several parts of the
economy are influenced by strong public regulation and planning. This applies
particularly to those utility industries discussed here, where competition or
contestable markets are believed not to function adequately. The regulatory
principles recognize that the natural gas transportation activity operates under
economy of scale and the regulation seeks to utilize this fact to increase
welfare. The regulation specifies the extent to which pipeline owners can
collect profit based on a given rate of return on the investment. In Sections 5
                                          
60 Nese (1998) and Mansell et al. (1995)
61 This conclusion assumes the following: When throughput increases the capital costs toll
element will be adjusted down as reduced toll, to the benefit of the shipper. Similar
reductions are assumed for the fixed O&M costs.
62 See also Grøn (1996) page 62 and IEA (1994) page 69
63 See Fact Sheet (1999)
64 EEA: The European Economic Area.
65 Sejersted et al. (1995) page 283
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and 7, the current Norwegian regime is scrutinized and discussed in light of
the theory and empirical data.
A strong regulation of the natural gas industry is also prominent in
many countries around the world. The IEA natural gas transportation studies,
as well as several other authors, provide a comprehensive review of the vast
diversity of regulatory regimes in the OECD countries. This literature shows
how the regulatory regimes have evolved in later years as deregulation and
liberalization advance in many countries. Generally, new and modern
regulatory regimes focus on some key issues that are derived from the basic
theory described above. In the following sub-sections, these key notions are
highlighted, together with a graphical and mathematical expression of the
theory.
3.4.3 Economic theory of regimes in transition
3.4.3.1 The liberalization notion 66
The main purpose of the following sub-sections is to identify the major
economic principles and notions that capture the theory behind the
liberalization process currently going on in the European gas market. The
literature on the topic is rich and a number of books, papers and reports are
published in recent years. The synthesis of the economic theory outlined
below is derived from a number of these references as specified in the
footnote.67
                                          
66 In the present work, the term liberalization is used to describe the process that is
currently underway in the European gas market. As noted by Armstrong et al. (1994, p. 99),
deregulation may remove restrictions on competition, but it may also remove regulation
(which does not necessarily enhance competition). Liberalization, to the contrary, is used
here to describe measures aimed only at “opening up for competition,” or for “removal of
restrictions on competition.”
67 A few examples are Kahn (1988), who discusses the theory of economy of regulation in
great detail. Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) contribute to the same discussion, using the
U.S. electricity industry as the subject of their analysis. Another book by Hunt and
Shuttleworth (1996), discusses the same topics, based on the development of recent years in
the electricity industry. Several books and a collection of articles have been published
relating to the Norwegian petroleum and gas industry and its regulation; see, for example,
Bjerkholt et al. (1990) and Golombek and Hoel (1987). A more recent book is Hannesson
(1998); see especially Chapter 3, in which natural gas economics is discussed. Another
particularly interesting book is Mansell and Church (1995), which discusses the Canadian
experience in natural gas pipeline regulations, and their analyses of incentive regulation
within this industry. The U.S. experience is discussed by a number of authors; see, for
example, De Vany and Walls (1994 and 1995), and Jensen (1992). Armstrong et al. (1994)
offer a detailed review of economic theories, supported with a number of examples from
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As was discussed in the previous sub-sections the transportation (and
production) of natural gas possesses natural monopoly characteristics, a
situation that may lead, in theory, to a situation where stakeholders exercise
market power. Such exercise of market power will lead to market failures, as
the market will suffer from ineffective competition. According to economic
theory, such inefficiencies are caused by pricing the gas deliveries at a price
above the sum of marginal cost of production and transportation (including
transmission and distribution).
These relationships are commonly expressed in mathematical and
graphical terms. If we assume that the gas deliveries are bundled and
merchant, i.e. the same company is vertically integrated and undertakes the
sole production, shipping, selling and transportation (which in essence is the
reality today for Norwegian gas sellers), a number of relationships can be
specified. In order to do so several terms and relationships must be defined.
The gas volume sold in the downstream market is termed Q. The total
cost of production and transportation is termed TC(Q) and the average cost is
termed AC(Q) = TC(Q)/Q. The marginal cost of production and transportation
is termed MC(Q) = dTC(Q)/dQ. 68 The average cost is decreasing over the
output range and the marginal cost is increasing, but its numerical value is
significantly lower than average cost, over the whole range of output. The
company’s total revenue is termed TR(Q)= P(Q)*Q. Here P(Q) is the inverse
demand curve. We assume that the demand is elastic and downward sloping.
The company’s profit function can be expressed as shown below.
)()()( QTCQTRQ -=Õ  (Eq. 3.4.1)
The monopolist will exploit the market power and the classic solution is
to maximize the profit at a volume Q* and price P* that satisfy the first-degree
solution; MR(Q) marginal revenue equals marginal costs:
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The elasticity of the market demand, eQ,P can be introduced into the
                                                                                                                     
British experience. See also Hope (2000) and Nese (1998).
68 This expression is a simplification of reality. A precise marginal cost function for
transportation of natural gas in a pipeline system will be developed in Section 7.
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analysis. The elasticity is defined as follows:
Q
P
dP
dQ
e PQ *, =
The solution in (Eq. 3.4.2) can now be written on the well-known form
as follows:
PQeP
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,
*
* 1
-=
-
(Eq. 3.4.3)
This result is known at the inverse-elasticity rule for optimal
price/marginal cost markups. The result can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3
below.
Figure 3.  Economic relationships
A number of core problems can easily be identified by reference to the
figure above.  The long run demand is noted by the line marked D. The
monopoly profit is equal to the rectangle marked a-b-c-d and the welfare loss
is equal to the area b-g-f.
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As noted by Hope, 69 if the monopolist can exercise full price
discrimination, he can reap all consumer surpluses over the MC line and the
optimal output level would be Q at the point f.
Further, by the same monopoly maximization arguments as stated
above, the figure clearly illustrates the incentives for restricting the producer’s
market power in order to improve social welfare. How this can be obtained,
from a theoretical perspective is discussed below. We see that a price equal to
average cost (Pe) will cover the producer’s cost, but the corresponding output
level will still cause welfare loss. A price equal to marginal cost (Pf) will,
according to this theoretical approach, cause no social welfare loss. 70 This
price however, is not sufficient to cover the producer’s fixed costs, i.e. the
investment and fixed operational and maintenance costs, as will be shown
later.
3.4.3.2 Drive for competition
The problem identified above may be characterized as a specific class of
market failure. 71 The market suffers from insufficient competition, due to the
natural monopoly characteristics of the industry. Broadly speaking, there are
two alternative ways of correcting such distortions:
· introduction of regulation (by some means) in order to prevent the
producer from exercising market power
· inducing of more competition - if and where possible.
In a fully competitive market – assuming now that the market was
functioning, and assuming a long-term perspective – the market would be
characterized by dP(Q)/dQ = 0, causing P(Q) = P = MR = MC = AC. In that
case the demand curve would have been a horizontal strait line. The producers
would be price takers and they would have no market power. The elasticity of
market demand would be infinitely elastic (eQ,P = - º) in that case.
Before proceeding any further, one interesting observation regarding
market failure is illustrated in the figure above. In the figure it is shown how
the current European gas market distinguishes itself from a fully competitive
                                          
69 See Hope (2000) page 179
70 If we consider the market as being the continental European gas market, this solution will
cause no welfare loss for continental Europeans. As there is practically speaking no
consumption of natural gas in Norway this solution will however not optimize the profit for
Norwegian producers and it will not cover the producer’s fixed costs.
71 See Armstrong et al (1995)
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market in a short-run perspective. In this market the short-run demand curve
may be illustrated as shown in the figure by the horizontal line marked D’-D’.
Based on the gas sales agreement the customers can nominate different
volumes of gas, but the price is set constant regardless of the volume taken.
The price is also normally set above the average costs and the gas price
is specified as a function of alternative energy prices and not as a result of a
“gas to gas” competition in an elastic gas market. The price remains the same
(from a principle point of view) regardless of the volume delivered to the
customer under the given contract. This pricing principle stays the same
throughout the entire contract period. 72 The price may thus be thought of as
an exogenously given price during the contract period. This situation,
illustrated in the Figure 3 is indicated by setting Pex = MR = demand curve
D’-D’.
We immediately see that the optimal solution for the producer in the
short-run is to set production at Qmax (note: we do not consider the demand
curve marked D-D in this case, as this line refers to the long-run illustration),
which is equal to the systems’ maximum capacity. 73 Or in other words, the
optimal solution for the producer (the seller) is that the customer nominates
full requests according to his rights in the given contract.
The perhaps most interesting question after all, from a consumer point
of view, is whether the pricing mechanism currently applied (prior to the
introduction of the Gas Directive) for negotiating gas prices in the European
market, is appropriate and secures efficient outcomes. The political view in the
EU and answer to this question is an expressed willingness to seek other
options than the prevailing alternative-fuel net-back pricing mechanism.
If we therefore return to the two basic principles for correcting
inefficient markets, the Gas Directive essentially applies both of the (bullet-
point) measures identified above. In theory, and as will be discussed later, the
Gas Directive opens up for competition and it simultaneously regulates the
industry. The key issue to be noted here is that the political position of the Gas
Directive is a view that competition is achievable in the down stream market,
i.e. the “burner tip” market. The natural monopoly activities, to the contrary,
are not believed to be neither competitive nor contestable and therefore subject
to regulation. This principle therefore inevitably calls for regulation of access
to the natural monopolies, being the natural gas transportation activities as
                                          
72 See Brautaset et al. (1998)
73 This conclusion can be show analytically as presented for example by Brottemsmo
(1994-A) see page 17 and figure 3.2.
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well as some few others as defined in the Gas Directive. 74
3.4.3.3 Organizational structures – integration versus separation
The next logical notion of the analytic framework follows as a requisite
or a corollary of the “opening up of the market” provisions and the “regulation
of access” to the transportation system provisions of the Gas Directive. The
notion is that a vertically integrated company may be in a better position in the
downstream competitive market than the rival firms who are not vertically
integrated, but dependent on the vertically company’s transportation services.
There are several reasons for this argument.
The first argument is that the vertically integrated company may
conduct cross-subsidization between internal activities. The adverse effect is
obvious as the company, if allowed, can pass on to competing shippers costs
that have its origin in activities other than those needed to serve the competing
shipper. To overcome this problem, regulatory regimes specify in some way
transparency of accounting or separation of activities.
The second argument is that the vertically integrated company can
benefit from information asymmetry. The vertically integrated company may
have access to information on market and cost, as well as technical and
operational information that is not available to the rival company (or the
regulator – for that matter). The core notion here is that the Gas Directive
requires transparent accounting of the transportation services presumably due
to arguments as stated above. This requirement needs thus to be observed
throughout the course of this work.
3.4.3.4 Symmetry and asymmetry in information
Access to information is a crucial topic for all stakeholders of this
industry. 75 In many cases the choice of a regulatory regime and pricing
principles are founded on a presumption regarding what information is readily
available and what is not. As will be elaborated below, the different options
for tariff and toll rules are all based on different presumptions about
information availability and their individual attractiveness for practical
implementation depends largely (as a viewpoint of the author) on the extent to
which the required information is available.
The information concerned in the context of this work can be organized
                                          
74 Note that Norway and continental Europe may have asymmetric incentives in this case –
at least conceptually as Norwegian interests are basically those of the producers.
75 The very fact that this dissertation starts out with a comprehensive assessment of
information is credited to this recognition.
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into some distinct categories. The first category relates to the cost functions
(i.e. total and marginal costs). Such information is important both in the short-
term perspective as in the long-term perspective. Generally speaking, the
short-term costs are fairly easily obtainable for production and transportation,
based on empirical data. 76 The long-term costs are less available, due to
significant uncertainties of future development on the NCS. These facts may
have bearing on the choice of tariff and toll regimes; to be suggested later.
The next category of information is related to market demand functions
for natural gas throughout the different regions in Europe and the demand for
“stand-alone” transportation services. Accurate information on market demand
functions is imperative in order to apply and utilize several of the economic
optimizing rules listed below. If an unbundling of the merchant function
should develop, new uncertainties will be introduced regarding demand
functions for “stand-alone” transportation services. The market demand
information is uncertain in the long-term perspective as well as in a short-term
perspective. Such uncertainty is caused by the assumption that the market will
develop differently in the future compared to what is has been doing in the
past, due to the introduction and implementation of the Gas Directive. Again,
any “real world” approaches for suggesting new principles for tariff and toll
rules in a Norwegian context must consider such uncertainties when designed.
A third class of information relates to all the technicalities conducted by
the transportation system operator and shippers’ dispatching representatives
for securing pipeline integrity, optimizing operations, performing imbalance
control, utilizing operational flexibility and “line-pack” gas and so on. These
are all features required in order to deliver gas under existing contracts as a
bundled, merchant product with high security, regularity and quality of supply.
In the current regime existing gas sales contracts and transportation
agreements are silent about such features as regards to their details and
separate costs of conduct. The extent to which such features shall be made
transparent and included as separate costs and toll elements must be
considered in the proceeding work.
3.4.4 Economic efficiency criteria
3.4.4.1 Pareto optimal efficiency
In order to quantify different possible solutions by means of economic
analytic measures, a number of economic efficiency criteria are developed and
                                          
76 In Section 5 it has been shown that no significant or major resistance is observed in the
stakeholder group assessed in this work, for releasing such information or making this
information public.
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listed in the literature. 77 This sub-section assesses some often-applied
measures.
One ultimate economic measure is often referred to as Pareto efficient
allocation of resources, defined as: “an allocation of available resources in
which no mutually beneficial trading opportunities are unexploited. That is, an
allocation in which no one person can be made better off without someone
else being made worse off”. 78 Another way of defining according to Mansell
et al. is that “an effective outcome maximizes the sum of producer and
consumer benefits from production and consumption”.
In the literature several authors 79 have pointed out the fact that the
Norwegian natural gas export interests represent almost solely the producer
interests, due to the fact that only a minor portion of the gas is sold
domestically. The corollary is that the gas buying nations to a large extent
represent the consumer interests only. 80 This observation is presumably
clearly understood by the major stakeholders of the industry, a fact that may
have implications when it comes to national and enterprises’ strategy
development of their business. 81 For the cause of this work, the prevailing
national and international legislation is taken as a matter of fact and any tariff
or toll regimes suggested here comply with the Gas Directive and the EU’s
competition law.
The Pareto measure has a quite general nature and other measures may
prove more useful in this context. The economic efficiency criteria ought to be
useful for evaluating the attractiveness of different rules and options for
allocation of costs, allocation of shippers’ access to capacity and so on.
Several such criteria are therefore listed below.
3.4.4.2 Dynamic efficiency
Dynamic efficiency 82 is a measure of a firm’s ability to respond to
changing market demands by producing more and better products and finding
ways of producing at lower cost, see IEA (1994). Another way of putting it is
that innovation and investments in cost reductions are socially efficient.
Due to the nature of this industry, dynamic efficiency is basically a
                                          
77 See, for example, the IEA study reports, Teece (1990), or Mansell and Church (1995).
78 Nicolson (1972)
79 See for example Nese (1998)
80 The key questions typically are the sellers’ concern related to gas price development and
the buyers’ concern related to security of supply. As both parties have undertaken large
“sunk cost” investments they are mutually dependent to a large extent.
81 See Radetzki (1999) for a related discussion.
82 Armstrong et al. (1995) apply the word “productive” efficiency.
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long-term related question due to several reasons of which a few can be
mentioned here. The industry is characterized by large sunk costs. This causes
limited scope for introducing new technology into old systems. If new
technology should be introduced the old must be phased out. It may thus be
more cost effective to operate and utilized the old technology. Further, new
investments are throughput driven. No new investments are done if no more
gas is sold in the market. Finally, new capacity is developed in large
incremental steps. As a consequence of these facts, diffusion of innovation and
technological change will largely take place in connection with development
of new capacity, at least when it comes to the “hardware” components of the
systems. 83
Therefore, and as will be discussed in Sections 5 and 7, a major concern
probably is to design proper incentives for dynamic efficiency into the
nation’s licensing systems and the industry’s planning systems for
development of new capacity on the NCS. This probably is more feasible than
seeking to include strong incentives for dynamic efficiency in the toll regime.
In a liberalized regime, however an important consideration may be
how to finance innovation and technological change. If an independent
transportation system company shall be assigned the sole responsibility for
development of new capacity including research, funding of such activities
must be clarified. Given this situation, one may argue that the toll must cover
the cost of research.
3.4.4.3 Static efficiency
According to Nese, 84 static efficiency may be defined as “an efficient
use of resources at a given market structure and technology”. Based on this
understanding of static efficiency, Nese suggests that two “motivations” are
present for optimal regulation of the Norwegian natural gas transportation
system. The first motivation is to optimize the depletion of Norwegian natural
gas resources. The second motivation is to maximize the profit from the
natural gas export.
In this work, the above expressed motivations are identified as
effectiveness measures and not as economic efficiency criteria as suggested
motivations are very difficult to quantify and measure directly. Actually, and
as will be verified in Section 5, such overall success criteria are fulfilled by
means of conducting a large number of functions and carefully designed
processes. As pointed out by Nese, the toll regime must not have an adverse
                                          
83 See Dahl (1999-A)
84 Nese (1998)
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effect, making it more difficult to succeed and fulfill the effectiveness
measures.
As will be thoroughly discussed in Section 5, a number of effectiveness
measures are stated by the stakeholders and in Section 7, revised effectiveness
measures will be derived based on the liberalization process.
3.4.4.4 Allocative efficiency
According to Mansell et al. 85 allocative efficiency may be defined as
“the quantity of product and services supplied is efficient”. In a broad
perspective this means that all customers who are willing to pay a price equal
to or above marginal cost of production and transportation shall be supplied
with gas. When it comes to transportation services only, the aim is to have
sufficient capacity to serve all shippers with a willingness to pay a toll equal to
or above marginal costs of transportation. Allocative inefficiency exists if this
aim is not met or if there is excess capacity due to lack of willingness to pay
the given toll.
The challenge of obtaining allocative efficiency is largely and basically
a long perspective task. In a Norwegian context, the development of new
transportation capacity has so far been done as an integral part of a production
field development where considerations are given to oil, NGL, natural gas
production and injection. The final need for new capacity is derived by a
comprehensive assessment and planning process. 86
Therefore and similarly as was argued in relation to dynamic efficiency,
the main means for obtaining allocative efficiency in a Norwegian context has
been the planning process rather than any incentive structure provided by the
toll regimes. The basic argument – expressed somewhat simplified – is that the
planing process generally has ensured that there is an overall balance between
production capacity, transportation capacity and sales commitments. Of
course, one question is whether a centralized planning function will persist in
a liberalized setting and if liberalization will speed up the demand for new
capacity faster than actual development of new capacity. Further, terms of
transportation may become increasingly more important for securing
allocative efficient transportation for tail production and for development of
“small” fields.
One theoretical approach for enhancing allocative efficiency is a toll
regime based on long-run marginal costs (LRMC) where the marginal costs
                                          
85 Armstrong et al. (1995), page 13 use the word allocative efficiency to express a
combined view of Pareto allocation and “allocative efficiency”.
86 See the “legal framework,” sub-section 5.3.
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accurately reflects the development of new capacity in a region over a given
time frame. If such information is available this may be a feasible approach, as
the LRMC will inform the shippers of future incremental costs of
transportation. 87
One question is the following: is a toll based on LRMC for
transportation a feasible approach for enhancing allocative efficiency in the
Norwegian context? Again, to answer this question information is required
regarding future developments on the NCS and the procedures to handle future
decision making. Such information is uncertain in both respects, even though a
contradicting argument is that LRMC can be predicted based on historic data.
To sum up one may argue – at least to some extent – that any
calculation of LRMC may be uncertain in a Norwegian context. Allocative
efficiency (as dynamic efficiency) may therefore in a foreseeable future be a
prime objective for the licensing system and any future planning function of
NCS development, rather than the toll regime. The toll regimes however, must
not have any adverse effects on allocative efficiency.
3.4.4.5 Rationing efficiency 88
According to Mansell et al. rationing efficiency measures whether “the
distribution of the services among customers is efficient”. This means that
transportation services are given to those shippers who earn the most by using
the service. The criterion is relevant in a short-run perspective and the
criterion may be quite useful for measuring the efficiency of potential auction
principles as well as capacity allocation and booking rules in general.
3.4.4.6 Cost efficiency
According to IEA and Mansell et al. cost efficiency includes the
concept of providing the services at the lowest possible cost. 89 The efficiency
criterion may also include managerial efficiency. This criterion is relevant in a
short-term perspective when it comes to the variable operational costs as well
as for fixed operational and maintenance costs. The measure also is applicable
in a long-run perspective related to minimizing cost of new capacity.
                                          
87 These principles are applied in the UK’s “network” code according to Madden (1997) at
Financial Times, see page 56. The toll is based on a LRMC evaluation over future 10 years
demands in a given region.
88 Please note for the sake of completeness that the IEA report uses the word “allocative
efficiency” where Mansell et al. use “rationing efficiency”.
89 According to IEA (1994) this is sometimes referred to as technical efficiency.
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3.4.4.7 Efficient product selection 90
The type of services offered is efficient; i.e., the “menu” of services is
differentiated to match the services demanded by shippers. This measure is
relevant in a short-term perspective, even though this type of services likely
will develop over time.
3.4.4.8 Other criteria
Teece 91 lists a number of other quite specific additional criteria. These
are according to Teece, efficiencies that are often improved by vertical
integration of the industry. Information efficiency is related to the information
flow between stakeholders. Operating efficiency relates to operational
information and handling of operational tasks. This topic will be assessed in
Section 7. Transaction efficiency relates to pooling of nominations and
utilizing contractual flexibility, as will be discussed in detail in Section 7.
Efficiency due to credible commitment and supply relates to the political and
economic costs associated with failure to perform.
Several of the efficiencies characterized by Teece are observed in the
prevailing vertically integrated Norwegian system. The introduction of the
Gas Directive may have some adverse effect on some of these issues. Such
adverse effects must be minimized if possible.
3.4.5 Tariff and toll principles
3.4.5.1 Definition of tariff and toll
In this work the term tariff is used to define the conditions of
transportation services. A transportation system owner offers such services to
shippers i.e. the users of the system. The tariff specifies such issues as access
rules, services, terms of service, policies, procedures, and the toll (or rate).
The latter term, toll defines the monetary compensation to be paid by
shippers. In the Canadian literature the term toll is usually applied, while US
industry often uses the term rate.
3.4.5.2 Main objectives of tariff and toll
Some main purposes of the tariff regime – in conceptualized terms – are
to specify the services provided to shippers and to specify the toll applicable
for that specific service. A number of authors, such as Von der Fehr (1996),
Cave and Doyle (1994), Armstrong et al. (1994), Mansell and Church (1995),
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91 Teece (1990)
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the IEA Study (1994) reports, and Hope (2000) discuss these issues
theoretically and practically.92 According to the test cases specified in Section
2.4, and as discussed in Sections 6 and 7, three basic types of new
transportation services are assessed in this work, namely firm services,
interruptible services and peak load services. Each of these services will call
for different toll rules and such toll rules may be founded on different well-
known toll principles. In the following sub-sections these principles are
reviewed and their advantages and disadvantages are identified from a
theoretical point of view.
Based on the list of efficiency measures above, the main ideal
objectives of the toll regime may be conceptualized into the following
requirements:
· The toll shall provide appropriate signals to the shippers regarding the
cost of providing additional capacity. This requirement is derived from
the dynamic- and allocative efficiency criteria.
· The toll shall provide efficient rationing so that existing capacity is used
optimally. The toll structure (supported by the tariff structure and an
efficient product selection) shall be flexible enough to allocate capacity
optimally between shippers, both when there is sufficient capacity and
when there is insufficient capacity. This requirement is derived from the
rationing efficiency (and static efficiency) criteria.
· The toll shall normally provide recovery of costs. 93
· The toll shall provide incentives for cost minimization. This
requirement is derived from the cost efficiency criteria. Cost
minimization shall be conducted during development of new capacity,
i.e. minimizing new investments. Costs minimization shall also be
conducted in day-to-day operations, i.e. minimizing fixed and variable
operations and maintenance costs.
The notion described in the analytic framework below is that the
transportation company shall offer access to any shipper as defined in the Gas
Directive. The shippers’ demand is thus a demand for transportation services.
The services offered are basically “access to the system” in order to transport a
                                          
92 Von der Fehr (1996), Cave and Doyle (1994), Armstrong et al. (1994), and Mansell and
Church (1995). See also the study reports from IEA. Hope (2000) see page 177.
93 This requirement is not necessarily so under all circumstances. For example given some
regulatory regimes and applicable for some national utilities it may be more efficient for
example to cover costs by general taxation.
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specified volume of gas as firm, interruptible or peak load transportation.  The
gas transported in the pipelines always belongs to the shippers and it never
belongs to the transportation system company. The transportation system
company receives and re-delivers the gas at specified entry and exit points.
The transportation company can be organized either as an incumbent
vertically integrated company (with transparent accounts) or as an independent
transportation system company that offers these services as its sole business
entity (sometimes referred to as a “common carrier”). 94
Finally, a number of other considerations and requirements may be
included into the analyses dependent on the type and extent to which
information is available. Some toll regimes may prove to be more feasible and
effective than others. In Section 7 it will be indicated how some of such
additional requirements will rule out some toll regimes, simply because they
may prove to be too complicated to implement in a practical manner or they
may be judged “unfair” or unstable.
3.4.5.3 Marginal cost pricing
Given that the cost and demand functions are known and assuming
some specific ideal conditions, several authors 95 have shown that the optimal
toll based on a pareto allocation criteria is to set the toll equal to marginal cost
of transportation. This solution is referred to as the marginal cost based pricing
rule and it constitutes a “base case” solution. The solution is persistent
regardless of the two organization structures identified above given “ideal”
assumptions of demand and costs functions. 96 The solution is illustrated in the
Figure 3 above and the toll would thus be equal to the price Pf. The toll
formula will simply yield T(Q) = MC(Q). This toll formula is a linear toll
function.
To summarize, 97 marginal cost pricing may secure an efficient
rationing as long as there is sufficient capacity. Short-run marginal cost
(SRMC) gives no rationing efficiency during periods of capacity constraints.
If LRMC is applied it may improve allocative efficiency as it gives signals of
capacity constraints and where to invest. The main caveat to the rule is that it
does not contribute to cover the fixed costs. The rule requires knowledge of
marginal costs of transportation and it will improve on cost efficiency.
                                          
94 See Hope (2000) and Carpenter, Jacoby and Wright (1986)
95 See Von der Fehr (1996) or Bjørkvoll (1996)
96 This topic will be further elaborated in section 7 of the dissertation.
97 See also Nese (1998), page 50
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3.4.5.4 Average cost pricing
Armstrong et al. for example have shown that given the constraint that
the firm (i.e. presupposed here to be a single product form) breaks even the
Pareto optimal allocation and maximizing welfare, is to set toll equal to
average costs. In Figure 3 this is illustrated by setting toll equal to Pe. The toll
formula will yield T(Q) = AC(Q).
The average cost based toll covers cost by definition. It gives no
rationing efficiency during periods of capacity constraints. Average cost
pricing does not enhance allocative efficiency, as it gives no signal of capacity
constraints. The rule requires knowledge of all costs functions related to
transportation. The main caveat to the rule is that in theory it gives no
incentives for cost efficiency and it causes welfare loss.
3.4.5.5 Two-part toll
A two-part toll is an example of a nonlinear toll. The main purpose is to
improve on welfare beyond the possibilities of linear pricing (i.e. a fixed unit
cost). A two-part toll is commonly applied in this industry. A two-part toll
may consist of a fixed charge in order to obtain booking rights for a certain
capacity and a variable part, charged per unit of gas actually transported, in
order to cover variable costs.
Armstrong has shown that this toll regime improves upon a simple
linear toll, constrained by the firm breaking even. The Pareto optimal
allocation will yield a toll formula of the form:
T(Q)=F+t(Q)Q     (Eq. 3.4.4)
Generally, there are two objectives sought by applying this two-part toll
formula. First, the fixed part, F shall be chosen to cover total costs and
secondly, the variable part t(Q)Q shall be set equal to or close to the marginal
cost pricing to ensure an efficient usage of capacity.
The two-part toll may improve rationing efficiency provided
discrimination is possible between shippers. Those shippers who are only
willing to pay marginal costs will not be granted access if a fixed charge is
enforced. The regime will cover all transportation costs provided the fixed
charge is chosen correctly. The regime will improve allocative efficiency as
more price discrimination is provided. If the fixed charge is set differently for
the individual parts of the system the actual costs of these parts are made more
transparent. The regime requires information of the shippers demand functions
and information on transportation costs. The disadvantage is the same as for
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the average cost-pricing regime, it may in theory give poor incentives for cost
efficiency as all fixed costs are covered by the toll.98 It also causes some
welfare loss, albeit less than average cost pricing.
The two-part tariff is a simplified case of non-linear pricing. If perfect
price discrimination was obtainable, in theory, different segments of shippers
could be split into groups according to their willingness to pay toll.
3.4.5.6 Pricing with capacity constraints
As will be discussed in the Section 5, new transportation capacity on the
NCS is developed in large incremental steps based on a centralized planning
procedure. So far, new incremental capacity has normally been introduced
ahead of the enforcement of new sales commitments and the increased
demand. In a liberalized context one may envisage that this situation may
change due to several reasons. The result may be that the demand may exceed
capacity during peak time periods. At such peak time periods demand may
exceed either the total network capacity or local capacity in certain regions of
the network. Such peak periods may consist of short daily peaks or yearly
seasonal fluctuations. 99
The first issue to be studied here is how to handle short daily peak
demands. Somewhat simplified we may say that the aggregated shippers’
demand for transportation services can normally never exceed the physical
production capacity at any time. Obviously, no shipper can sell a given
physical volume of gas if the gas is not produced in the first place. Due to the
harmonization of production and transportation capacities, the aggregated
transportation system capacity will normally always be sufficient to handle all
the produced gas if the routing of gas is optimized purely on physical terms
(and assuming there is a corresponding downstream off-take of the gas).
Another characteristic of the Norwegian natural gas transportation
system is the fact that the transportation system operator is in full control of all
the entry and exit points. All entry and exit points are physically controlled by
a gas flow regulation valve, which means that unlike some other utilities or
downstream networks, 100 no “drainage” of the system will be allowed in such
                                          
98 This may not necessarily be so as the fixed part can be set constant and at a level less
than total cost.
99 See the Canadian experiences discussed in Section 6.3.1 on page 102. In Canada, and
following the liberalization, a significant growth in natural gas production and
transportation has occurred. The pipeline systems have been utilized at a very high level.
100 In the downstream market the consumers may typically take gas or electricity at any rate
they wish, without any direct possibility for the system operator to limit their consumption,
except of eventually completely shutting down a given region of consumers.
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a manner that integrity is jeopardized. Therefore, the rationing task is
important primarily for securing economic rationing efficiency, and has less
importance for securing physical integrity of the systems and operations.
What is quite possible however, is that the given maximum gas
production can be split and routed differently or distributed “unevenly” in the
pipeline system network. This will cause constraints in some parts of the
system and potentially spare capacity in other parts of the system. This fact
leaves the shippers with a possibility to compete for transportation services,
either in one given pipeline or between pipelines.
We now assume that the transportation system operator is acting as an
independent system operator and he receives all the shippers’ requests. The
task is now to rationalize and prioritize the different shippers’ requests so that
an optimal rationing efficiency is obtained. One feasible means is to utilize the
toll regime to do so. A feasible approach is an auction in which the individual
shipper discloses information on his bid.
The rationing task is a quite complex achievement as added value due to
increased transportation in one region of the system simultaneously may cause
losses due to reduced transportation in other regions. Due to the technical
nature of the gas network, several physical and technical threshold-values
exist. If such values are trespassed, only minor incremental deliveries in on
part can cause significant unintended reductions elsewhere. A rationing task
must therefore involve a physical evaluation, optimization and trade-off
between the additional and reduced volumes based on the individual shippers’
information on where to receive and where to deliver the gas. Further, the
rationing task must include and combine information on the individual
shippers’ bid of toll compensation, volume to be shipped and potentially the
duration of the deliveries. The toll function must thus be a function of the
following information received from each individual shipper:
TAuction = maximize f(entry point, exit point, volume, bid price, duration)
In Section 7.5, a tolling regime for peak load toll based on the above
principles is suggested.
A number of other issues must be solved in connection with peak load
pricing. One interesting topic is the relative split between the revenues from
auctions versus revenues from firm and other interruptible tolls. One question
is to what extent the toll received from auctions shall contribute to cover fixed
costs. Auctions are virgin ground in a Norwegian context and the size of
revenues is uncertain. If the revenues are significant, some kind of for
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example (annual) reimbursement principles may be introduced in order to
limit the pipeline system owner’s rate of return at a fixed level. Another
question and uncertainty is to what extent shippers will shift their preferences
from firm transportation to interruptible transportation and the extent to which
there will be constraints.
A second issue to be discussed is whether a feasible toll regime is a
means to deliberately encourage more usage of the system in seasonal off-
peak periods. Traditionally, the Norwegian gas deliveries are higher during the
winter period than the summer period. 101 The general principle is that the
shippers shall be faced with a toll that reflects the shortage price for using the
pipeline system in peak periods as well as in off-peak periods. The latter usage
will typically be provided by means of implementation of interruptible
services.
3.4.5.7 Rate of Return and Cost of Service
Rate of return regulation and costs of service regulations are
refinements of average cost toll and these types of toll regimes are applied
frequently in current regimes. The former regime is applied in the prevailing
Norwegian regime, and the latter is quite common in North America.
These toll regimes will be discussed in detail in Sections 7.4.2.10 on
page 160 and in Section 6.3.4 on page 105, respectively, and no further
discussions are thus provided here.
3.4.5.8 Ramsey pricing
If price discrimination is possible between shippers and the aim is to
optimize welfare, Ramsey pricing is a feasible means. If we presuppose that
demand for transportation is a decreasing function of the toll, welfare is taken
as the weighted sum of consumer surplus and firm profit. Assuming further
that there are no cross-price effects, the rule for optimal price/marginal cost
markups can be written as follows:
iPQi
ii
eP
MCP
,,
*
* 1
-=
-
(Eq. 3.4.5)
Here eQ,P,i is the elasticity of the market demand for transportation
services in market i.
The implication of Ramsey pricing is that the toll shall be set closer to
                                          
101 Source: Statoil
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marginal cost in the elastic market and farther from marginal cost in the
inelastic market. The rule assumes perfect information on the individual
shippers’ demand for transportation services (the individual shippers’
elasticity). Further, the rule assumes that price discrimination between
shippers is acceptable. 102
3.4.5.9 Efficient component  pricing rule
The last toll rule of a generic nature – to be discussed here  – is a rule
known as the Baumol-Willig-rule or the “efficient component pricing rule”, 103
and the rule is applicable in the context of scarce capacity. The rule is often
presented in connection with solving the problem that typically occurs if a
vertically integrated company is obliged to grant access to a third party
shipper – a newcomer. The third party shipper, and his gas, competes in the
same market as the incumbent. If the incumbent accepts to grant access to the
newcomer he will potentially loose some gas sales and corresponding
revenues. The rule thus constitutes an alternative approach to the auction type
of toll regime, provided a fair amount of information is available.
According to Nese (1998), the rule says that an “optimal use of
transportation capacity requires that each user is faced with a price reflecting
the cost in money valued inconvenience that this use is causing for other
agents.”  Another way of saying this is the newcomer shall pay a toll equal to
the marginal cost of transportation plus a compensation for the loss incurred to
the incumbent. The latter is referred to as the opportunity cost or the
incumbent’s profit margin. The formula can be expressed as follows: 104
T = MCt + (P – MCp – MCt)x (Eq. 3.4.6)
Here, the prefixes t and p represent transportation and production,
respectively and x is the displacement ratio of the incumbent’s sale of gas for
the competitor’s sale of gas. x has a value between 0 and 1.
We now assume that both the newcomer and the incumbent compete in
the same market and they obtain the exact same price, P per unit of gas and x
is thus equal to 1. The gas deliveries from the two companies’ are perfect
substitutes in the market. This is a perfectly sound assumption, as the natural
gas in Norwegian pipelines is a commingled gas stream with a number of
individual sources of supply. Further, the cost of transportation is the same
                                          
102 The Author provides further details of the rule in Dahl (1998-C) page 15.
103 See Von der Fehr (1996) and Nese (1998)
104 Nese (1998) page 35.
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regardless of who owns the gas. (Neither the compressor nor the pipeline
“distinguish” between who owns the gas). Therefore, both the incumbent and
the newcomer face the same marginal cost of transportation.
The rule thus implies that the only way for the newcomer to make profit
is to produce his gas at a marginal cost less than what the incumbent does.
This conclusion inevitably leads to the caveat and the shortcoming of the rule,
in the context of Norwegian natural gas transportation. To the extent marginal
costs of production are available, the information is probably proprietary and
not subject for release to the competitors. Further, in many cases, the
production costs may be deemed almost negligible, as much of the gas
produced on the NCS is associated gas derived from the oil production. If such
latter assumptions are made, the rule will give no additional contribution at all.
If however, we assume that the gas price in the downstream market are
differently priced the rule would give priority to the gas with the highest
downstream price. Again, this information is probably not transparent for any
potential regulator who should enforce the pricing rule.
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4 Systems approach application and
methodology
4.1 Development of systems engineering processes for the work
Based on systems theory the first major activity conducted in this
research was to develop two systems engineering processes for the work. The
subsequent steps were to develop sub-hypotheses and order these into the
processes, and to develop and identify the different methodologies that the
research has to apply.
The goal of the first process is to define the existing transport operations
accurately and thoroughly. This process is called as systems re-engineering
process. One should remember that the transportation system being
scrutinized is already built and is operated for many years. The operations
personnel are performing their tasks according to an established organization
model and with operation functions and systems performance defined. This
fact causes significant constrains on the results – or the outcome of the process
– in the sense that the main objective of the re-engineering process is to
describe the existing system as accurately as possible. One may thus
summarize and say that the process is optimizing the description of an existing
system.
The second process provides a systematic approach for analyzing future
conditions and this process is referred to as systems engineering process. It
incorporates and handles the new requirements and the process uses results
obtained in the first process. The second process thus expands the first process
and it seeks to find solutions to the problems identified.
The two systems engineering processes are shown in Figure 5 on page
60. The figure is a functional flow block diagram (FFBD), according to the
conceptual thinking as described by Oliver et al. 105 Figure 5 specifies several
work tasks and each task is formulated as a sub-hypothesis that accomplishes
specific tasks as outlined in the next sub-section.
This figure is thus showing the flow of information as it is developed in
the research work. This figure is thus illustrating how the systems approach is
implemented in a practical manner into the research and how it contributes to
derive and infer overall and consistent solutions to the problems identified.
                                          
105 Oliver et al. (1997). The FFBD concept will be described later in the report.
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4.2 Development of work tasks and hypotheses
The main hypothesis has been decomposed 106 into a number of sub-
hypotheses that are ordered into the systems engineering processes. The sub-
hypotheses cover such work tasks as assessment activities (assess), modelling
development (model), test-case scenario development, method development
(method), test of models and methods (test) and conclusion and discussions
(doc). The sub-hypotheses tested in this dissertation are tabulated in Table 2
on page 61. In the bullet points below some few comments are offered to each
of the different tasks.
· The B.1 and C.1 activities assess available information regarding the
systems requirements, design and operation. This step consists of
documentation review and interviews. Different methodologies are
applied for interviewing stakeholders and for assessing documents.
· The B.2 and C.2 activities consist of defining the effectiveness
measures. These measures specify criteria for successful operations and
system performance. They are derived and inferred from assessment
activities.
· The B.3 and C.6 activities are creation and modification of information
models. The models provide a communication mechanism that specifies
the system and the system operations. A specialized systems
engineering computer tool, called RDD-100 is applied to create these
models.
· The B.4 and C.7 activities indicate the importance of iteration and
feedback in the modelling work. The “trade-offs” performed in the first
process (B.4) are trade-offs required in order to correctly create the
models. In the C.7 activity similar trade-offs are carried out. The C.7
activity however also includes different trade-offs that optimize future
operations based on the new requirements of change.
· The C.3 activity tests the validity of the two test cases defined in
Section 2.6 and it infers essential requirements for future operational
modes. The methodology applied here is simply to summarize the
lessons learned throughout the assessment activities and synthesizing
some main requirements of change.
· The C.4 activity comprises a major activity as it analyzes many
different aspects of future operations based on technical and economic
                                          
106 Systems engineers often apply the term decomposition as an expression for breaking up
(or disaggregating) any aggregated entity into hierarchic tiers of lower level entities.
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theory. The activity is in essence a testing of the hypothesis C.4 and it
suggests solutions for how to operate the Norwegian natural gas
transportation system in the future. New transportation services and new
tariff and toll regimes are developed.
· The C.5 activity verifies and tests that new economic methods for future
operations are compatible with physical and operational considerations
and constraints. A major feature applied is a specialized computer tool
based on linear programming. The particular problem to be solved in
this activity is how to allocate spare and scarce capacity in a rationing
efficient manner and at the same time optimize the physical flow in the
integrated system.
· The B.5 and C.8 activities cover the reporting and discussions and a
simple methodology for aggregation of results are developed.
In order to test the different hypotheses defined in this work several
different methodologies are applied. In the next sub-sections these
methodologies are discussed.
4.3 Methodologies applied in the work
4.3.1 Methodology for literature review
During testing of the hypothesis B.1, simple scientific methods for
qualitative research are applied. King 107 and Ilstad 108 describe such
methodology and the core elements applied are described below.
The first task of the assessment B.1 was to establish an overview of the
relevant literature. (Dahl 1998) 109 created a starting point for the activity. The
documents reviewed comprised Norwegian legislative acts and Royal Decrees,
110 Norwegian White Papers, licensees’ agreements and operating personnel’s
work instructions and procedures. Several other types of written information
were also looked into such as Statoil presentations at various conferences,
internal minutes of meetings, letters and the like. Finally, some few relevant
textbooks, publications, and journals are available in the literature and such
documents were read as well.
Having identified and assessed the written documents, a second task
was to extract the prime information of concern. By doing so, a risk occurred
of loosing important information. To minimize this risk all the interviewees
                                          
107 King et al. (1994)
108 Ilstad (1998)
109 Dahl (1998 -A,-B,-C)
110 Royal Decree No 653 (1997)
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were asked to identify the most essential information for their own needs.
They were also asked to identify – as far as they could – the information being
most important pertinent to other stakeholders. By applying this method,
cross-references were achieved to the information believed to be most
important.
4.3.2 Methodology for interviewing stakeholders
In connection with the B.1 activity a representative group of
interviewees from the stakeholder population had to be select without bias. In
order to do so an inital meeting was held with two of the stakeholders. 111 They
were presented the up coming interview plan and asked to suggest interviewee
candidates. A list of names was suggested and the list was subsequently
presented to three persons mentioned on this list. They were also addressed
with the same question, and a final list of candidates was settled.
Based on this list of names, an interview plan was worked out and seven
persons were interviewed according to the plan. The interview schedule is
enclosed in Appendix 11.3 and a copy of the questionnaire is enclosed in
Appendix 11.4. In order to prevent bias and to obtain traceable and
reproducible information pre-written questionnaires were developed and
applied throughout the interview process. The interviewees got the
questionnaires and background information prior to the interview.
In order to reduce bias in the results and to verify common
understanding, several “cross-reference” types of questions were asked. Some
questions were of a general nature, developed for all interviewees, while other
questions were tailored for specific stakeholder functions. The questions were
designed to gather descriptive data, facts and exploratory information.
Finally, and as an important ethical principle the information was
processed and aggregated into the information models in such a manner that
no traces exist to any individual stakeholders’ answers or views. All answers
are documented in an anonymous manner.
Regarding C.1, the interviews where not as formal as those conducted
during the assessment activity B.1. The interviews conducted were more like a
company presentation followed by a discussion and clarification session.
4.3.3 The systems engineering computer tool
The master strategic approach identifies the necessity of using a systems
engineering computer program, see assumption A.4. One main reason for
applying a computer tool is to run computerized consistency checks on the
                                          
111 Person A and B (names are available for Statoil employees).
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data. A verification of the accuracy of the collected data requires neat and
thorough work. Manual methods will easily create errors when handling such
large amount of interrelated information.
Another significant feature of the systems engineering computer tool is
its capability to support the modelling of information models. Each of the
models specifies and “mirrors” different aspects of the system. It is therefore
important to map the models against one another to verify consistency
between the models. The tool provides easy means for such verification.
According to the “Tools Database” on the INCOSE web site 112 there
are several systems engineering computer tools available in the market. The
author did the first screening of this web site in the fall of 1998. Based on the
information given on the INCOSE web-site several programs would probably
meet the author’s need.
In order to select an appropriate tool some evaluation criteria were
established. The criteria and the results of the evaluation are given in
Appendix 11.5. The most important criterion for the author was easy access to
the supplier and its support function. This argument was based on the
assumption that these programs are specialized tools and the author thought it
was important to have the supplier easily available. The author assumed that a
close relationship between the author and the supplier would ease and
facilitate an effective support.
From the INCOSE list it appeared that it was only one supplier
available in this region. The company in question was Ascent Logic
Corporation located in Bergen, Norway and the product was  “RDD-100”. 113
It was decided to evaluate this program’s feasibility against some additional
author-defined needs and to verify its potential usefulness.
Based on an assessment of available systems engineering tools the
RDD-100 program was chosen. The author recognizes however that there
exist several other tools capable for solving the tasks of this work. RDD-100
was chosen primarily because it was easily available for the author. The listed
evaluation in Appendix 11.5 is only intended to document the usefulness of
the program for this work.
4.3.4 Economic and technical analyses
In several of the activities such as C.3, C.4 and C.5 different analyses
are conducted based on the scientific theories identified as relevant for this
                                          
112 http://www.incose.org/
113 Recently this technology was acquired by Holagent Corporations in California - USA,
see http://www.holagent.com/new/index1.html
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work. These analyses are of course core activities and they were performed in
order to obtain insights, validations and inferences of the different problems
and suggested solutions. The theoretical analyses are also supported by
empirical data and operational experiences in order to make the analyses as
relevant as possible.
4.3.5 The optimization algorithm and the GassOptTKL program
In relation to the conduct of activity C.5, linear programming (LP) is
applied by means of the GassOptTKL program. The GassOptTKL program has
been developed for Statoil by SINTEF in Trondheim, Norway. The main
purpose of the program is to calculate and optimize flows through the entire
natural gas transportation network in the case where an unexpected event has
occurred. Such an unexpected event can for instance be a shutdown of a gas
production field or unavailability of a pipeline or a riser platform due to
technical problems. Given such abnormal conditions a tool is needed for
optimizing the gas transportation until normal conditions are restored.
The GassOptTKL applies a software program XPRESS-MP to solve the
LP optimization algorithm. The Wheymouth’s equation (Eq. 3.3.1) is applied
in the program in order to calculate pressures and flows. The techniques
applied in the program are based on a linearization of the Wheymouth’s
equation by means of series expansion.
The GassOptTKL program optimizes the flows in the integrated systems
by seeking the flows that cause the least pressure differentials in the systems.
The delivery pressures are set equal to the lowest allowable contract delivery
pressure at the exit points. For further details, see the user’s manuals. 114
4.3.6 Methodology for aggregation of results
In order to summarize and draw some main conclusions of this work
and ultimately test the main hypothesis, a simple system for aggregation of the
observations and conclusions made in the work is needed. Such a method is
shown in Figure 4 below. The methodology applied is to summarize any
lesson learned or any outcome of an analysis or a discussion into a numbered
list of Observations. Upon completion of a given analysis or a discussion,
these observations are aggregated in to Conclusions. Finally in Section 9 the
main conclusions of this work are aggregated and inferred into some few main
conclusions expressed as Recommendations.
                                          
114 See Sintef report STF38 A99613 (1999)
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Figure 4.  Structure for aggregation of results in this work
4.3.7 Work breakdown structure and scheduling of work
The Microsoft project planner computer program has been quite helpful
in order to make the research work manageable and realistic given the limited
timeframe of the work. The work was carefully broken down into a Gantt
diagram and a planned workload was assigned to each activity. These plans
have been updated some few times during the project execution, see Appendix
11.8 for details.
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Figure 5.  The systems engineering processes for the work
 showing the information flow and work tasks
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 Table 2. The sub-hypotheses
ID Sub-hypotheses tested in the dissertation work Covered in
paper 20
B.0 It is possible to develop a systems re-engineering
process for assessing, specifying, and documenting
current operations.
INCOSE’
2000
B.1 Major stakeholders will provide empirical descriptive
data regarding their needs and systems requirements.
INCOSE’
2000
B.2 It is possible to establish effectiveness measures for
the prevailing operations.
INCOSE’
2000
B.3 It is possible to create information models that
unambiguously specify the system.
INCOSE’
2000
B.4 The systems re-engineering process will provide
means for making satisfactory trade-offs between
identified requirements in order to obtain consistent
information models and unambiguous descriptions.
INCOSE’
2000
B.5 The systems re-engineering process will document
valuable information, identify complex interactions,
and clarify the main features of the current transport
operations.
Dissertation
C.0 It is possible to develop a systems engineering process
for assessing, specifying and documenting future
operations.
Dissertation
C.1 It is possible to assess relevant liberalized regulatory
regimes and extrapolate some possible conditions that
may prove applicable to future Norwegian transport
operations.
IAEE 2000
C.2 It is possible to redefine the effectiveness measures
applicable to future operations.
Dissertation
C.3 It is possible to unambiguously specify some future
economic and technical requirements, and to express
and treat these requirements as test-case scenarios in
the succeeding work.
IAEE 2000
C.4 It is possible to develop new economic methods and
rules in order to fulfill the future economic
requirements.
IAEE 2000
C.5 It is possible to identify solutions that are feasible
from a gas flow optimization point of view by
applying the GassOptTKL program.
Dissertation
Systems approach application and methodology
        62
ID Sub-hypotheses tested in the dissertation work Covered in
paper 20
C.6 It is possible to modify the information models so they
unambiguously specify future operations.
Dissertation
C.7 The systems engineering process will provide means
for making satisfactory trade-offs between identified
requirements and solutions in order to obtain
consistent information models and unambiguous
descriptions and solutions.
Dissertation
C.8 The systems engineering process will document
valuable information, identify complex interactions
and clarify the main features of future transport
operations.
Dissertation
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5 Assessment of the prevailing regime
5.1 Introduction
Section 5 covers the fist part of the master strategic approach; the
systems re-engineering process. The main objective is to test the hypothesis
B.0, stating that “it is possible to develop a systems re-engineering process for
assessing, specifying, and documenting current operations”. In order to test
the hypothesis, system theory is applied and a systematic framework is
developed.
The hypothesis B.0 consists of five sub-hypotheses as was briefly
discussed in Section 4.2. The first one to be tested is hypothesis B.1. This
activity is assessment of available information. The identified data are
subsequently organized and classified into appropriate groups. In order to
provide a systematic treatment of the data, the systems engineering expert
computer tool is applied.
The next step is to establish the effectiveness measures as stated by
hypothesis B.2. This activity extracts applicable data, identifies and writes out
the measures. The subsequent step is testing of hypothesis B.3. The B.3
activity is the creation of the information models. The computer program is
applied as the main tool for conducting this activity. The applicable data is fed
into the computer and the information models are developed and printed. This
is an iterative process as hypothesis B.4 suggests and the B.4 activity is an
integral part of the information modelling activity. The last sub-section
contains a discussion and summary (hypothesis B.5) of the results.
If we now turn to the two test-case scenarios specified in Section 2.6 of
the work some few assumptions can be inferred regarding why it is important
to conduct the B.0 activity.
Observation 5.1. It may be assumed that liberalization will impact the
existing organization and working procedures regarding Norwegian
natural gas transport operations. The assessment activity B.0 therefore
shall unambiguously identify the existing organizational set-up, the
organization’s working processes and the main documents governing
the operations. This will create a starting point for later analyses related
to changes in organizational issues, conduct of work and related topics.
Observation 5.2. It may be assumed that liberalization will call for
amended and new economic and operational requirements. The
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assessment activity shall identify the most relevant economic
conditions, requirements and rules governing existing transport
operations. This must be done in order to analyze – at a later stage
(Section 7) – how liberalization affects these requirements.
Observation 5.3. The assessed information shall be categorized in such
a way that it can be applied in a commercially available systems
engineering computer tool and thereby enhance the correctness of the
results.
5.2 Assessment of available information
The hypothesis B.1 specifies that: “major stakeholders will provide
empirical descriptive data regarding their needs and system requirements”.
The hypothesis is true provided the following conditions are satisfied:
· information is obtained by literature review and interviews.
· the information is unambiguously defining the stakeholders needs. 115
· the information contains sufficient information to completely specify
the system and the system operations.
· upon completion the stakeholders shall review the information models
and agree to the results.
However, if significant ambiguity exists, lack of information is revealed
or disagreement between the stakeholders is apparent the hypothesis has
failed. The work was conducted according to the methodology as described in
Section 4.3.1 on page 55 and Section 4.3.2 on page 56. The results can be
summarized in the following observations:
Observation 5.4. The literature review identified all main requirements
related to operations of Norwegian natural gas transportation. All
requirements related to objectives and work processes are particularly
identified. Further, technical and economic empirical data are identified
for later usage. The result is documented in the information model
printouts (from the computer program) and in the proceeding text.
Observation 5.5. The interviews identified the main requirements
related to operations of Norwegian natural gas transportation. Similarly
as above, all requirements related to objectives and work processes are
                                          
115 These requirements are also referred to as the system requirements in the work.
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particularly identified. Another important goal of the interviews was to
validate and verify the results from the literature assessment. The result
is documented in the information model printouts and in the proceeding
text.
5.3 Description of legal framework
5.3.1 Supranational legislation
The Norwegian legal system, governing the petroleum activities,
complies with relevant international documents. Some relevant documents to
be mentioned here are the United Nation Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and the EEA agreement. 116 As a result of the EEA agreement the
Norwegian legislation has implemented general and specific internal market
regulations of the EU 117 including the “licensing directive”.
In this work the EU’s Gas Directive is considered. In a White Paper
(WP) no 46 (1997-98) “Petroleum operations” some comments are offered
related to the implementation date of the Gas Directive. The WP states that the
Gas Directive will be in force in Norway at the same time as it will be in force
in the EU 118, provided the Gas Directive is included in the existing EEA
agreement and implemented into Norwegian legislation. 119 A recently issued
WP no 39 (1999-2000) states that the Gas Directive has not been included in
the EEA agreement so far, and a 5 years transition period has be requested by
the Norwegian Government.120
5.3.2 Norwegian legislation
5.3.2.1 The licensing system
The Norwegian petroleum legislation features a licensing system
regulating all activities on the NCS. Information on the Norwegian licensing
system is available in the public domain. 121 The following sub-sections
highlight a few features of the licensing system pertinent to the natural gas
production and transportation activities. These features are included here
because it is of interest to test if the liberalization process influences on some
                                          
116 European Economic Area (EEA) decided on 5 April 1995
117 See for example Fejø (1996) and Arnesen (1996) and Brautaset et al (1998)
118 Which is summer year 2000, see WP no 46 (1997-98) page 32.
119 See WP no 46 (1997-98) page 33
120 According to several newspapers, see for example “Aftenposten” February 22, 2001 the
commission has denied this request.
121 Selvig (1995). This reference is some years old. An introductory to the issue is given in
the Fact Sheet, issued by the Ministry for Petroleum and Energy (MPE) and in the IEA
(1994) study. Dahl (1998-D) gives a general brief outline of the Norwegian legal system.
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of these provisions. 122 By the same argument, these features are included in
the systems engineering processes and the information modelling.
The Petroleum Act No 72 of 29 November 1996 regulates the licensing
system. Pursuant to the Act, Royal Decree no 653 of 27 June 1997 stipulates
detailed regulations. There are several other important acts and Royal Decrees,
regulating topics such as safety or taxation. 123 The only act considered
relevant for this work is the Petroleum Act.
According to section 3-3 of the Petroleum Act, the King awards the
production license to the licensees. The key provision 124 of the Petroleum Act,
regulating field development, is section 4-2 that requires the licensees to
submit a plan for development and operation (PDO) 125 to the Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy (MPE). MPE subsequently approves the plan.
The key provision 126 of the Petroleum Act, regulating natural gas
transportation, is section 4-3 that requires the licensees to submit a plan for
installation and operation (PIO) 127 of transport systems and related facilities
to the MPE. On the basis of this plan MPE awards the transportation license to
the licensees according to specified rules. Pursuant to the Decree no 653 of 27
June 1997, specific requirements are given related to the contents of the PIO.
The licensees shall inform on subjects such as transport operations and the
transport organization. Under section 4-10 of the Petroleum Act, the King
decides where and how petroleum is to be brought ashore. Pursuant to section
4-8 of the Petroleum Act, MPE approves any use of installations by others
than the licensees. This section is an important provision as it opens up, on
MPE’s discretion, a possibility for a third party access to the systems.
                                          
122 This work does not provide a comprehensive assessment of these topics, as this is left
for the lawyers to undertake. The “bottom-up” approach of this work will however indicate
whether any high level requirements ought to be amended. This work introduces changes
into current operations and identifies any low level documents that are affected. By means
of the requirement traceability model, traces are provided to higher-level requirements
affected. In the real world case, the opposite procedure may likely occur. As soon as the
outcome of the Norwegian implementation of the EU directive is known to stakeholders, a
top-down decomposition of requirements can be performed, identifying any changes in all
tiers of the document structure.
123 See the Petroleum Taxation Act, please not that no aspects of taxation is treated here.
124 See the Petroleum Act and Fact Sheet (1999)
125 Called PUD (Plan for utbygging of drift) in Norwegian
126 See the Petroleum Act and Fact Sheet (1999)
127 Called PAD (Plan for anlegg of drift) in Norwegian
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5.3.2.2 The resource management policy
According to sections 1-2 and 4-1 of the Petroleum Act, “prudent and
efficient resource management has always been a key objective of Norwegian
petroleum policy” 128 and it is of interest in this work to assess whether the
liberalization process affects this policy. 129 The resource management policy
has a main bearing on the development plans for the NCS, but it also provides
operational goals for the day-to-day transport operations. It is therefore
interesting to clarify how the resource management policy affects the current
transport operations. In the following sub-sections, the resource management
policy is briefly reviewed.
 White Papers (WP) no. 46 (1986-87) “The petroleum activity on
medium long term” and WP no 46 (1997-98) and WP no. 39 (1999-2000)
discuss the resource management topic. MPE also gives a comprehensive
review of the topic in an official letter to the EFTA Surveillance Authority
(ESA) (1997). The resource management is funded by Norwegian sovereignty
on the NCS. 130 According to the letter to ESA, the management of resources
remains within the national state.
One key element of the management is to pool the different production
fields and coordinate the total development of the NCS. The objectives of the
resource management are many and they include depletions plans, methods for
enhanced oil recovery, coordination of associated gas logistic and gas
injection, environmental aspects, provisions for enjoying economic of scale in
field and transports system development and gas marketing and sale. The
argument is that such goals can only be obtained by Norwegian authority
control. Important means for achieving gas marketing and sale are the
establishments of the Gas Negotiation Committee (GFU) and the Gas Supply
Committee (FU).
5.3.2.3 GFU and FU 131
The GFU was established in 1986, see WP no 46 (1986-87). The GFU
system, however, is not directly regulated by the Petroleum Act.  The Fact
                                          
128 This statement is quoted from “MPE’s official letter to the EFTA surveillance Authority,
dated 20.01.97”
129 Whether liberalization affect the policy is limited to whether future (new) forms of
transport operations affect the policy. The work does not assess the effect of liberalization
in relation to for example investment policies and overall field development planning.
130 See United Nation (1982) Convention of the Law of the Sea, article 76, 77 and 80.
131 For a more detailed assessment of the arrangements see Hammer (1998).
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Sheet (1999) 132 gives a brief overview of the topic, while Brautaset et al. give
a comprehensive description. Gas sales are based on commercial negotiations
performed by the GFU. Statoil and Norsk Hydro constitute normally the GFU.
The GFU-parties enter into a gas sales contract.
Different types of gas sales contracts are developed over the years such
as the depletion contracts and the delivery contracts. The delivery contracts
are the dominant type of contracts.
MPE approves all commercial deals, pursuant to paragraph 19 of the
Decree and designate contract volumes to individual fields. MPE’s
designating activities are called allocation of field and transportation system
development and assignment of gas sales contracts to contractual field or
supply fields. A contractual field is assigned the contractual responsibility for
the gas deliveries to the customers, while the actual physical gas supplies may
be assigned to other fields called the supply fields. The FU was established in
1993 and comprises a number of Norwegian and international oil companies
that are involved in activities on the NCS. The committee advises MPE on
issues related to allocation of field and transportation systems development.
According to Stern 133, a liberalization process in the EU gas market
may affect the Norwegian system for gas marketing and sales. Rune Pedersen
in Brautaset et al. discusses the sales arrangement (i.e. the GFU) in light of the
EEA agreement’s competition rules. It falls outside the scope of this work to
recapture and comment on these conclusions. 134
WP no 46 (1997-98) and the MPE’s letter to EFTA express the
Norwegian governmental view on this topic. The WP confirms the
governmental view that the existing system (GFU and FU) is important means
to secure a high level of exploitation and cost effective systems and a means to
support resource management. Similar views are expressed in the WP no 39
(1999-2000).
This work does not aim to analyze the establishment of GFU and FU.
However, by the same argument as stated before, the systems engineering
processes will inevitability identify the current lower level documents and
requirements affected by any introduction of liberalization measures. By a
bottom-up aggregation of requirements, it is possible to easily identify new
operational conditions, which contradict prevailing requirements derived from
the GFU or FU.
                                          
132 See Fact Sheet page 48.
133 See Stern (1997) and the discussions in Brautaset et al.(1998 )
134 For any interested reader see Brautaset et al. (1998) page 78-79.
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5.3.2.4 Policies for natural gas transportation
Several WP are issued throughout the years, discussing topics related to
gas transportation, tariff and toll stipulations. 135 These WP give valuable
information on how the Government and the Parliament evaluate petroleum
related topics from time to time. Two WP of special interest are WP no. 46
(1986-87) and WP no 46 (1997-98).
WP no 46 (1986-87) section 12 incorporates some main policy
objectives for the transportation activities. The paper states that licensees shall
collect the main portion of their profit from the petroleum activities “at the
field and not from gas transportation.” In order to understand this statement
one needs to remember the vertically integrated nature of Norwegian natural
gas activities. In most cases, the owners of the production facilities own the
natural gas transportation systems as well (see Fact Sheet). Gas transportation
is thus only “a means” and the transportation activity is not supposed to be a
separate area for profit optimization by pipeline owners.
The WP 46 (1986-87) discusses principles for stipulations of transport
tariffs and tolls in Norwegian natural gas transportation systems. The toll
principles are rooted in the policy objective described above. In order to limit
the pipeline owners’ rents from transport operations, the paper specifies that
profitability in transportation shall be limited to a specified rate of return on
invested capital. This rate is 7% on capital invested before taxes. 136 These
principles are referred to as the “Zeepipe-principles”. 137 In the transportation
agreements, entered into by transportation system owners and shippers, tolls
are calculated to yield this rate of return to the owners. The tolls are based on
an agreed throughput obligation called “Ship or Pay” (SOP). The SOP volume
typically equals the Take or Pay (TOP) volume specified in the pertinent gas
sales contracts. 138
The WP 46 (1986-87) also discusses general considerations regarding
tariff principles and toll calculations. The WP recognizes that tariff principles
and tolls affect questions like the profitability in development of marginal
fields and tail production at fields. Tolls affect co-production among fields and
they influence on the share of profit amongst transport system owners and
shippers. The WP also recognizes that the tariff and toll system influences the
                                          
135 See the Fact Sheet or the web: http://odin.dep.no/html/english/
136 Nielsen (1999) and IEA (1994)
137 See Nielsen (1999) page 112. Nielsen provides a review of the prevailing transportation
agreements tariff system. The IEA (1994) study also refers to these principles, see page
251.
138 Note that the pipeline lifecycle is normally longer than the gas sales contract periods.
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willingness to make investments in transport systems. Many of these
arguments are of a universal nature and they have relevance for tariff
stipulation in the context of liberalization.
WP no 46 (1997-98) section 5 concludes that the best incentives for
obtaining cost efficiency in transportation as well as less conflicts among
stakeholders are to balance the owner shares and shipper shares. MPE draws
this conclusion based on experience. This normally means that any individual
party in a specific field production license shall have the same share in the
ownership of the transportation system as the share of his gas volume handled
by the transportation system.
A final observation to be made here is a clarification of who normally
are the shippers. Nielsen (1999) states that the shippers are those who are
owners of natural gas tendered for shipment in the system and to be delivered
under a Gas Sales Agreement defined in the Transportation Agreement. 139
5.3.3 Summary – legal framework
Finally, to sum up the main observations obtained by the assessment of
the legal framework the following can be concluded:
Observation 5.6. The detailed assessment of the prevailing Norwegian
legislative requirements has provided the work with legal insight. This
insight is quite useful in relation to the research activities to follow.
Based on the assessment of legal issues, the work has identified the
governing documents and requirements, and the prevailing
organizational set-up of the industry. The legal knowledge is also
required in order to understand and evaluate how the Gas Directive may
impact on existing working processes and economic, technical and
operational conditions.
Observation 5.7. Normally only defined shippers who have an
obligation to deliver gas according to a defined Gas Sales Agreement
have a right to ship gas in the natural gas transportation system
according to the existing Transportation Agreements. The tariff and toll
regime is normally designed primarily to support such long-term
shipping needs.
                                          
139 See also HA #1, Article 1.20
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5.4 Results - effectiveness measures
5.4.1 Hypothesis B.2
The hypothesis B.2 states that “it is possible to define effectiveness
measures for the prevailing operations”. In the following work the hypothesis
is tested. The hypothesis is true if the work succeeds in establishing the
measures. An additional condition is that the stakeholders recognize the
measures.
The measures are derived from the data obtained during the information
assessment activity and the measures are ordered into three levels based on the
three levels of document classification. The author has identified twelve
effectiveness measures and they are ordered into these groups:
· The authorities’ measures (four measures)
· The licensees’ and gas buyers’ measures (three measures)
· The operators’ measures (five measures)
The source document that specifies an effectiveness measure is termed a
main document in the proceeding text. Effectiveness measures typically are
“high” level requirements according to the definitions given in Section 3.2.4,
and a number of lower tiers of requirements are developed and specified in
order to find feasible solutions. Those documents that include lower tires of
requirements are termed incorporated documents. In the following text the
twelve effectiveness measures are assessed and references are provided to the
documents specifying the requirements.
5.4.2 Authorities’ effectiveness measures
Resource management
The first effectiveness measure derived relates to the management of
petroleum resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) and it states:
The development of new transportation systems, the daily transport
operations, and the tariff regime shall help optimize the exploitation of
Norwegian petroleum resources.  This measure incorporates the following
observations:
Observation 5.8. Gas production facilities and transportation systems
shall be treated as an integrated “production system” on the NCS, in
order to enhance the total production of hydrocarbons.
Observation 5.9. Resource management shall include planning of gas
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production for injection purposes, phase-out of declining fields and
phase-in of new production.
The Norwegian Petroleum Act (Act) and White Papers (WP) as
clarified in Section 5.3.2.2 are the main documents that specify resource
management. Relevant sections are 1-2, 4-1 through 4-4 and 4-7 and 4-8.
Further, White Paper no. 46 (1997-98) and White Paper no. 39 (1999-2000)
discuss the same requirements. Several lower tiers of documents incorporate
similar provisions such as the transportation system owners’ Heads of
Agreements, Transportation Agreements and the transportation system
operator’s procedures for operational flexibility.
Coordinated gas sales
The second effectiveness measure relates to gas marketing, sales, and
planning activities and it states: Transport operations and the tariff regime
must support the established regime governing: gas marketing, negotiations
and sales, assignment of gas sales contracts to contractual fields, allocation of
gas supplies to delivery fields, and planning and development of new transport
capacities. This measure incorporates the following observations:
Observation 5.10. Gas sales represent a continuing activity: gas shall
be marketed, negotiated, and sold in a coordinated manner.
Observation 5.11. The assignment of gas sales obligations to the
contractual fields, allocation of supply commitments to the delivery
fields and planning of new transport capacity shall be coordinated.
Observation 5.12. A coordinated approach is best means to secure gas
supplies for the mutual benefit of buyers and sellers.
Observation 5.13. The industry must be governed by stable, predictable
rules to secure investments and reduce financial risks.
Observation 5.14. Efforts will be made to protect, over the long run,
long-term contract provisions such as delivery obligations, take-or-pay
obligations, and ship-or-pay obligations.
The main documents are the Act and Decree as clarified in Section
5.3.2.1. The White Papers previously identified discuss this topic as well. A
number of lower tier documents specify related requirements. Such documents
Assessment of the prevailing regime
        73
are the Gas Sales Agreements, the transportation system owners’ Participants
Agreements, the PDO approvals and the PIO approvals.
Economically efficient development and utilization
The third effectiveness measure relates to economic theory and it states:
The development of new transportation systems, daily transport operations,
and the tariff regime shall be economically efficient.  This measure
incorporates the following points:
Observation 5.15. Economies of scale shall be utilized at the time of
investment and during operations.
Observation 5.16. All available systems capacity shall be utilized as
systems and facilities built cannot be reversed and the investments are
sunk costs.
Observation 5.17. Social welfare shall be optimized in a long run
perspective recognizing that petroleum resources are limited resources
and they are not renewable.140
This measure is relevant for the planning and development activities of
new capacity and it also is relevant for day-to-day operations. The measure
guides negotiations and development activities. The effectiveness measure is
derived and based on the Act, sect. 1-2 and White Paper no. 46 (1997-98) and
White Paper no. 46 (1986-87). In order to have the day-to-day transport
operations complying, the measure has been broken down into a number of
lower-tier requirements incorporated in a number of licensees’ documents and
operators’ procedures. Some important ones are the Transportation
Agreements, Participants Agreements, Upstream Agreements, and the
Operational Flexibility Procedure and the Interface Manuals and the Operating
Philosophy.
                                          
140 A related argument is that the state is the original owner of available resources; it is also
the major stakeholder (in several roles: as approval body (MPE) and also as producer, gas
owner, shipper, and seller (as a result of the state’s direct financial interests (SDFI) and as
owner of Statoil)). The state has the largest total owner’s shares in the sector. According to
Fact Sheet (1999), 88% of the net present value of cash flowing from the Norwegian
petroleum sector represents the state’s share. In 1999 money, the state’s share is NOK 1620
billion of a total NOK 1840 billion. Further, the state is responsible for securing a cost-
effective, optimal exploitation and utilization of facilities. See Act 1-1.
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Right incentives
The fourth effectiveness measure relates to the incentive structure and it
states: The regulatory regime for development of new transport capacity,
operations, and tariffs must have incentives which ensure that a company’s
optimal economic adaptation to the regime coincides with the economically
efficient solution. This measure incorporates:
Observation 5.18. The incentive structure must enhance cost
effectiveness in project solutions and operations.
Observation 5.19. The incentive structure must be designed so that a
company’s economic adaptation to the regime coincides with the
economically efficient solution.
Observation 5.20. Shippers’ shares as well as ownership shares in
production fields and transportation systems must be harmonized
throughout the value chain and between old and new projects to reduce
conflicts and optimize incentives for cost effectiveness.
Observation 5.21. Licensees’ profit shall be earned “at the field and not
in the transportation system”: transportation is only “a means” (or an
agent serving in a broader context).
Observation 5.22. The rate of return in transportation systems shall be
based on a risk assessment (based on risks occurring during project
development, operations, production, and execution of gas sales
contracts); the current system imposes low risk on transportation system
owners. 141
Observation 5.23. Tariff regimes and ownership shares must align with
taxation principles.
The effectiveness measure is derived basically based on White Paper
no. 46 (1997-98) sect 5, the Transportation Agreement and the Participants
Agreement.
                                          
141 See Brottemsmo et al. (1993), pp. 18-21 for a discussion of such risks.
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5.4.3 Licensees’ and buyers’ effectiveness measures
Supportive agreements
All agreements such as sales-, transport- and upstream-agreements must
be developed keeping the implementation stage in mind. An optimal operation
is an optimization of the totality and all aspects of natural gas transportation
must be considered including commercial, technical and operational aspects.
This is a challenging task for the stakeholders and they find it difficult to do it
right.
The present effectiveness measure focuses on the task described above
and it is derived from the White Paper no. 46 (1997-98) and the transportation
system owner and operators’ Objective Document for 1999. 142 The
effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
Observation 5.24. Sales-, transport-, and upstream- agreements shall be
negotiated and agreed upon by parties in such manners that the
agreements support transport operations, and vice versa.
Reasonable and prudent
The term “reasonable and prudent” is normally defined in all transport
and sales agreement and it has for some time been applied in the industry to
express the rules of conduct for the parties. The term specifies the “best
practice” and it encompasses an awareness of fairness and impartial conduct.
The operations shall not deteriorate the environment, be energy
efficient, and be reliable and safe. Included here is an expectation that the
operations do not jeopardize the integrity of the system. Further, stakeholders
expect that the natural gas transport operations pay due attention to the
production of oil and NGL as well and in such a way that the production of
these hydrocarbons is optimized.
The effectiveness measure is derived and based on the Gas Sales
Agreements and the Transportation Agreements. 143 The requirement is also
incorporated in a document that regulates the coordination of activities
between the representatives of sellers and shippers, called the Interface
Procedure. The effectiveness measure can be written:
Observation 5.25. Operations shall be conducted in a “reasonable and
prudent manner,” with due attention to safety and the environment.
                                          
142 The document is discussed later, see “Mål for D&P 1999, sect. 7”
143 See TA # 2, STC art. 3
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Gas buyer compliance
The gas buyers must act reasonable and prudent. The effectiveness
measure is derived from the Gas Sales Agreements and the Sellers
Representatives’ Operating Agreements. This effectiveness measure can be
written as follows:
Observation 5.26. The gas buyers must act in accordance with the sales
agreements.
5.4.4 Operator’s effectiveness measures
Regularity
Several of the interviewees stated that one of the most important
objectives for the industry was to deliver gas at high regularity. This
effectiveness measure is documented in the transportation system owner and
operator’s yearly objectives, termed: Objective Document for 1999. 144
Further, several lower tier documents have incorporated requirements to this
effect as well. This effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
Observation 5.27. Dry gas deliveries shall be made to customers with
100% regularity.
Gas quality
The gas must be delivered with a gas quality that complies with the gas
sales agreements. This requires that the transportation system operator
monitors and blends gas at all times. The effectiveness measure is specified in
the transportation system owner and operator’s yearly objectives. Further,
several lower tier documents have incorporated requirements to this effect as
well. This effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
Observation 5.28. Dry gas deliveries made to customers shall meet gas
quality specifications at all times.
Tariff and toll
This effectiveness is based on the Objective Document for 1999, the
Transportation agreements 145, and the Measurement Manual. Several lower
tier documents have incorporated requirements to this effect as well. This
effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
                                          
144 See “Mål for TCC 1999, sect. 1”
145 See HA # 1, sect. 3 and TA # 2, STC article 3 and GTC 3.8 and sect. 4 and 5.
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Observation 5.29. The transportation system operator shall correctly
produce and issue tolls to shippers in a timely manner.
Communication system availability
This effectiveness measures is documented in the Interface manuals, the
Objective document for 1999, and the Transportation agreements. 146 Several
lower tier documents have incorporated requirements to this effect as well.
The effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
Observation 5.30. Communications and support systems shall never
shut down.
Production field regularity
The production field operations affect the outcome of the transport
operations in obvious ways. The ultimate success is dependent on the
production units’ capability to deliver gas according to instructions. Gas
deliveries shall be made at the right quality, flow rate and pressure. The
effectiveness measure is based on the Interface manuals and the PUD
permissions. This effectiveness measure can be written as follows:
Observation 5.31. Natural gas producers must deliver gas of the
agreed-upon quality in a timely fashion, according to the specified
delivery instructions.
5.4.5 Summary - effectiveness measures
The author has summarized the effectiveness measures as suggested
here, but there are probably other ways of expressing and formulating these
criteria as well. Further, it may be argued that some measures overlap to some
extent with other measures.
The list of measures has been presented to the interviewees for
comments, review and acceptance. The hypothesis B.2 it thus argued here to
be true. The main result of this activity can be summarized as follows:
Observation 5.32. The list of identified effectiveness measures
presented here accumulates and summarizes the success criteria that
were identified in the literature review and derived from the interviews.
Observation 5.33. Another observation is that the authorities’ and
                                          
146 See TA # 2, GTC sect 3.9
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licensees’ effectiveness measures, unlike operators’ measures, are not
directly measurable.
This latter result is expected and the challenging task then becomes to
verify or make certain that current operations really meet all the success
criteria. In order to verify this task the highest tiers of effectiveness measures
have to be decomposed into lower-tier requirements in order to permit testing.
Traces of such decomposing are therefore expected to be visible in
lower tiers of effectiveness measures. This is apparent in the results shown
above. For example, one may argue that the “regularity measure” is derived
from the “reasonable and prudent” measure, which again is a derivative or
interpretation of the “coordinated gas sale” measure.
The main means however to verify that prevailing operations meet the
success criteria will be the information models. In this manner, the way in
which operations fulfill the above-noted twelve measures is easily
documented. The last observation can thus be expressed as follows:
Observation 5.34. The final verification and proof that current transport
operations really meet all the success criteria is an object and a result of
the detailed information models.
5.5 Results - the information models
5.5.1 Hypothesis B.3
The hypothesis B.3 relates to the information modelling and it states:
“It is possible to create information models that unambiguously specify the
system”. In the following sub-sections the hypothesis is tested. The hypothesis
is true if the work succeeds in creating these information models. A second
condition is that the stakeholders shall recognize and accept the models.
The following sub-sections present the result of the modelling work and
the results are presented in the following manner. First, each one of the
subsequent sub-sections focuses on the specific contributions offered by the
individual model. This is done by means of presenting a typical figure that
illustrates the structure of the model. This structure is composed according to
the principles laid down in Section 3.2.5.
Secondly, the information modelling applies the “RDD-100” computer
program and large printouts are produced as the main means of
documentation. These printouts are enclosed in a separate Volume II of the
work. 147 The contents-list of this volume is reproduced in Appendix 11.6.
                                          
147 These printouts are available for Statoil employees only. These printouts are needed in
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Finally, for the benefit of the reader who does not have access to the computer
printouts, the core contents of these printouts are synthesized into some few
figures, lists and tables followed by some main conclusions at the end of each
of the following sub-sections.
5.5.2 Requirement traceability
The first decision to be made was to decide a starting point or a source
document for the models. Three possible starting points were identified, the
Petroleum Act, the effectiveness measures or the White Papers. The Petroleum
Act was chosen because it was assumed, and later also shown, that the Act
represents the highest level of source document for the prevailing regime. By
using the Act as a starting point, incorporated requirements were identified
and lower tiers of documents and requirements were sorted out. Eventually,
leaf-level requirements were obtained.
The next step was to test if the identified effectiveness measures and the
White Papers introduced other requirements than those already identified. No
such unidentified requirements where disclosed.
In the work that followed all other identified documents were modelled
and the documents were arranged into a hierarchy structure.  The tier of
documents that followed the Petroleum Act was documents related to the
transportation licenses approval process (PAD), the production field licenses
approval process (PUD) and the gas sales negotiations, assignment and
allocation process (GFU and FU). 148 Thereafter the modelling of
transportation licensees’ documents followed, 149 and finally the lowest tier of
documents was modelled including all the documents as identified in Table 3
(see page 81).
In connection with the modelling work a carefully designed
classification of the information was deemed necessary. For the reader
interested in further details of this classification and categorization of
information, see Appendix 11.7.1. In Appendix 11.7.2 a list of all documents
included in this work is presented accompanied by a minor description of each
of the documents.
On the following pages the requirement traceability model is
summarized and a conceptual illustration is presented in Figure 6. This figure
                                                                                                                     
order to obtain an accurate and detailed understanding of the results.
148 These processes comprise comprehensive procedures and the models presented here are
significant simplifications of reality. The interesting point of view in this work, however, is
not to assess how these processes are carried out, but to identify the documents and
requirements that are produced by the processes.
149 A detailed descriptive review is given by Nielsen (1999).
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shows what the RDD-100 printouts look like. Figure 7 and Figure 8 synthesize
the core requirements that are incorporated in the documents assessed in this
work. The requirements are called “rules” in these two figures. This is done to
pinpoint the fact that the requirements looked for in this work are those
requirements that specify rules of conduct for the Norwegian natural gas
transport operations.
Based on the requirement traceability model the following conclusions
can be drawn at this stage in the work:
Observation 5.35. A requirement traceability information modelled is
developed. 3 major source documents are applied: the Petroleum Act,
Decree and White Papers. Approximately 10 different types of
licensee’s agreements are incorporated and approximately 9 different
types of company documents are incorporated.
Observation 5.36. 55 leaf-level requirements are identified and they
specify 55 functions that subsequently are allocated to stakeholders. The
Transportation System Operator and the Shippers’ Dispatching
Representative were jointly allocated 75% of the functions, the Sellers
Dispatching Representative 18% and the Production Field operators
some 7% of the functions.
Observation 5.37. As the models have identified that the 55 leaf-level
requirements are actually allocated to functions and to stakeholders who
carry out the functions, a proof is provided that the effectiveness
measures are indeed complied with. 150Another way of saying is that
current transport operations fulfill the success criteria specified.
                                          
150 In figure 1.10 - 1.13 in the “RDD-100” printouts this fact is shown, see the separate
volume of the work.
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 Table 3. Documents specifying effectiveness measures
M: Main
I: Incorporated
Authorities’ E.
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E. Measures
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Petroleum Act M M M
White Papers M M M M M
PUD approval M M
PAD approval M
Transportation
A. *
I
151
I I M I
152
M I
Participants
A.
I I M
Upstream A. I I I I
Gas Sales A. M M M I I I I
Op. Flex. P. * I I I I
Objectives M M M M M
Interface M. * I I I I M M
Operating
Philosophy
I I I
Measurement M. I
Tariff P. M
Identification P. I I
Interface P. 153 I I I
Operating A. M
*Note; A: Agreement, P: Procedure, M: Manual
                                          
151 See HA # 1, sect. 6.1 and TA # 2, GTC sect 2.9
152 See HA # 1, sect .6.1 and TA # 2, STC sect. 2.2.4 and GTC sect 2.9
153 The full name is: “Interface procedure between Sellers rep. and Shippers rep. and
transportation system operator”, (“koordineringsprosedyre” in Norwegian).
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Figure 6.  Main principles of requirement traceability model
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Figure 7.  Extract of the requirement traceability model
Rules for trade-off calculations – UA,
OpFlex, linepack optimization *1 *2
Participants Agreements
Upstream Agreements
Regularity support agreements
Modeling agreements
Substitution agreements
Supply agreements
Storage agreements
Rules for upstream agreement handling *1
Transportation Agreements and Heads of Agreements
Rules for gas quality monitoring and control
Interface Manuals
Rules for handling of gas delivery instructions and nominations
Rules for handling of availabilities
Rules for trade-off calculations – nominations and instructions
Rules for shortfall handling
Measurement Manuals
Rules for verifying gas energy contents of gas delivered
Operations Philosophy Manual
Rules for handling of physical gas
Tariff procedure
Rules for tariffing
Rules for trade-off calculations – valve set points and compression
Procedure for linepack arrangement between transportation
systems and operational flexibility arrangement between fields
Rules for optimization of gas sales and resource management
Rules for dispatching of operational flexibility
The shipper's dispatching representative appointment procedure
Rules for upstream agreement dispatching
Rules for field imbalances handling and dispatch
*1 Note: These two rules apply for all upstream agreements
*2 Note: This trade-off includes optimization of both upstream agreements and
operational flexibility
The Petroleum Act and Decree
Transportation license application and approval process (PAD)
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Figure 8.  Extract of the requirement traceability model
Field licenses application and approval process (PUD)
The Petroleum Act and Decree
Interface Manuals
Rules for receiving field gas delivery instructions
Rules for issuing field availabilities
Participants agreements
The Petroleum Act and Decree including White Papers
The gas sales negotiations, assignment and allocation process (MPE, GFU and FU)
Gas sales agreements – from GFU
Gas sales agreements – contractual fields
The gas sales agreements’ appendixes *
Gas sales agreements – supply fields
Gas sales agreements – depletions contracts
The seller and shipper administration procedures *
Rules for gas quality compositions
Rules for gas delivery terms
The agreements “trigger” PUD and PAD processes
and MPE’s allocation and assignment of contracts
The sellers operating agreements *
Rules for reporting
Rules for dispatching
The sellers invoicing manual *
Rules for gas invoicing to customers
The sellers identification procedure *
Rules for shortfall handling
Rules for prioritizing gas deliveries
Rules for acting on behalf of other shippers
 * Note: The rules are pertinent to all types of sales agreements
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5.5.3 Systems architecture
The systems architecture information model shows how the physical
facilities are interrelated and decomposed according to the principles defined
in Section 3.2.5.3. The Transportation Agreements specify these facilities. In
the proceeding work, only the dry gas system is specified, as already
mentioned.
Figure 9 illustrates schematically the Norwegian dry gas transportation
system. Borders are defined such that the system consists of two treatment
terminal facilities (Kollsnes and Kårstø), two riser platform facilities (Sleipner
riser platform, or SLR, and Draupner riser platform, or Dr), four shore
terminal facilities on the European continent, and 11 pipelines. Belonging to
external systems are three production fields (Sleipner, Heimdal and Ekofisk)
and a number of production fields upstream from the treatment terminals (not
shown). Customer facilities downstream from the shore terminals also belong
to the external system (not shown). The external systems are also referred to
as the context systems.
At each facility, a gas input and/or output valve is installed; between the
output valve at one facility and the input valve at another facility, a pipeline is
installed, connecting the facilities. This fairly obvious observation has some
implications guiding subsequent modelling and later research. First, the
pipeline’s configuration (length, diameter, internal coating condition, etc.)
unambiguously defines its gas-flow capacities. Knowledge of these capacities
and of how to optimize flow in the total pipeline network will be useful later
in this research.
Secondly, many economic topics relating to the transport owner's tariffs
are linked to gas flow in each pipeline.
Thirdly, from an operational point of view, many interesting actions
focus on the set point values of flow and pressure at each valve: in fact, all
operational behavior eventually devolves to decisions about how to set each
valve’s gas pressure and gas flow values.
Figure 10 displays schematically the system architecture modelled for
this project and this figure illustrates how the RDD-100 printouts look like.
Figure 11 synthesizes some parts of the architecture information model.
The following can be inferred by studying the architecture model:
Observation 5.38. The systems architecture model presented here is
quite simple and the basic purpose of the model is to identify a system
boundary and to capture the components comprising the system
assessed in this work.
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Figure 9.  The physical components of the system
Treatm.
Terminal
KårstøDrSLR
Treatment
Terminal
Kollsnes
Production
Field Heimdal
Production
Field Sleipner
Shore
Terminal
Germany
Shore
Terminal
Belgium
Shore 
Terminal
France
 Inlet valve, outlet valve
 Field, Terminal, Platform
 Pipeline
Ze
ep
ip
e I
IA
Z
ee
pi
pe
 II
B
ZP
ZP
St
at
pi
pe
 Z
4
Statpipe Z4
Z
eepipe
Statpipe/N
orpipe
Europipe
E
ur
op
ip
e 
II
Fr
an
pi
pe
Shore
Terminal
Germany
Production
Field Ekofisk
Assessment of the prevailing regime
        87
Figure 10.   System architecture
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Figure 11. Extraction of the system architecture model
5.5.4 Behavior
Main purpose
The main objective of the behavior information model is to organize the
identified functions into processes and to introduce the entities of inputs and
outputs. Functions normally require some kind of input, which is processed
The dry gas transportation system
Platforms
Draupner Platform
Input valve
Other Platforms
Pipeline “from and to”
Gas stream “from and to”
Output valve
Pipeline “from and to”
Gas stream “from and to”
Shore terminals
Dunkerque terminal
Input valve
Other terminals
Pipeline “from and to”
Gas stream “from and to”
Treatment terminals
Kollsnes terminal
Input valve
Other terminals
Pipeline “from and to”
Gas stream “from and to”
Output valve
Pipeline “from and to”
Gas stream “from and to”
Assessment of the prevailing regime
        89
and returned as some kind of output. The modelling work presented here
follows the principles given in Section 3.2.5.4.
Three major processes have been included and the processes are
described in the following sub-sections. The author thinks that the behavior
model is the most difficult one to summarize here and the RDD-100 diagrams
are the only appropriate means to obtain a complete understanding of the
behavior. But as before, for those readers who have no access to these
printouts, an extraction of the results is given in the sub-sections to follow.
The main processes included are:
· the dispatching process
· the optimization process
· the handling of physical gas process
The dispatching process
The dispatching process consists of four sub-processes called the
buyers’ dispatching process, the sellers’ dispatching process, the
transportation system operator’s dispatching process and the fields’
dispatching process. In these processes, much information is transmitted
between the stakeholders. The information transmitted relates to availability
information regarding facilities and production capacities, and nominations
and delivery instructions. The processes consist of daily transmittals as well as
weekly or long term planning activities. In this work, only the day-to-day 154
dispatching is modelled and the planning activities have been left out. 155
The Transportation System Operator calculates and performs trade-offs
between different possible solutions in order to meet a specific gas buyer’ gas
daily nominations. There is a need to do trade-off calculations due to the fact
that production units and pipelines may be unavailable and imbalances must
be corrected for, and so on. The processes are thus designed to cope with both
normal days as well as days with shortfall situations. A shortfall occurs if the
sellers are unable to meet the buyers’ requests for daily gas deliveries.
In Figure 12 below the dispatch processes are illustrated based on their
appearance in the RDD-100 printouts.
                                          
154 According to the gas sales contracts a gas day is a 24-hour period starting at 06.00 am.
During this period a given nominated gas volume shall be delivered. If the seller fails to
meet the obligation a contractual shortfall situation has occurred, see Brautaset et al. (1998)
155 The planning activities are identified in the requirement traceability model, but they are
not included in the behavior model.
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Figure 12.  Behavior model of some of the dispatching processes
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Based on the figure above, one observation can be stated:
Observation 5.39. In order to facilitate the gas deliveries a
comprehensive dispatching process is developed. The process makes
sure that information regarding availability, requests and so on is
conducted in a timely manner.
The optimization process
The optimization process comprises trade-offs between several
requirements and considerations derived from three major means for daily
optimization. The first means is to utilize provisions of five different
Upstream Agreements. The second means is utilization of Operational
Flexibility, and the third one is utilization of Linepack.  In Appendix 11.7.3,
11.7.4 and 11.7.5 these three different means for optimizing daily operations
are described in further details, respectively.
The main observation to be made here is:
Observation 5.40. In order to optimize the gas transport operations so
that gas delivery commitments are met and resource management on the
NCS is obtained in daily operations, many formal and informal
arrangements have been developed.
The process for handling of physical gas
This process is covering the procedures for physical handling of gas in
the pipeline systems. First, this process collects information on all gas flow
rates, pressures and gas compositions from the SCADA156 system. Then the
process takes into consideration the results of the optimization process and the
results from the dispatching process. As there are many considerations and
contradicting requirements yielding some trade-off iterations must be
performed. The rules for so doing are basically given in the two documents
called Procedure for linepack arrangement between transportation systems
and operational flexibility arrangement between fields, and Operations
Philosophy Manual.
Upon collection of SCADA information and following the successful
trade-offs, final decisions are made with respect to the sizes of flow rates and
pressure set points in the systems. The control valves are remotely adjusted
and instructions are given to field and terminal operators.
                                          
156 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System, part of the “communication and data
system”.
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In  Figure 13 below an extract of the entire behavior model is given.
The figure indicates the trade-offs performed and how information is passing
on between the different sub-processes. Finally, it shall be noted that these
processes run continually, 24 hours a day.
Figure 13.  Extract from the behavior information model
Two observations are made based on a study of the behavior models:
Observation 5.41. The Transportation system operator monitors and
routes the physical gas in the transportation system by two major
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means. First he remotely controls several key control valves at the two
riser platforms, and secondly he instructs the terminal and platform
operators to adjust control valves, flow and pressures on their respective
installations.
Observation 5.42. The instructions on how to change physical
conditions in the systems are derived based on careful evaluations of the
information obtained in the dispatching process and the optimization
process. As there typically are several contradicting wishes, the
Transportation system operator conducts trade-offs in order to settle on
final instructions.
5.5.5 Context
The last conceptual model is the context information (or “interface”)
model that identifies the system’s interfaces with surrounding systems and the
environment. The systems boundary is defined around the dry gas
transportation system and the model identifies all major input and output
crossing the system boundary.
The context information model derived in this research is displayed in
Figure 14 below. The main conclusion is:
Observation 5.43. The context model identifies how requests,
availabilities and instructions, the gas itself and toll are crossing the
system boundary. The model shows how these entities interfere with
other systems in the context. This model is useful in the later analyses
of the work when effects of the Gas Directive on the prevailing regime
shall be discussed.
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Figure 14. The context system
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hypothesis and to do the trade-offs. 157 The hypothesis is true because this
activity turned out successfully and the stakeholders accepted the effectiveness
measures and the information models.
The following observation can be concluded:
Observation 5.44. By applying the computer tool an accurate
description of the behavior of current operations is obtained (i.e.
ordering of current working processes). This is a main reason for
applying the tool. Another important aspect is that the tool makes it
possible to accurately trace requirements to source documents and to
identify how specified functions are allocated to stakeholders.
Observation 5.45. The computer program also “forced” the data to be
entered according to defined rules. This helped the author to think
logically, systematically, and holistically, as well as creatively. The
author believes that the same level of data accuracy and creativity
would have been very difficult (or at least time consuming) to achieve,
had the work been done manually.
5.5.7 Summary – information models
The hypothesis B.3 states: “It is possible to create information models
that unambiguously specify the system”. Section 5.5.1 specifies that the
hypothesis is true if the work succeeds in creating these models and the
stakeholders subsequently accept the models.
The work has produced the four types of information models called for
in hypothesis B.3 and the systems theory. The models have subsequently been
reviewed and commented by most of the representatives of the stakeholder
group. In particular the Transportation System Operator has reviewed and
commented the models and he has accepted them. The author will thus argue
that the hypothesis B.3 is true.
5.6 Summary
5.6.1 The hypothesis B.5
The hypothesis B.5 reads: “The systems re-engineering process will
document valuable information, identify complex interactions, and clarify the
main features of current transport operations”. Based on this hypothesis, the
overall results of the work so far must satisfactorily answer at least three
questions:
                                          
157 See also Malcolm et al. (1993).
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· Is valuable information documented?
· Are complex interactions identified?
· Are the main features of current transport operations clarified?
In the following sub-sections each of the three questions are discussed
and the main lessons learned are identified together with the main conclusions.
These sub-sections - in sum - document and test the hypothesis B.5 and
confirm that the hypothesis is true.
5.6.2 Documentation of valuable information
The following main conclusions can be inferred by reference to the
observations made throughout the preceding text:
Conclusion 5.1. By means of the literature review and the interviews
all main documents and requirements that govern Norwegian natural
gas transport operations are identified. See Observation 5.4 through
Observation 5.6.
Conclusion 5.2. All main success criteria (the effectiveness measures)
are identified for Norwegian natural gas transport operations. See
Observation 5.8 through Observation 5.31.
Conclusion 5.3. The systems boundary and system components are
identified and ordered into system architecture. See  Observation 5.38.
Conclusion 5.4. Empirical data has been collected, systemized and
categorized in the assessment process. This information will be applied
during analytical analyses later to be carried out in the work. See
Observation 5.2.
5.6.3 Identification of complex interactions
The following main conclusions can be inferred by reference to the
observations made throughout the preceding text:
Conclusion 5.5. A quite complex task is to verify that the effectiveness
measures are complied with and that current operations actually meet
the success criteria identified. The requirement traceability model has
documented and verified these relationships in broad terms. See
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Observation 5.32 through Observation 5.34, and Observation 5.37. 158
Conclusion 5.6. There are several complex processes undertaken by
the stakeholders. Further, the Transportation System Operator conducts
several complex and comprehensive trade-offs. These are all identified
and modelled. See Observation 5.35 through Observation 5.37.
Conclusion 5.7. Complex interactions between the system and its
context systems have been identified. See Observation 5.43.
5.6.4 Main features of current operations
The following main conclusions can be inferred by reference to the
observations made throughout the preceding text:
Conclusion 5.8. All requirements are broken down into leaf-level
requirements and all leaf-level requirements are allocated to
stakeholders. Further, all functions are ordered into processes. The
functions and the processes define unambiguously the current
operations and describe the complex interactions that take place
between the stakeholders.  See Observation 5.39 through Observation
5.42.
Conclusion 5.9. Domestic suppliers of gas do normally not compete in
the gas market. See Observation 5.10 through Observation 5.14.
Conclusion 5.10.  Access to the transportation system is normally
granted only for those shippers who are identified in the existing Heads
of Agreements and Transportation Agreements. These shippers are all
companies that own gas to be delivered under specified Gas Sales
Agreements. By the same token the existing tariff and toll regimes
support normally only these types of transportation needs, see
Observation 5.7.
                                          
158 On the NCS the ownership shares are not aligned and harmonized 100 % between the
different parties’ interests in production field licensees and transportation licensees. This
causes some conflicts and sub-optimizations from time to time, source: Statoil and law
cases in recent years.
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5.6.5 Discussion of the results
Some comments to the data collected.
First, some asymmetry exists in the data collection, as the interviews
were conducted on Statoil personnel only. Some main stakeholders were not
interviewed and these are representatives of MPE and representatives of other
companies participating in the licenses. Finally, no representatives of the gas
buyers were interviewed.
The author predicts however, that the chosen group of interviewees was
able to provide representative information as this group represents the
management of approximately 90 % of Norwegian natural gas transport
operations. The major issues of operations are covered and the models can
easily be corrected if misunderstandings or discrepancies are identified at a
later stage.
Improved results due to systems approach in the research work.
In the master strategic approach (A.1 and A.3) and in the INCOSE 1999
paper 159 it was argued that a systems approach would yield more correct
solutions to the problems than those we would have obtained by using
traditional approaches only and not focusing on systems thinking and
multidisciplinary research. To verify this assumption is a challenging task and
the later work of this dissertation will address this topic in detail (see Section
8). There are however some few results obtained so far that fully support this
statement. The main ones are discussed below.
Traditional methods do not capture traceablility to requirements.
In this industry no similar assessments of information have been
conducted, as far as the author knows. In order to study working processes the
typical approach in the industry so far, is an assessment based on “value
chain” thinking. 160 This means that subsequent work tasks are identified and
described as we follow the physical gas stream from wellhead to burner tip.
These methods lack some essential features, which are however included in
the methods, applied in this work. These features can be summarized as
follows:
Conclusion 5.11.  The systems engineering approach presented here
applies recognized methods into a new field, according to INCOSE 161
                                          
159 Dahl (1999-B)  page 793
160 Source: Statoil
161 Written comments given by INCOSE reviewers related to paper: Dahl (1999-B)
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and the work develops tailored information models for this industry.
These models provide traceability between requirements, stakeholders
and processes and this level of traceability goes beyond what is
obtained by traditional methods. Information asymmetry is thus
reduced more effectively compared to applying traditional methods
only.
Stakeholders consider the operations as complex, multidisciplinary and
difficult to document. One particular reason for this experience is the fact that
there are many agreements governing the industry. There are only a few
stakeholders that find themselves in a position to have detailed knowledge of
all agreements. More than a thousand different agreements exist, comprising
transportation-, gas sales-, and upstream agreements. The conceptualization
and documentation of the relationship between these agreements, as presented
in this work, have therefore an intrinsic value for the stakeholders.
Conclusion 5.12.  The work also contributes to the literature dealing
with Norwegian legislative issues regarding the oil and gas industry.
The work aims to clarify how current legislative requirements are
implemented, understood and adhered to by stakeholders.
For further details see the discussion and concluding remarks sections
of Dahl (2000) INCOSE paper (enclosed).
Core results from the B.0 activity
The following core results are obtained from the B.0 activity:
Conclusion 5.13. The system re-engineering process has documented
that the Norwegian natural gas transport operations are “intimately”
vertically integrated and that the transportation system is an integral part
of the entire NCS hydrocarbon production “machinery”. It is thus not
feasible to think of the transportation system solely as an independent
system for natural gas transportation only. See Observation 5.8.
Conclusion 5.14.  The services to customers are “bundled” (i.e. the
seller provides all services associated with the sale such as gathering,
transportation and storage activities). Further, the services are
“merchant” (i.e. the seller owns the gas all the way through the system
from production until final sale in the downstream market thus offering
security of supply and a high level of nomination rights for the buyer).
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See Observation 5.12, Observation 5.25, Observation 5.28, Observation
5.29 and Observation 5.31.
Conclusion 5.15.  One last observation to be made here is that vital
features of operations optimization are based on requirements stated in
documents issued at company levels, but higher-level documents only
briefly specify relevant requirements. These documents are very little
transparent and there is asymmetry in information. This complicates
external bodies’ assessment of transport operations’ optimization, and
limits understanding of the nature of bundling services currently being
provided. This work, however, has modelled the optimization process
conceptually, thus clarifying the matter. This topic is further discussed
in Section 7.6. See Observation 5.40 and Observation 5.42.
The overall main conclusion is therefore that the hypothesis B.0 stating:
“It is possible to develop a systems re-engineering process for assessing,
specifying, and documenting current operations” is true based on the
successful outcome of testing hypotheses B.1 through B.5.
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6 Assessment of regimes in transition
6.1 The hypothesis C.1
The hypothesis C.1 states: “It is possible to assess relevant liberalized
regulatory regimes and extrapolate some possible conditions that may prove
applicable to future Norwegian transport operations”. This section applies
three distinct sources for assessing regimes in transition: the North American
experience, the Gas Directive and the recently issued Norwegian public
document called St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001) “Ownership in Statoil and future
management of SDFI” 162
The first source of information assessed in this section is experiences
from the natural gas industry in North America. It is not the intention here to
present a comprehensive and detailed overview of the development of this
industry or to list every important lesson learned from these experiences, as
this would be an overwhelming task. The main objective is to point at some
basic lessons, theoretical notions and the like that may be argued to be
applicable in a European and Norwegian context given the requirements of the
Gas Directive. The basic idea here is to test whether the suggested and
assumed implications of the Gas Directive are supported by experiences from
North America. Two methods were applied here for assessment of
information, first a literature review and secondly, interviews.
The second part of this section assesses the Gas Directive and the third
part reviews the Norwegian St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001).
6.2 Assessment of available information
6.2.1 Literature review
There is a rich literature discussing natural gas regulation in North
America. In order to prevent this dissertation to become too lengthy the major
documents assessed are discussed in the text below, rather than being
identified here separately.
The Gas Directive is reviewed and supported by the descriptive
assessment of Dyrland et al. (2000) and finally the recently issued Norwegian
St. prp. 36 (2000-2001) is briefly discussed.
6.2.2 Visits to selected companies in North America
Several companies working with natural gas transportation have been
                                          
162 The author has translated the title. The Norwegian title is: Eierskap i Statoil og fremtidig
forvaltning av SDØE”, SDFI means The States Direct Financial Interests
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visited in the period of fall 1999 to fall 2000. These companies are:
· Statoil Energy, Washington
· Columbia Gas, Fairfax
· Colombia Gas, Charleston
· TransCanada, Calgary
· National Energy Board, Calgary
· Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Calgary
· Tabors Caramanis & Associates, Cambridge
Appendix 11.3 shows the visit schedule and a typical questionnaire
applied, is reproduced in Appendix 11.4. The results of the assessment
activities focus on some core issues that are quite apparent, such as supplier
competition, vertical separation and cost of service regulation and these results
are documented in the proceeding text.
6.3 Results - assessment of regimes in North America
6.3.1 Supplier competition
Countries like the USA and Canada have, for many years, adopted
approaches to move away from a regulated gas price (which was often set at
the wellhead). The Canadian experience offers particular clarity on this issue.
In the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB)’s163 May 1986 document
outlining its “reasons for decision,” the governments of Canada and its
provinces agreed, with respect to the domestic market, “that purchase and sale
of natural gas will be freely negotiated, and prices will no longer be
prescribed.” Further, the governments “anticipate that the reviews of surplus
tests … will result in significant freer access to domestic and export markets
and will thus contribute to the achievements of the market-oriented pricing
system.”
It is interesting to note that, prior to the NEB’s May 1986 agreements,
several resource management-related measures were in effect in Canada, and
the liberalization process relaxed these. The standard view of the Canadian
governments and regulatory bodies was that Canadian reserves were fixed and
more or less known, and any increase in production and export would only
result in a more rapid drainage of these resources, causing gas shortages
sooner. Several measures, or “tests,” were designed to secure national control
of gas resources and prevent uncontrolled gas exports. The NEB’s May 1986
                                          
163 National Energy Board (1986).
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agreements eliminated several of these tests.164
Interestingly, history shows that both reserves and production increase
rapidly following liberalization. Mansell and Church (1995)165 summarize this
effect as “perhaps the most important implication of these earlier
experiences,” noting that the gas supply’s responsiveness to market signals has
resulted in a growth in Canadian gas production of approximately 3.5%
annually, for many years. In Canada, for example, since liberalization,
shippers have constantly requested more capacity, and existing systems have
been utilized at near 100% capacity year-round.
It must be noted here that gas production on the NCS differs markedly
from that in Canada, in such aspects as exploitation offshore versus on-land
production, production unit size, number of producing units, cost per unit of
production, and owner structure. Further, Canada has both foreign and
domestic customers, while Norway has basically only foreign customers. No
indication is meant to be given here that Canadian experiences will necessarily
apply to Norway.
The main observation to be concluded here is simply:
Observation 6.1. North America has for long aimed for supplier
competition between producers and suppliers of natural gas. The buyers
can purchase gas at the wellhead, or at any other defined location (hub)
in the transportation, transmission and distribution system.
6.3.2 Open access
Open access is a key element in the de-regulation process that has taken
place in North America. Carpenter, Jacoby and Wright (1983 and 1986)166
may serve here as two examples of literature references analyzing how the
natural gas pipeline industry responded and was transformed in the early
stages after field price decontrol. A key question was access to pipeline
transportation and much focus was on the formal status and duties of the
pipeline to transport gas on behalf of other shippers not being pipeline owners.
In a course given by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers,
see Schultz (1998) is this issue pointed out quite clearly. All observations
                                          
164 See NEB (1986) and its Appendix II, Article 17: “the governments of Canada will take
appropriate steps to amend its existing policy on short term export sales of natural gas.
Specifically: I) the “incremental test” shall be eliminated, II) the “competing fuels test”
shall be eliminated; and III) “Regulations…shall be amended to allow export of natural gas
by order without volume limitation for terms not exceeding 24 months.”
165 Mansell and Church  (1995), p. 23.
166 Carpenter et al. (1983) and Carpenter et al. (1986)
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listed below are borrowed from this course and they are quotations from the
handout material of the course.167 These observations may thus summarize the
material assessed by the author on this issue.
Observation 6.2. Open access involves the functional separation of
gas transmission from gas buying and selling. Open access is
distinguished from the “merchant” pipeline that buys gas in the
production area and sells gas in the market area such that transmission
is just one component “bundled” into a single transaction.
Observation 6.3. Functional separation is achieved by creating a tariff
for transmission services with access rules, services, tolls, terms of
service.
Schultz (1998) also discusses the ownership structure versus functional
separation and he concludes as follows:
Observation 6.4. Separation of ownership of transmission from
buying and selling is not necessary. If the owner of the pipeline also
markets gas, then some form of separation of the activities is required.
Observation 6.5. Separation may involve separate divisions of the
same company, or the creation of separate companies with common
ownership. The key is to avoid conflicts of interest, preferential
treatment, or other unfair dealing. This is achieved by separating the
transmission employees from the marketing employees and by
implementing codes of conduct to ensure all customers of transmission
services are treated equally.
Observation 6.6. Functional separation of transmission from
marketing is essential for a competitive gas commodity market.
Functional separation of transmission from marketing is compatible
with monopoly gas buying and selling.
6.3.3 Diversified transportation services
Some illustrations from the U.S. market may indicate some aspects of
how gas market contacts may develop, even though there are many differences
                                          
167 Course given by Mr. Nick Schultz of CAPP at the CIPID Natural Gas Regulatory
Framework Course, July 1998.
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between the US gas industry and the European context.
The Energy Information Agency (1994) outlines a variety of
independent services developed in the deregulated U.S. market after so-called
“Order 636.”168 For example, at any given “City Gate” several independent
services are designed such as “firm, bundled firm notice, interruptible,
capacity release, managing for peaking, swing and balancing.”169 A glance at
the transportation services offered by Colombia Gas and TransCanada fully
supports this observation. 170
Sutherland (1993)171 states that an efficient gas supply requires
increased contracting options and reduced regulatory approval of contracts. He
specifically suggests that spot purchase and short-term contracts have become
more efficient than the long-term fixed price contracts that typified U.S.
industry before the 1980s. Further, Wilson (1997)172 examines and documents
how deregulation in the U.S. gas market significantly impacted Canadian gas
producers.
Again Schulz (1998) of CAPP 167 summarizes the issue and the
following observation is a quotation taken from the course:
Observation 6.7. Services must be adequate and suitable for the
desires or needs of shippers.
Schultz lists several different types of services in a conceptual manner.
Some shippers may require the ability to demand services each and every day
(firm service). Others may require an annual service i.e. on some days the
shipper will not be served but in total over the year the demand is met. This
may be a feasible service for shippers who have access to gas storage. Some
shippers want interruptible supplies as they may burn oil as an alternative
energy source. Some shippers want seasonal services for example during
winter heating seasons. Some shippers want peaking services to meat a peak
heating demand.
6.3.4 Main elements of “cost-of-service” (COS) regulations
Mansell and Church (1995) provide an informative overview and
                                          
168 Department of Energy, USA, Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas 1994:
Issues and Trends.”
169 In the “old days,” security of the supply was typically part of a U.S. pipeline’s standard
services, which were often referred to as merchant pipeline functions.
170 See for example web sites: https://www.columbianavigator.com/Ebb/Default.asp
171 Sutherland (1993).
172 Wilson (1997).
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analysis of traditional cost-of-service regulations, as applied in North
America. The COS regulation is an extension to a general ROR regulation (as
given in (Eq. 7.4.17), in such a way that the regulator will make decisions
regarding every element in the formula. Major issues are how to calculate
capital cost tolls based on different rules for depreciation, how to calculate the
tolling base, and how to estimate and measure other cost-related activities.
The regulatory body usually applies a number of standards in order to secure
fairness in the evaluation process.
The main political decision inherent in the COS regime is that shippers
shall cover all costs for serving them; that is, they must cover average costs
plus a regulated profit. This fact recognizes an economic distortion, and Khan
and Mansell and Church (1995) discuss reasons for doing so. A few arguments
can be mentioned here: COS is in line with a general public recognition of
“fairness,” it provides rate stability, and it secures company credibility. From
what the author has observed, most regulatory regimes that are currently in
force in this industry recognize such principles.
The following observation summarizes this topic:
Observation 6.8. It seems to be a general preference for a cost-based
toll in North America. The cost-based tolls are intended to assign to
shippers the costs that shippers cause the pipeline to incur when
providing services to those shippers. This principle is referred to as cost
causality according to Schultz (1998).
6.3.5 Regulatory boards
In Canada a national regulatory board is established. The USA has
established a similar institution known as the U. S. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). By referring to the Canadian National Energy Board’s
Annual Report of 1999 the purpose, vision and goals are expressed as follows
– and this statement may serve here as very short summarization of the
objectives of these institutions.
“The NEB’s purpose is to promote safety, environmental protection and
economic efficiency in the Canadian public interest while respecting
individuals’ rights within the mandate set by Parliament in the regulation of
pipelines, energy development and trade.”
A major lesson learned is that the liberalization process brought into
focus the need for a strong regulatory body. As the industry became more
competitive, and the costs of transportation more transparent, experiences
have shown that stakeholders have much attention on costs. Therefore, a
strong independent regulator is often needed in order to settle disputes and to
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make finial judgements of the acceptable level of toll.
6.3.6 Standardization of the industry
As de-regulation has advanced and the industry has responded a
growing need for standardization has occurred. In order to meet this need a
Gas Industry Standards Board (GIBS) has been established. This Board
publishes a “Business Practice Standards” 173 that specifies standards covering
a wide range of topics. Some examples are standards related to nominations,
invoicing, electronic delivery mechanism, and capacity release related
standards, contracts and so on.
6.3.7 Differences - North American and European gas industry
A last issue to be mentioned here – for the sake of completeness – is to
point out some of the many differences between the industries in these two
continents. As can be seen from Table 4 below Continental Western Europe is
largely dependent on some few major suppliers, and the buying nations are net
importers. Further the lead-time for new gas projects for Continental Western
Europe is significantly longer than elsewhere.
 Table 4. Natural gas market differences 174
North America UK Continental
Western Europe
Market size,
BCM/yr.
700 80 280
Number of suppliers > 5000 30-40 4 majors
Import dependent 0% 0% 40% rising
Development cost Low Medium High
Lead time new gas 1-2 years 2-3 years > 5 years
Primary energy
share
27% 30% 18%
6.4 Results - EU’s Gas Directive
6.4.1 Comments by other authors
In the following sub-sections some few core provisions of the Gas
Directive relevant to our discussion are identified and commented upon. Some
few authors have commented on the Gas Directive and pointed at several
                                          
173 See for example a GIBS’s Business Practice Board Version of July 31, 1998
174 Source: Holm (1999)
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shortcomings and unsolved matters. 175 WP nr. 36 (1999-2000) and the
recently issued St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001) both refer to the Gas Directive but
give few details regarding it’s implementation in a Norwegian context.
Several authors have commented the Gas Directive and have offered
views that are relevant for the discussion. Such comments and views are also
identified in the text below. Another interesting report is also “The Brattle
Group” (2000) which discusses the Gas Directive and it suggests many
practical solutions to questions related to implementation in a European
context.
6.4.2 Access to the system
“System” is defined in article 2.13 of the Gas Directive and it means
“any transmission network and/or distributions network”. An interesting
question is whether the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems are
included in this definition. We notice that “transportation systems” or
“upstream pipeline networks” is not included in the definition and Dyrland et
al. (2000) thus conclude that “upstream pipelines” are not included in this
definition. The Gas Directive has some special provisions covering the
“upstream pipeline networks”, see sub-section 6.4.4 below.
The main provisions may be summarized as follows: access shall be
given to the “system” with “objective, transparent, and nondiscriminatory
criteria” (Article 14), either as negotiated access with published commercial
conditions (Article 15) or as regulated access based on published terms and
tariffs (Article 16).
One key question here is what service obligations the “systems” have
under capacity constraints. Dyrland et al. (2000) and also Stern (1992) discuss
this issue. The interpretation offered by Dyrland et al. (2000) is that the Gas
Directive does not require “Common Carriage” 176 obligations but it allows the
                                          
175 Percebois (1999) analyses the Gas Directive and discusses the different measures
introduced in order to enhance liberalization in the European gas market. He points to a
number of unsolved questions and obstacles. See also Brautaset et al. (1998). Readers
interested in unbundling and related implications within a European context are referred to
IEA (1994), pp. 93-99, or IEA (1995), pp. 106-107, as well as IEA (1995), pp. 221-236,
where Øystein Noreng discusses this topic. Radetzki (1999) discusses related questions.
She argues that market forces will result in competition in any case, and that commercial
development may undermine existing monopolies.
176 See Stern (1992) page 23-24 and Carpenter, Jacoby and Wright (1983) for a clarification
of the term “common carrier”. A common carrier pipeline is normally obliged to serve all
shippers even under capacity constraints by reducing capacity pro rata to all parties in
proportions to the shippers tender in the first place.
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“system” to refuse access to new requests if the system capacity is already
fully utilized.
Another key question is of course the terms and conditions for access to
the “system”. Two possibilities exist, either negotiated access or regulated
access. The Gas Directive leaves it to the Member State to choose which
principles they will go for. Lijesen 177 has analyzed the issue by means of a
game theoretical model and indicates that under given assumptions “the
regulated access-pricing regime is likely to be superior to the negotiated
access-pricing regime”, as the former will yield the highest welfare. There are
however many parameters and assumptions influencing on the results above
and detailed analyses ought to be carried out case by case prior to concluding
on a preferred solution.
6.4.3 Eligible customers, natural gas undertakings and market opening
Access shall be given to “natural gas undertakings” (defined in Article
2) and “eligible customers” (defined in Article 18), and the provisions shall
lead to specified levels of “market opening” over a ten-years period (Article
18). “Natural gas undertakings” means any legal natural person carrying out at
least one of the fowling functions: Production, transmission, distribution,
supply, purchase or storage of natural gas”. “Eligible customers” are gas fired
power stations and other final customers consuming more than 25 million
cubic meter of gas per year on a consumption site”.
Article 18 also stipulates the minimum requirements for levels of
“market opening”. This provision aims for creating a competitive European
market in natural gas. The main objective is that gas suppliers must compete
in the marketplace in order to obtain a gas price set by the market. This, of
course, is a new approach to setting the price, an alternative to the existing
gas-pricing mechanism in Europe.178
6.4.4 Upstream pipeline networks
Article 23 specifies provisions applicable for “upstream pipeline
networks”. One question is whether the Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems fall into this category of systems. Dyrland et al. (2000) discuss this
issue and they conclude that in their view it seems fairly reasonable to assume
                                          
177 Lijesen (2000)
178 Austvik (1997) provides an overview of prevailing pricing principles. He also discusses
differences between U.S. experiences and European development, and assesses the
importance of taxation. Brautaset et al. (1998) provides a detailed description of the pricing
formula and gas sales contracts. See also Dyrland et al. (2000) page 21 who clarify the
matter of competing suppliers.
Assessment of regimes in transition
        110
that all of the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems used to convey
natural gas to a final coastal landing terminal179 are included by this provision.
Another question is whether all provisions of the Gas Directive apply
for the upstream pipeline network. On this issue Dyrland et al. (2000) express
that there are some uncertainties regarding the extent to which all provisions
of the Gas Directive are applicable for the upstream network and it seems that
Article 23 introduces less stringent requirements for access. The same
conclusion is suggested by Brautaset et al. (1998).
Article 23 specifies that member States shall take necessary measures to
ensure that natural gas undertakings and eligible customer “are able to obtain
access to upstream pipeline networks…in accordance with this Article”.
6.4.5 Unbundling of accounts
An integrated natural gas undertaking shall unbundle its internal
accounts i.e. keep separate accounts for their natural gas transmission,
distribution and storage activities. (Article 13). The reasons for so doing are
specified in Article 13.3 which states that this shall be done “with a view to
avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidization and distortion of competition”.
Dyrland et al. interpret these provisions to require the same level of separate
accounting as would have been done if the companies actually were separate
companies.
Observation 6.9. The Gas Directive specifies unbundling of internal
accounting. It may be assumed that this provision will be applicable for
Norwegian natural gas transportation.
6.4.6 Other provisions
There are many more articles in the Gas Directive and some few are
briefly mentioned here. Articles 25 and 26 specify provisions pertinent to
specific difficulties that may be encountered during the transition stage. The
Gas Directive also specifies rules for the establishment of a competent
authority for dispute settlements (Article 21). Technical rules and
interoperability are specified in Article 5.
Article 25.1 specifies that only if “a natural gas undertaking encounters
or considers it would encounter serous economic and financial difficulties
because of its take-or-pay commitments” a temporary derogation for access to
the system can be filed as an application to the Member State. The derogation
can be accepted only on the condition that “it is impossible to find
                                          
179 “Ilandføringsledninger” in Norwegian.
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economically viable alternative outlets.” In article 23.3 this provision is
constrained by “serious difficulties shall in any case be deemed not to exist
when the sales of natural gas do not fall bellow the level of minimum offtake
guarantees contained in gas purchase take-or-pay contracts”. For a more
detailed discussion of the topic see Dyrland and Moe (2000) page 26.
6.5 Brief assessment of St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001)
On December 15, 2000 a Norwegian public document was released
called St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001) “Ownership in Statoil and future
management of SDFI”. 162 This document presents the Government in Office’s
view on the future ownership of Statoil and related issues. The document is
pending final approval by the Parliament presumably later this year.
This document proposes several legislative changes regarding the
conduct of the Norwegian natural gas transport operations and a brief review
of the document is given here.
The document refers to the Gas Directive as a force of change and it
points to the Gas Directive’s intention of having more direct competition
between suppliers in the downstream market.
The document states that the resource management objective remains a
main objective for the Norwegian oil and gases policy, see page 13 and page
116. The document specifies that competition between Norwegian
stakeholders is important on issues such as geological knowledge and
exploration, development of production fields and transportation systems and
environmental issues.
The document discusses the future role of Statoil, but these discussions
are left out here. The main focus of the text that follows here is the proposal of
a new organization for natural gas transport operations.
The Norwegian Government suggests that a new transportation
company shall be established (see page 17 and page 109). The new company
shall be responsible for the natural gas transportation systems including those
terminals that constitute parts in the transportation system. All parts of the
transportation system that are “integral parts” in operations and that secure the
resource management shall be included in the new company’s scope of
responsibility.
The “technical” operations, meaning essentially inspection and pipeline
repair contingency shall not be part of the new company’s work
responsibilities, see Section 7.4.2.3 on page 139 for a break down of such
work tasks. The State shall own the company, at least initially.
The reasons for establishing a new transportation system company are
based on some main conditions as follows:
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· The transportation systems and the treatment terminals shall serve all
producers of natural gas in order to enhance resource management on
the NCS.
· The natural gas transportation system operator shall behave in a neutral
manner (being impartial) to all systems users (the shippers).
· The transportation system operator shall have a significant role in
connection with the development of new transportation systems.
The transportation company shall have no other business functions than
natural gas transportation. The document states that the Norwegian natural gas
transportation systems are highly integrated and the transport operations are
complex achievements. The integrated structure also makes possible a high
production of oil and NGL from the different production fields and terminals.
Two more important rules are suggested. First, the prevailing ownership
structure shall remain. The toll shall be based on a 7% real rate of return
before taxation. There are some provisions for the pipeline owners to increase
their revenues slightly if increased throughput is obtained.
 Secondly, the prevailing tariff and toll regime shall remain. The
transportation services shall be negotiated between parties, i.e. shippers and
pipeline owners, and the Ministry shall approve all agreements. The Ministry
shall also continue to allocate sales contracts to the production fields. The
Ministry has thus an overall function for the allocating the systems usage.
The Government lists several major reasons why they suggest that a
new transportation system operator shall be established. These are:
· The company who operates the transportation systems shall not
participate in production and sale of natural gas.
· The company who operates the transportation systems shall enhance
resource management in a neutral manner. This is also, according to the
government the best way of securing a further development of the
pipeline systems as the transportation company is neutral and has a
unique information of capacity constrains and so forth.
· Information asymmetry. No company on the NCS shall have a benefit
of information asymmetry related to the transportation system
operations or other conditions related to the pipeline systems. This is an
argument of having the transportation operations conducted by a
separate company. See also Section 3.4.3.4.
· Cross-subsidizing.  This is the classic argument as clarified in Section
3.4.3.3.
Assessment of regimes in transition
        113
As we have seen the arguments listed above are all quite common
arguments that are often applied in modern regulatory regimes and as outlined
in Section 3.4.
The document has caused substantial political debate and involvement
by stakeholders. The debate is often politically influenced. All parties
however, seem to agree that some kind of a new company is needed in order
to allocate capacity between shippers impartially.
Observation 6.10.  The Norwegian government has suggested that an
independent organization unit (operator) shall conduct parts of the
transportation system operations, limited to the dispatching and
administration of the systems. This company shall not participate in
production or sale of natural gas or any business development based on
natural gas.
6.6 Summary
This section has reviewed the North American experiences related to
deregulation of the natural gas industry and some few, but important lessons
are listed in the preceding text. The Gas Directive has been reviewed together
with a recently issued Norwegian public document expressing the view of the
government on the issue. The author will argue that the hypothesis C.1 is true
and the following main conclusions are stated:
Conclusion 6.1. Competing suppliers of natural gas is a crucial
element of the liberalization process both in North America and it is
also called for in the Gas Directive, see Observation 6.1 and the Gas
Directive Article 18.
Conclusion 6.2. Access to the system is an imperative element for
enhancing competition in North America and it is called for in the Gas
Directive, see Observation 6.2 and the Gas Directive Article 15 and 16.
Conclusion 6.3. All shippers (i.e. all natural gas undertakings and
eligible customers) shall have access on equal terms, see Observation
6.5 and the Gas Directive Article 14. It is somewhat uncertain to what
the extent all shippers shall have access to the Norwegian dry gas
systems, by if they are granted access it shall be impartially and equally.
Conclusion 6.4. The company who offers transportation services (in a
Norwegian context) shall have their internal accounts unbundled if
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vertically integrated and it must have separate and transparent accounts
for the transportation services. Alternatively – and conceptually – the
transportation services may be offered by an independent transportation
system “operator” 180 that is not involved in gas production, marketing
and sales. The latter view has recently been suggested by the Norwegian
government, see Observation 6.5, Observation 6.6, Observation 6.9 and
Observation 6.10.
Conclusion 6.5. The functional separation shall be supported by a tariff
and toll regime that ensures adequate services that meet the shippers
demand, see Observation 6.3 and Observation 6.7.
Conclusion 6.6. The toll regime in North America is generally cost-
based and it is just and reasonable, see Observation 6.8.
                                          
180 The term “operator” as used here does not necessarily mean the formal “Operator” role
as defined in the stakeholders’ documents such as the Transportation Agreements. The term
used here is to be understood simply as an independent organizational unit.
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7 Norwegian transport operations in a new
regime
7.1 Introduction
The first activity conducted here is testing of hypothesis C.2 that
redefines effectiveness measures. According to system theory and well-known
principles of systems engineering stakeholders must define their effectiveness
measures at an early stage in the systems engineering process. Such principles
have to be observed here as well. The hypothesis C.2 expresses an assumption
that the prevailing effectiveness measures must be redefined to some extent.
This is needed in order to specify feasible measures for transport operations in
a liberalized regime. The hypothesis is tested and shown to be true, and
redefined measures are inferred.
The second activity is to test the hypothesis C.3 related to test case
scenarios of change. The Gas Directive is still not implemented into
Norwegian legislation 17 and any specification of future requirements for
Norwegian natural gas transportation, done here, will inevitably have to be
based on assumptions containing uncertain factors. In order to reduce the
uncertainty of these assumptions, the suggested assumptions are assessed and
tested. The applicability of the two test case scenarios suggested initially (see
Section 2.4) is verified and it is concluded that they are relevant, albeit the text
had to be slightly rephrased.
Hypothesis C.4 tests how new economic methods can be developed so
that future operations comply with the new requirements assumed to be
enforced. The first activity analyzes the extent to which the existing toll
formula and incentive structure for rationing and cost efficiency are
compatible with the new requirements. The analyses conclude that the
prevailing toll formula and incentive structure only partly meet the
requirements of a liberalized regime. New toll methods are thus developed
regarding firm and interruptible supplies.
It has already been mentioned that an objective of this work is to apply
system thinking and multidisciplinary approaches to enhance the correctness
of the solutions suggested. One important issue is thus to test that the
suggested new economic tariff and toll rules are compatible with the physical
operations of the transportation network. Hypothesis C.5 comprises such
important testing and it documents the extent to which the suggested new
economic tariff and toll methods are feasible technically and operationally. In
particular a tariff and toll regime for allocation of spare capacity is studied.
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In order to perform the latter task a computer expert system is applied,
known as the GassOptTKL program. The program applies linear programming
for optimizing the physical gas streams in the Norwegian natural gas network.
The program however, has never been applied to solve problems as identified
here, and the program was tested on empirical data in order to verify its
accuracy prior to being applied.
Throughout Section 7, the technical and economic theories identified in
Section 3 are applied and combined. The analyses are also constrained by the
statutory requirements inferred from our discussion of the Gas Directive in
Section 6. Further, the analyses are enhanced by blending the theoretical
analyses with empirical data, the attribute information from activity B.0, thus
obtaining validation of the discussions and bringing into focus the core
problems to be solved.
The last major task in this Section is amendment of the information
models. This will call for updating and changes to be introduced into existing
organizations and working processes as well as documents and requirements.
The hypothesis C.6 and C.7 deal with such questions. Finally, hypothesis C.8
summarizes the results of these analyses and draws some conclusions.
7.2 Redefined effectiveness measures
7.2.1 The hypotheses C.2
The hypothesis C.2 states: “It is possible to redefine the effectiveness
measures applicable to future operations.” In the following sub-sections the
hypothesis is tested. Based on the information obtained during the system re-
engineering process (B.0) and the subsequent assessment activity C.1, the
twelve effectiveness measures are revisited and their applicability in a
liberalized context is analyzed. The measures are amended or changed as
deemed necessary.
The hypothesis is true provided the analyses produce redefined
measures that unambiguously specify success criteria for conduct of
Norwegian operations in a liberalized European regime – and provided that
the stakeholders accept the measures. The author recognizes however, that the
final verification and acceptance by stakeholders is difficult to obtain as there
are many uncertainties present, ultimately related to a still pending Norwegian
implementation of the Gas Directive. The author also recognizes that different
stakeholders may have different preferences and they may focus on different
success criteria that are contradictory by nature. This assumption is based on
the prediction that liberalization will cause a more competitive business
environment.
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7.2.2 Results –  redefined effectiveness measures
7.2.2.1 Resource management
This effectiveness measure stated: “The development of new
transportation systems, the daily transport operations, and the tariff regime
shall help optimize the exploitation of Norwegian petroleum resources.”
No evidences have been found in the assessment activities B.1 and C.1
of a Norwegian political desire to change this effectiveness measure. Actually,
governments and MPE have repeatedly reconfirmed the topicality of this
measure as documented in much of the literature assessed, such as White
Papers and official letters. The resource management is an ultimate objective
of the Norwegian petroleum activities and it is applicable in a liberalized
context. These are the arguments as listed in Section 5.4.2.
A recently issued White Paper, no. 39 (1999-2000) and a Norwegian St.
prp. 36 (2000 – 2001) emphasize that the transportation systems and their
operations are integral parts of petroleum production on the NCS. The
transportation system is thus a major tool for enhancing resource management.
According to WP No. 39, Section 5.2.1, “production of natural gas” is defined
as exploration, exploitation, blending, and transportation in the dry gas
transportation system.181
The final treatment of natural gas is performed at the shore terminals.
This treatment 182 focuses on extensive properties (e.g., volume, mass
composition, heating value, and tracers) and intensive properties (e.g.,
pressure and temperature). The aim of the treatment is to bring the dry gas into
compliance with gas sales specifications and delivery requirements.
In order to obtain resource management on the NCS efficient
development of the transportation systems is needed. The centralized planning
and licensing system is the main mechanism to secure a successful
development of new capacity.
                                          
181 A note is to be made here: The WP No 39 (1999-2000) seems to define “transportation
in pipelines” as being part of “production”, see Sect 5.2.1. This definition is apparently not
in agreement with the provisions of the Petroleum Law. Sect. 1-6 g) of the Law defines
exploration, exploitation etc as part of production but does not include “transportation of
petroleum in pipeline systems”. Sect. 1-6 h) defines “transportation” as “shipping of
petroleum in pipeline systems”. The licensing system is featuring this distinction as well, as
separate licenses are issued; one pertinent to the exploration, exploitation and production of
petroleum and the other pertinent to transportation of petroleum in pipeline systems: the
transportation license. Ulf Hammer pointed out these relationships for the author.
182 The interpretation of  “treatment” is based on the author’s experiences with daily
operations. See also Thaule and Postvoll (1996), who provide an overview of several
operational aspects of gas deliveries in Norwegian systems.
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One main concluding observation is thus made here:
Observation 7.1. It is assumed for the course of this work that the
main components of the current framework for planning, developing
and licensing of new production fields and transportation systems
remain intact as no major reasons for changing them have been
identified.
It falls outside the scope of this work to conduct a detailed assessment
and testing of the above observation. Nor does this work evaluate whether or
not liberalization will call for changes in the existing legislation.
If we now turn to the economic theory outlined in Section 3.4 it is
argued that resource management – and the prevailing mechanisms to secure it
– is a long-term task that also enhances dynamic and allocative efficiency.
This industry has significant conditions for economy of scale 183 and these
conditions are especially noticeable in the Norwegian high pressure, long
distance sub-sea pipeline systems. Further, huge “one of its kind” projects
characterize the development of the industry. As a consequence of these facts
it is argued here that any planning and development of new production and
transportation systems can not be done in small incremental steps and in an
uncoordinated manner.
Based on the Observation 7.1 above and the economic facts stated
above another observation is thus suggested here:
Observation 7.2. A centralized planning and licensing system remains
to be a necessary tool for securing allocative and dynamic efficiency
even in a liberalized context.
Two derived observations may be stated here as a consequence of
Observation 7.2:
Observation 7.3. The tariff and toll regime will not constitute a major
or prime tool for securing allocative and dynamic efficiency in a
liberalized Norwegian context.
Observation 7.4. Daily natural gas transport operations and the tariff
and toll regime must not prevent or hamper an efficient physical
                                          
183 See Sections 7.4.2.2 where some empirical data related to economy of scale is
documented.
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production of all petroleum products from the NCS.
To conclude, the transportation system including its operations is
currently treated as an integral part of the development and production of the
nation's petroleum resources on the NCS, both with respect to long-term
development and in daily operations. The author has found no arguments
opposing the validity of this effectiveness measure in a liberalized context nor
has he found any reasons to argue that this effectiveness measure ought to be
changed as a consequence of the liberalization process.
Further, in the current regime the operations are vertically integrated but
as we have seen in Section 6.5, the Government has suggested to segregated
operations into a separate operator entity. This however, does not oppose the
resource management objective.
The main observation to be made is thus:
Observation 7.5. The resource management effectiveness measure
remains valid.
7.2.2.2 Coordinated gas sales
The next effectiveness measure stated: “Transport operations and the
tariff regime must support the established regime governing: gas marketing,
negotiations and sales, assignment of gas sales contracts to contractual fields,
allocation of gas supplies to delivery fields, and planning and development of
new transport capacities”.
The main notion here is that the legislation governing the transport
operations shall support the principles governing gas negotiating and sales.
Phrased somewhat differently we may say that there shall be no conflict of
interests between the rules governing transport operations and the rules
specifying gas sales activities. In the prevailing regime, the licensing system
and the centralized sales and planning functions by means of GFU and FU, as
well as the prevailing tariff regime cause few conflicts, at least conceptually.
The core question here – in the context of this analysis – is whether the
established mechanism for gas negotiation and sales, the GFU, will remain in
a liberalized context or whether it has to be changed. If it has to be changed
the subsequent question is whether this will cause an effect on the current
regime for gas transportation and whether this regime must be altered and
transformed.
If we turn to the literature, several authors have in recent publications
discussed this topic. Brautaset et al. (1998) offer a juridical discussion of the
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topic and especially relate the GFU, FU, and Norwegian resource management
establishments to European competition law. Sunnevåg 184 offers an economic
discussion of the topic, approaching the issue by assessing inefficiencies and
externalities caused by these establishments. He indicates in his concluding
remarks that “with separation and transactions through the vertical chain at
transparent prices, decisions on exploration and field development can be
decentralized and based on expected market prices for the compound product
consisting of transport access and a unit of natural gas.” As can be seen from
Observation 7.2 above this author does not fully support such a view.
Another author, Stern (1997 and 1998),185 discusses the GFU and
argues, much in line with the Canadian experience described earlier, that the
current Norwegian system may “curtail expansions of Norwegian gas exports,
beyond what has already been contracted.” Hannesson (1998) 186 expresses
similar views.
Two recent White Papers 187 assess the implications of the Gas
Directive and indicate possible implementation measures in relation to the
prevailing Norwegian legislation. In particular in the former of the two White
Papers mentioned, Norwegian authorities argue that GFU is an important
means to secure resource management.
It is not the intention of this work to evaluate the impact of new market
conditions on GFU; nor does this work aim to comment on the effectiveness
of provisions introduced by the Gas Directive. 188 The following observation is
thus made in relation to this work:
Observation 7.6. The validity of the Norwegian means for gas sales
(GFU) in light of the Gas Directive and other EU provisions has been
assessed in the literature. Many different arguments are raised and
several authors are questioning and analyzing the validity of the
                                          
184 Sunnevåg (1999) and Sunnevåg (2000)
185 Stern (1998), pp. 164-170.
186 See Hannesson (1998), page 59.
187 WP No. 46 (1997–98) and WP No. 39 (1999-2000).
188 For readers interested in such issues, a large number of published books and articles
relate to the possible development of the European gas market. Estrada et al. (1995), Stern
(1998), Mestmeacker (1993), and several studies issued by IEA (1994, 1995, 1997, the
1998 Distribution study, and the 1998 Gas Pricing study) discuss these topics. Further, the
United Nations, as economic commission and gas center for Europe, has issued a series of
articles on the subject. Stoppard (1996), together with a number of books published by
Financial Times (FT), give overviews and insights on many European-related natural gas
market issues. See the reference list for information on these publications.
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arrangements. It falls outside the scope of this work however, to assess
and conclude on whether this establishment endures liberalization and
whether the effectiveness measure identified here is valid in a
liberalized context.
There are however, one important observation that can be argued to be
applicable based on the discussion above and the discussions to follow in
Section 7.3 (which relates to new modes for transport operations). This
observation thus constitutes an essential element in order to conduct the
research as outlined in this work. This observation is:
Observation 7.7. It can be inferred that domestic suppliers of dry gas
must compete – this is a prerequisite for competition.
The observation above can be derived from the Gas Directive as the Gas
Directive specifies that a competitive natural gas market is an important
element of the internal energy market in Europe. 189 Further, basic principles
of economic theory generally call for competing suppliers as a prerequisite in
order to obtain competition in a given market that is characterized by an
elastic market demand.
Observation 7.8. As a consequence of the above observation, and as
will be discussed later in the work, it follows that transport operations
will be affected in different ways because competing suppliers will
cause that shippers will request new gas transportation services.
Observation 7.9. The core challenge then becomes to secure economic
and operational efficiency under these new assumptions. One major
means to do so is to revise the tariff and toll regime keeping in mind
that it must be compatible with technical and operational constrains.
7.2.2.3 Economically efficient development and utilization
This measure states: “The development of new transportation systems,
daily transport operations, and the tariff regime shall be economically
efficient”.
This effectiveness measure reflects universal economic objectives as
they were outlined in the discussion of economic efficiency criteria in Section
3.4.4. The observation to be made is simply:
                                          
189 See the Gas Directive, “whereas” no. 3
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Observation 7.10. Economic efficiency is a valid effectiveness measure
in a liberalized regime.
7.2.2.4 Right incentives
The fourth measure states: “The regulatory regime for development of
new transport capacity, operations, and tariffs must have incentives which
ensure that a company’s optimal economic adaptation to the regime coincides
with the economically efficient solution.”
This measure reflects the incentive objectives applicable for the
vertically integrated structure of today, but it is must be rephrased to cover the
effects caused by liberalization. In Section 7.4.3 the key features of the
prevailing incentive structure are analyzed. It will become apparent in the
analyses that liberalization will call for new incentive structures in order to
improve on rationing efficiencies in a liberalized context.
The incentive structure is to a large extent dependent on political
decisions. No new incentives are formally introduced into the Norwegian
legislation so far except for those suggestions specified in the recently issued
Norwegian St. prp. nr. 36 (2000-2001). The document is still pending final
approval. 17 This document emphasizes – in relation to the effectiveness
measure stated here – the importance of having the transport operations
conducted impartially and in such a way that all shippers are treated in an
equal manner. Based on this information and the assessment activity C.4 and
the discussion of Section 7 some observations are made here and summarized
below:
Observation 7.11. The transport operations shall treat all shippers
impartially and equally and the transportation system operator shall
conduct its activities in an independent (neutral) manner.
Observation 7.12. New incentives for improving economic efficiency
must probably be introduced as a consequence of the Gas Directive and
in order to treat all shippers equally. It is especially argued that a new
incentive structure is needed for securing rationing- and potentially also
cost- efficient daily transport operations in a liberalized context.
Observation 7.13. The main means to achieve a proper incentive
structure, an efficient allocation of existing capacity and cost efficient
operations are the tariff and toll regimes and an efficient product
selection of transportation services. This therefore constitutes a revised
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effectiveness measure and it will be the subject for research work later
in this dissertation.
Further, by reference to Section 6 and the lessons learned from
liberalization in other regions, a liberalization process will typically result in
disputes between stakeholders related to cost and tolls. All gas industries
studied in this work have established a resolute and independent regulator who
is entitled to settle disputes. Such regulators are established by virtue of
national legislation.
Observation 7.14. It may be assumed that stakeholders will experience
disputes and conflict of interests related to transportation services,
access, and tariff and toll to a larger extent than what has been common
so far. It may therefore be a need to establish a dispute settlement
arrangement in order to settle such disputes. 190  This topic is not
pursued any further by this work.
7.2.2.5 Supportive agreements
This measures states that: “Sales-, transport-, and upstream-
agreements shall be negotiated and agreed upon by parties in such manners
that the agreements support transport operations, and vice versa.”
In a liberalized regime this effectiveness measure will still be valid.
There is however one important noteworthy distinction. Given the assumption
that the transportation services are transparent and access to the transportation
system is made available as specified in the Gas Directive, the transportation
system operator must include in his product portfolio services that support
such upstream transportation. Such services must be made more transparent
than what is the prevailing practice. One observation is thus stated here:
Observation 7.15. The future tariff and toll regime must support
upstream arrangements and provide transparent services for such
arrangements.
7.2.2.6 Reasonable and prudent
This measure states: “Operations shall be conducted in a “reasonable
and prudent manner,” with due attention to safety and the environment.” This
requirement is valid in a liberalized regime. The conditions for operations will
                                          
190 The Gas Directive has provisions to this effect, see Article 23.3-4
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probably change as a consequence of liberalization, but the conduct must
always remain reasonable and prudent. One specific related argument can be
made here, derived from experiences of regulatory regimes elsewhere, and as
was discussed in Section 6 namely that:
Observation 7.16. The tariff and toll regime shall be designed in a just
and reasonable, prudent and fair fashion.
7.2.2.7 Gas buyer compliance
The gas buyers must act in accordance with the sales agreements. In
Section 6 it has been documented that gas buyers in a liberalized market
diversify their contracts and in Section 7.3 this topic is further discussed. But
regardless of the contracts entered into, this effectiveness measure remains the
same assuming that the gas buyers must act prudently according to the
contracts made.
One special situation regarding the existing Take-or-Pay contracts is
regulated in the Gas Directive. If any parties encounter “serious economic and
financial difficulties” because of these commitments, Article 25 of the Gas
Directive specifies some counter measures. These topics however, are not
discussed any further in this work.
7.2.2.8 Regularity
Dry gas transport system deliveries shall be made to gas buyers with
100% regularity. Based on the current gas sales commitments, this
effectiveness measure is an ultimate goal. If new types of gas sales contracts
will be introduced in a liberalized regime such as interruptible contracts, this
measure obviously is irrelevant for those contracts. However, a high technical
regularity of the facilities will always be attractive and aimed for, especially in
periods of full capacity usage. The effectiveness measure is thus relevant in a
liberalized regime. 191
7.2.2.9 Other measures being unchanged
The remaining effectiveness measures related to gas quality, tariff and
toll, communication system, and production filed regularity remain valid as
specified.
                                          
191 Reference is also made to the Canadian experience, where the regularity of gas
transportation became imperative in the time that followed the introduction of deregulation.
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7.2.3 Summary
The main lesson learned here is that many of the effectiveness measures
remain the same, especially those related to the resource management, see
Observation 7.1 and Observation 7.2, Observation 7.4 through Observation
7.6 and Observation 7.10. Some of the effectiveness measures however, must
be changed – or be rephrased somewhat – in order to reflect valid
effectiveness measures in a liberalized regime and to incorporate essential new
legislative requirements caused by the Gas Directive. In the preceding text
these changes are summarized based on the observations identified in this sub-
section. The revised effectiveness measures, relevant for this work can be
summarized as follows:
Conclusion 7.1. In order to facilitate competition in the downstream
market – a pre-requisite for competition according to the Gas Directive,
domestic suppliers may be required to compete (between themselves) in
the gas market, see Observation 7.7.
Conclusion 7.2. In order to facilitate such competition shippers of gas
will require new transportation services, see Observation 7.8.
Conclusion 7.3. New transportation services must be developed in
order to meet the shippers’ new demands and the main means for
providing such services is a new tariff and toll regime, see Observation
7.9.
Conclusion 7.4. The new tariff and toll regime must enhance rationing
efficiency and cost efficiency and provide an incentive structure to this
effect, see Observation 7.12, Observation 7.13 and Observation 7.15.
Conclusion 7.5. Transport operations must be transparent and secure
all shippers access to the services, see Observation 7.11.
Conclusion 7.6. The new tariff and toll regime must be compatible
with an efficient physical transport operation and it must support
upstream agreements in order to enhance production of natural gas, oil
and NGL, see Observation 7.15.
Conclusion 7.7. A new toll regime must be just and reasonable,
transparent and fair, see Observation 7.16.
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The revised measures have been review by a representative of the
Transportation System Operator and found reasonable. The author will thus
argue that the hypothesis C.2 is true, given the uncertainty that exists due to
lack of political decisions regarding the implementation of the Gas Directive
into Norwegian legislation.
7.3 New modes for future transport operations
7.3.1 The hypothesis C.3
The hypothesis C.3 states: “It is possible to unambiguously specify
some future economic and technical requirements, and to express and treat
these requirements as test-case scenarios in the succeeding work”.
In the following sub-sections this hypothesis is tested. The hypothesis is
true if it is possible to make probable some requirements for future operations
by deriving and inferring such requirements from three distinct sources. The
first source is obviously the revised effectiveness measures as concluded in the
sub-section 7.2.3 above. Secondly, the assumptions regarding future
operational modes are checked against the economic theory and related
literature. Finally experiences learned from similar situations elsewhere are
applied to see whether the new modes look reasonable.
The author recognizes that such requirements for new operational
modes under all circumstances will be uncertain to some extent as the final
outcome of the Gas Directive’s implementation process in a Norwegian
context is still pending political decisions and judgements. 17 The validity of
the suggested requirements is also influenced by the way the industry chooses
to respond to the Gas Directive – an experience still largely unknown.
In the initial stages of the dissertation work two assumptions were
made:
· Scenario 1: The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible means to
include short-term sales agreements in addition to the existing take or
pay agreements, taking into consideration the effect of possibly varying
natural gas market prices.
· Scenario 2: The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible means to
incorporate access of “third party shippers” in the transportation system.
The results of the work that has been done since these test scenarios
were suggested have shown their validity. But the work has also shown that a
slight rephrasing of the text will reflect future operational modes more
accurately regarding transportation services and transport operations. A
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rephrasing of the scenarios is therefore given at the end of this sub-section.
In relation to the first scenario it is show in the following text that
liberalization will introduce supplier competition. This is an argument derived
from the economic theory as pointed out in Section 3.4.3. The work shows
that literature and experiences support this conclusion. As a subsequent notion
diversified gas sales contracts will probably develop, again, derived from
theoretical assumptions and supported by experience. The next logical step
here is that the transportation costs shall be unbundled and made transparent.
This will result in a need to develop “stand-alone” transportation services that
support the shippers’ (and gas sellers’) need for diversified gas sales contracts,
eventually resulting in “firm, interruptible and peak load transportation.”
The second scenario is derived directly from the Gas Directive.
7.3.2 Firm and interruptible transportation
7.3.2.1 Introduction of supplier competition
From an economic point of view, competing suppliers in one way or
another represent a prerequisite to any alternative to regulated price - a fact
that has been noted by several journal and textbook authors over the years and
has been borne out by experiences around the world. Bjerkholt et al. (1990),192
for example, recognize this fact in their analysis of how liberalization would
affect the European gas market. Their analyses consider three major national
gas suppliers’ battle over market share in Europe. They apply a specific
simulation model calculating market share based on individual suppliers’ cost
functions and estimated demand functions, concluding that the results are very
sensitive to exogenous change.193
Golombek et al. (1995)194 also evaluate the effects of a radical
liberalization in Europe. They assume various possible approaches to selling
gas: sellers are considered in one case to be profit-maximizing Cournot
producers, in another case to be traders exploiting arbitrage, and so on. Their
conclusion is that economic welfare in Western Europe could increase by 15%
to 20% in the long run. In a more recent publication, the same authors 195
extend their study to include domestic suppliers, concluding that “once the
                                          
192 Bjerkholt et al. (1990 and 1992).
193 Yves Smeers (1997) offers an overview of the key elements of the European legislative
process, noting the diversity of the institutional contexts. He concludes that market
liberalization will probably be an intricate process. He also discusses how computable
equilibrium models can be applied to assess the market.
194 Golombek et al (1995).
195 Golombek et al (1998).
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demand side of the market is liberalized, each gas-producing country has an
incentive to break up its gas sellers.” The authors do, however, recognize
several obstacles to such a development, among the most important of which
are the possibilities of reductions in gas prices as well as in national profits.
In a recent paper, Ellis et al.196 follow up on the above discussions and
explore the effect on the market of three possible company strategies. They
claim that the Gas Directive alone is insufficient to create a competitive
market. Significant structural changes in the market depend on the strategic
positions taken by the stakeholders, who may pursue the particular market
structures that they prefer. Finally, an important point to note is that in all the
above studies, ideal “third-party” access to transportation systems is assumed.
The question of how to introduce competing suppliers on the NCS — if
competition should become a reality — is a very complex issue, indeed. One
difficult question is whether or not a structure of competing suppliers on the
NCS is compatible with the prevailing resource-management objective and the
extent to which such an objective must be altered. A related question is how
new licenses shall be awarded in a new regime.
Another legal question is who shall actually be the competing suppliers;
shall they be, for example, the field licensing group as a whole versus other
licensing groups, or shall it be based on a company level?
The above questions will not be perused any further here as they
basically are legal questions subject for political decisions. The outcome of
such questions will give rise to some other complex questions related to field-
production planning and over/under lifting of gas in the fields. These
questions will not be discussed either.
7.3.2.2 Introduction of diversified gas sales contracts
While existing Norwegian gas sales contracts may generally be
characterized as offering bundled services, 197 new contracts might be expected
to relax any “premium delivery” conditions and be much more diversified.
Existing agreements typically provide buyers with a high degree of security in
supply, gas quality, and flexibility in nominations over a long time period.
New contracts, however, may seek to include fewer services, and buyers may
consequently argue for a diversified pricing regime, as well. These
assumptions are also discussed in Section 5.2.2 of WP No. 39 (1999–2000).
According to economic theory, diversification can be understood as
                                          
196 Ellis et al. (2000)
197 See Section 7.4.2.11 on page 162.
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“freedom to enter and independence of action.” 198 New contracts typically
specify different provisions for total contract duration (in terms ranging from
days to years) and when deliveries shall start and stop (e.g., immediate
deliveries, as in the spot market, 199 or future deliveries). New rules may be
specified regarding the right to nominate how much variation is permitted in
daily contract quantity (DCQ) and where the gas is to be delivered and re-
delivered (the “hubs”). Finally, new requirements for the level of backup
arrangements to be utilized, such as gas storage, regularity of support,
modulation, hedging, and so on may be agreed to.
In Section 6 it is documented that the above assumptions are supported
by experiences from North America.
7.3.2.3 Introduction of firm and interruptible transportation services
The existing transportation service generally features only one service,
namely guaranteed transportation for all shippers.200 A liberalized regime, to
the contrary, would likely require significant diversification of the
transportation services. Such a split of transportation services into new
products is a core effect of the liberalization process as reflected in the
Conclusion 7.1 through Conclusion 7.3 on page 125.
This observation is based on experiences from other regions. These
lessons 201 tell us that the market may develop into different basic categories
of services identified as: non-interruptible service, interruptible service and
may be also peak load service. The first one is often also referred to as firm
supply or firm capacity. A similar development is also partly suggested as
relevant by the “The Brattle Group” (2000). 202
This conclusion is also supported by economic theory because an
efficient rationing will require all available capacity to be used if there is a
willingness to pay the costs of being served. If available off-peak capacity is
released at a lower toll than firm capacity some shippers will utilize this
capacity – in theory. These are the shippers who have a lower willingness to
pay for transport services than those requiring firm supply. One feasible major
way to distinguish between transportation services and thus costs of
transportation is by the level of security of supply.
                                          
198 Kahn (1988).
199 Roeber (1996) indicates the importance of spot markets in the UK.
200 So far, interruptible transportation agreements have been used only to a very limited
extent and they are agreed case by case.
201 See Section 6 and the experiences from TransCanada and Colombia Gas.
202 See Table 1 page 15 of The Brattle Group (2000)
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        130
To sum up, the first test case requirement for future transport operations
is thus rephrased as shown in Conclusion 7.8 of the summary of this sub-
section, see page 131.
7.3.3 Equal access to transportation systems
In Section 6 a detailed assessment of the Gas Directive was conducted.
The Norwegian view of the implementation process is to some extent
discussed in White Paper no. 39. Section 5.3 of this White Paper refers to
Article 23 of the Gas Directive and states that the scope or range of Article 23
needs to be further clarified. 203
At least two outcomes or scenarios of such clarification can be
suggested. In the first, the prevailing Norwegian regulatory regime continues
to a large extent. The assumption is that an insignificant number of eligible
customers and natural gas undertakings, other than the current ones, will
request access to the dry gas system. In this scenario, domestic suppliers on
the NCS will not compete. The current tariff and tolling system, therefore, is
assumed to largely serve shippers’ needs.
Some minor distortions, however, may occur of the type indicated in the
discussion of Section 7.4.3. These distortions are caused by uneven ratios of a
company’s share of ownership in a given pipeline system versus its share of
gas shipment in the same system. This may require some adjustments in tariff
and tolling rules, as indicated in WP No. 39 (1999-2000), Sect. 2.1.1, but no
major structural changes are envisaged.
The second outcome proposes a development discussed by Golombek et
al. (1998) and Ellis et al. (2000) (in their “pull-the-plug scenario”), involving a
radical liberalization, competing domestic suppliers, and access to the
Norwegian dry gas system for any eligible customer and natural gas
undertaking. In addition, all shippers ideally shall have access on equal terms
to natural gas transportation, transmission, and distribution system services.
Ellis et al. (2000) might serve as representatives for a large number of authors
expressing this view.204 They conclude, “competition is unlikely to emerge in
supplies to end-users unless access is unrestricted to existing gas networks.”
If we now finally turn to the experiences obtained from the assessment
of the conditions in North America, “open access” to the transportation
                                          
203 The interpretation and translation of the WPs and the Gas Directive, offered here,
represent the author’s best understanding and summarization of the material; the
adjudicated Norwegian text and the text of the Gas Directive, of course, supersede any
statements made here. Brautaset et al. (pp. 36–40) offer some interpretations of the
applicability of Article 23.
204 Jensen (1992) also discusses the importance of “open access,” as do the IEA studies.
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systems is a recognized notion as was clarified in Section 6.3.2 on page 103.
This latter scenario is thus applied in this work as a research
requirement. The work does not evaluate the extent to which this will be the
outcome of the Norwegian political process, but the work shows that this
development is realistic based on experiences from other regions and based on
analytical discussions founded on economic theory.
To sum up, the second test case requirement for future transport
operations based on the discussion above and also based on the revised
effectiveness measures, see Conclusion 7.5 in sub-section 7.2.3, is thus
rephrased as shown in Conclusion 7.9 below.
7.3.4 Summary
Two test cases are defined in the preceding text and they are based on
the test cases suggested initially in the work. The hypothesis C.3 is therefore
argued to be true. The test cases reflect that if the Gas Directive will have any
impact on Norwegian dry gas transport operations at all, a development as
identified here may be envisaged.
 The two test cases are rephrased as follows:
Conclusion 7.8. Test case scenario one can now be written as follows:
The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible methods to include
firm, interruptible and peak load transportation in addition to the
existing ship or pay transportation agreements, taking into consideration
the effect of an elastic demand for transportation services.
Conclusion 7.9. Test case scenario two can now be written as follows:
The dissertation shall analyze and suggest possible means to incorporate
equal access to the transportation system for all eligible customers and
natural gas undertakings.
7.4 New economic methods and principles for future operations
7.4.1 The hypothesis C.4
In sub-section 7.4 hypothesis C.4 is tested stating that: “It is possible to
develop new economic methods and rules in order to fulfill the future
economic requirements”.
In the first sub-section empirical data for the Norwegian natural gas
transportation systems is analyzed by means of economic and technical theory.
The purpose of this analysis is to derive some observations that may support
the later discussions of how to design new tariff and toll regimes and
organizational changes and so on. The empirical data and formulas are related
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to economy of scale and scope, costs of investments and energy consumption,
line packing and prevailing principles for gas pricing and gas quality.
The second sub-section contains an analytic discussion of the prevailing
tolling regime and incentives for profit maximization and cost reductions.
Several provisions are stated and some conclusions are drawn regarding the
extent to which the prevailing regime will be feasible in a liberalized context.
In the third sub-section the different tariff and toll principles described
in Section 3.4.5 are revisited and differentiated into some analytically
preferred tolling rules. This sub-section discusses implementation of toll rules
and conducts some analyses of different options. A number of theoretical and
practical questions are assessed. Some examples are: how shall a toll base for
tolling be established - shall old or new costs be considered, and is it a feasible
approach to calculate the toll by means of a “postage-stamp” approach or is a
toll based on the distances shipped a better solution?
7.4.2 Analytical assessment of empirical information
7.4.2.1 Validation of economy of scale and scope
The first bulk of empirical data analyzed here are used to evaluate
economies of scale. The existence of economy of scale is an imperative
economic fact. In order to support and document its validity some costs were
calculated for five main Norwegian transportation pipelines. The data applied
here are collected from MPE’s publications 205 and they are tabulated in Table
5. The table presents some data for these pipelines, along with the ratio
between investment and capacity over a typical licensing period. The licensing
period is set equal to 20 years.
Economies of scale can be realized during investment and is defined as
changes in cost with and equal proportional change in all input factors (the
long-run average cost). In a nutshell, it is cheaper to build, operate, and
maintain one large pipeline with a given capacity than two (or more) smaller
pipelines with the same total capacity. According to the International Energy
Agency (IEA), 206 “as a pipeline grows in capacity, its costs increase less than
linearly while throughput increases exponentially.” Bjørkvoll 207 concludes
that a doubling in installed compressor effect and pipeline diameter
quadruples pipeline capacity.
                                          
205 See Fact Sheet (1999)
206 IEA Transportation Study (1994).
207 Bjørkvoll (1994).
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 Table 5. Some economic and technical data for five major pipelines
Pipeline Start-
up
year
Dia.
(in)
Length
(km)
Annual
Capa-
city
(GSm3)
Daily
peak
capacity
208
(MSm3)
Invest-
ment,
1999
money
(GNOK)
Invest-
ment/
capacity
(NOK/
Sm3)
Norpipe 1977 36 440 19.0 53.8 34.4 0.0905
Zeepipe 1993 40 814 12.0 34.0 15.3 0.0638
Europipe 1995 40 716 209 17.0 48.2 15.0 0.0441
Franpipe 1998 42 840 15.0 42.5 7.6 0.0253
Europipe
II
1999 42 653 18.0 51.0 7.5 0.0208
Total 3463 81.0 229.5 79.8
Average
210
0.0493
As can be seen from the last column in the table above, the ratio of
investment to capacity has fallen in price over the years. Some of the
explanation is due to technological change, and some is attributed to
economies of scale. A detailed assessment is not conducted here to determine
the portion that is due to economy of scale.
A comparison of the ratio of steel volume to gas volume per unit length
for two Norwegian pipelines, Statpipe (30”) and Zeepipe (40”) illustrates the
latter. This comparison is made for locations at which the specified water
depth and internal pressures are in the same range, approximately 100 m and
160 bars, respectively. The pipe wall thicknesses are 22.2 mm and 26.1 mm,
211 respectively and this causes the ratio to reduce from 0.1165 to 0.1028. In
the IEA transportation study 212 similar conclusions are derived from a study
of the US natural gas transportation industry where economies of scale were
identified by calculating the pipeline construction costs/capacity for a number
of pipeline projects.
Observation 7.17. There are significant conditions for economy of
                                          
208 Daily peak capacity = yearly capacity/(365 – M), for M equal to some small specified
number of days the facility is shut down for scheduled maintenance.
209 Including pipes on land. Source: Statoil.
210 Weighted average, by volume
211 Source: Statoil.
212 See fig 3 of the IEA (1994) study
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scale in Norwegian natural gas sub sea pipeline systems. One major
reason for reduced investment costs is caused by the fact that the
relative required volume of steel reduces as the diameter increases.
Observation 7.18. Any future development of such systems must seek
to fully utilize these conditions in order to save investment costs.
Economy of scale can also be illustrated by calculating and comparing
the required inlet pressures for different pipelines in order to transport the
same amount of gas, with all parameters the same except for diameter.
Equations (Eq. 3.3.1-3) of Section 3.3 will produce such results and as show in
Figure 15. Here different inlet pressures are calculated for different pipeline
diameters as shown, while pipeline length (800 km), delivery pressure (80
bar), and flow (25 MSm3/day) all are kept constant. 213 All other parameters
are as specified in Section 3.3. As can be seen a smaller pipe requires more
compressor power than does a larger one, increasing variable operating costs
unfavorably for smaller pipes.
Figure 15.  Required inlet pressures for different pipes transporting same
amount of gas and delivering at same pressures
                                          
213 In these calculations the compressibility factors and the friction factors were calculated
for each case and the values ranged from 0,67- 0,68 for the Z-factors and from 0,0021-
0,00199 for the f-factors.
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Observation 7.19. There is economy of scale in operations as the
variable cost reduces as the diameter increases.
Observation 7.20. Any new development of new capacity must take
into considerations such effects.
A minor aspect of economies of scale is also present due to the nature of
compressor work equations. At a constant throughput, the required
incremental energy consumption increases less than linearly as delivery
pressure increases.
Economy of scope occurs in transport operations when the same
organization unit undertakes new task of different nature with less cost
compared to the option of having another organization unit doing the task. A
typical example 214 of this economic condition is to transfer as many tasks as
possible from “day personnel” to “shift personnel” in a 24 hours operated
control room. If we assume that this can be done without increasing the
workforce in the control room the net effect is a reduction in total number of
employees.
Statoil has utilized this possibility in their daily operations. Some few
examples are transfer of planning NGL shipments, general planning and
reporting activities, conduct of night-time security checks on the premises and
so on.
The significance of economy of scope is probably difficult to calculate
and quantify. The Statoil organization is currently handling approximately
90% of the Norwegian natural gas transport operations. Any calculations of
potential benefits or losses due to economy of scope must be based on an
assumption of a different organizational set-up on the NCS and no attempts
are made here to stipulate such costs.
Observation 7.21. Economy of scope has been utilized in the industry
and it can be achieved by having different operational task centralized
into one organizational unit. If the liberalization process calls for re-
organizing of the industry such conditions should be carefully assessed
in order not to create unintentional adverse effects.
7.4.2.2 Investment costs
An important component of the tolling regime is the fixed cost, largely
                                          
214 Source: Author’s experience
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comprising irreversible costs but also some reversible costs. The fixed cost is
derived from the investments and these investments are sunk costs as was
described in Section 3.4. The following sub-section takes a closer look on
these costs and it shows how to calculate annual coverage of such cost under
given assumptions for the five chosen pipelines specified in Table 5. These
discussions will provide valuable information later to be utilized when new
toll regimes are discussed.
In the calculations presented here the irreversible fixed annual capital
cost is calculated based on annual equivalent criterion calculations: 215
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Here,
FCI is the annual fixed capital cost, NOK/ Sm
3
i is the real discount rate
N is number of periods, years
Ipipe is the net present value of the pipeline investment in 1999 money,
NOK
Q is the annual throughput, Sm3
A number of sources are applied here in order to assign appropriate
values to the parameters specified in (Eq. 7.4.1). The first parameter assessed
is the interest rate.
The interest rate is of course a quite essential parameter as its size is
proportional with revenues for the pipeline owner. In a Norwegian context the
rate is specified by means of the PAD licensing approvals. The rate has in
recent years been limited to 7% real rate of return on capital invested before
taxes as documented in Section 5.3.2.4. In North America the rate of return is
typically between 12-14%. Many financial factors influence on the size of the
rate of return figure such as whether it is to be understood as the net rate of
return or not. Further, different aspects of risk exposure may influence on its
size.
The next parameter assessed is the investment figures. These are
derived from the Fact Sheet (1999) and they are tabulated in Table 5.
In a similar manner as how the rate of return is specified in licensing
                                          
215 See for example Park and Sharp-Bette (1990) page 204.
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document is the number of years of the licensing period specified in the same
document. In a Norwegian context this figure is typically ranging from 20 –
25 years. In North America the allowed depreciation period typically could
last much longer, for example 40 years.
The last parameter to decide is the annual throughput. White Paper no.
39 (1999–2000) clarifies that the peak capacity in a Norwegian context is
normally 110% of an annual contract quantity (ACQ). On average, customers
nominate approximately 90% ACQ, according to the White Paper, which
yields an 80% average annual utilization of the transportation system. The
yearly throughput is thus simply specified as 80% of the pipelines’ maximum
capacities. The maximum capacities are specified in Table 5.
In Figure 16 different values of annual fixed and irreversible costs FCI
are calculated for different sets of parameters for the five pipelines chosen. As
can be seen the choice of interest rates, and the licensing periods, or years for
depreciation, significantly influence on the results. The pipeline utilization is
fixed in all calculations at a level of 80% utilization.
Figure 16.  Annual fixed costs (FCI) for different pipelines at 80%
utilization
Based on the assessment above some few observations can be
concluded:
Observation 7.22.  The irreversible costs - as they appear for shippers
in a Norwegian context – are significantly influenced by several
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parameters being politically decided. These parameters are the regulated
rate of return, the time period of depreciation or the licensing period and
the level of utilization applied as the base load. In connection with
liberalization and deregulation elsewhere, several of these parameters
are brought up as objects for discussions between shippers, owners and
regulators. The Norwegian rate of return is low compared to typical
values applied in North America.
Observation 7.23.  Due to the very fact that Norwegian authorities have
published cost figures for the relevant pipeline system, the level of fixed
costs are already fairly transparent to external observers.
Observation 7.24. The fixed cost comprises in the range of 88-90% of
total average costs (see sub-section 7.4.2.6).
These irreversible costs contribute significantly to the declining short-
run average cost as shown in Figure 17. Here Europipe I is taken as an
example showing the FCI at 7% interest rate and 20 years of depreciation. As
average annual throughput increases the FCI reduces accordingly, as there are
more and more units of gas “to share” the costs.
Figure 17.  Declining irreversible costs in Europipe I
One main observation can be concluded:
Observation 7.25. Irreversible costs feature significant declining
average costs as throughput increases and this fact ought to be taken
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into consideration in the incentive structure of a future toll regime. (The
tariff and toll regime and regulatory incentive structures must be
designed so that they enhance full and optimized utilization of the
pipeline systems. See Section 7.4.4 where such issues are discussed).
7.4.2.3  Operational and maintenance costs
Operational and maintenance costs are reversible costs but they stay
fixed for a limited short period of time, typically a budget year.  In this sub-
section these costs are looked into.
There are six categories of reversible short-run fixed costs and these are
in sum noted FCO. The unit is NOK/Sm
3. All these costs are related to
operations and maintenance of the natural gas transportation systems. The
total annual budget for year 2000 covering these costs for the Statoil operated
systems is as a whole approximately 540 MNOK. 216 These costs are split into
six categories as follows:
· 10% for dispatching, termed FCd
· 25% for pipeline inspection and repair contingency, termed FCi
· 20% for shore terminal operations, termed FCt
· 25% for riser platform operations (two platforms), termed FCp
· 10% for administration, corporate overhead, R&D funding, property
tax, and the carbon dioxide emissions tax, termed FCa
· 10% for insurance, termed FCs
In mathematical terms the reversible fixed costs can be formulated as:
FCO = FCd + FCi + FCt + FCp + FCa + FCs
Observation 7.26. As can be verified evidently from the figures
displayed above, the current Statoil policy is to make the reversible cost
figures transparent.
Observation 7.27. The reversible costs comprise in the range of 8-10%
of total average costs (see sub-section 7.4.2.6).
The reversible costs are normally declining as throughput increases. If
                                          
216 Source: Statoil, year 2000 budget. Norpipe operation is not included in this figure.
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we assume that approximately 51 GSm3/yr will be transported in year 2000, 217
the FCO yields a unit cost of 0.0106 NOK/Sm
3. If costs remain the same until
year 2006, but the yearly throughput is increased to 72 GSm3/yr, the FCO will
yield a unit cost of only 0.0075 NOK/Sm3. Or in other words, if a constant
return to scale is applied (producing a linear increase in costs), these total
annual costs (FCO *Q) will have increased by an annual incremental cost of
approximately 224 MNOK in 2006.
In several of the cost categories listed above, declining average costs are
present. In the first category, the dispatching, these conditions are observed if
spare capacity is present and more work can be performed without increasing
costs. The dispatching costs consist basically of manning costs and
computer/software costs. Provided excess capacities exist in these recourses
new additional tasks (but equal in nature) may be added on without increasing
costs. The unit cost is thus decreasing for a given pipeline as throughput
increases in the pipeline. But there is also declining average cost in the sense
that the unit cost for dispatching of the total network decreases when new
pipelines are taken into an existing organization’s portfolio with no or only
minor additional costs. 218
Pipeline inspection and repair contingency programs are costly
activities also exhibiting declining average costs. In order to inspect the
pipelines internally, inspection tools are sent through the pipelines, and the gas
streams power them. Such tools are often termed “intelligent inspection pigs”.
External pipeline inspections require survey by sophisticated subsea tools
lowered into the sea from ships sailing the pipeline routes. It is obviously
cheaper to inspect one large pipeline rather than several minor pipelines as the
cost of inspection is linear with the pipeline length being inspected.
Further, the pipeline repair systems and contingency facilities (PRS) are
designed to repair existing pipelines by means of divers and tools remotely
controlled from a service ship. The repair equipment, tools and habitats are
design to fit all existing pipeline sizes. If a new pipeline is put into operation
and this pipeline has a size within the service range of the PRS the average
repair contingency costs are declining. These conditions are caused by the fact
                                          
217 Annual flow data is taken from WP No. 39 (1999-2000), Sect. 5.
218 Another related and similar issue is the learning effect in the organization. This effect
makes the organization more effective over time, creating the possibilities to take on new
tasks without increasing the costs linearly. One example derived from the author’s
experience may serve to illustrate the point. The dispatch and control center’s training costs
for commissioning of Zeepipe IIA (1996) was approximately 50 % of the training cost of
Europipe (1995), which again was 50% of training costs for Zeepipe (1993).
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that the average cost per pipeline length is decreased the more pipelines that
are included in the scheme.
Platform- and terminal - operations and administration costs exhibit
declining average costs by the same token as listed above. As long as there are
excess capacities in these resources additional tasks can be included causing
declining average costs.
A final and quite significant observation is that managerial discretion
over the operations and maintenance costs is limited, as a majority of the tasks
performed are required by statutory documents. In a Canadian context, the
management typically has less than a 50% influence in such matters,
according to Mansell and Church (1995). This figure is probably applicable to
a Norwegian context, as well. This observation supports the author’s view as
previously expressed in Section 3.4.4, namely that dynamic and allocative
efficiency is achieved basically during the planning and development stages of
a pipeline system, and not during the operational stage.
Observation 7.28. There are declining average costs in the reversible
costs due to the centralized organizational set-up of the transport
operations.
7.4.2.4 Variable cost
The next cost element assessed here is variable cost and it is termed
VC(Q,P). Its numerical size is basically dependent on throughput, delivery
pressures and fuel costs. Theories of fluidmechanics and thermodynamics are
applied in order to calculate this cost. In the proceeding text the required
compressor power is calculated for transporting gas in a pipeline system. In
order to illustrate and validate the calculations data from the Kollsnes plant
and Zeepipe IIB are applied.
Several major parameters influence on the variable costs. The three
most interesting ones to be studied here are the throughput (or mass flow of
gas through the compressor), the compressor suction- and exit- pressures and
the fuel costs. In order to assess these relationships the equations in Section
3.3 are applied and empirical data is applied in the analyses.
In the following example three flow rates are chosen; Q100 = 100
MSm3/d, Q70 = 70 MSm
3/d, and Q56 = 56 MSm
3/d. These figures represents
approximately full export capacity from the Kollsnes plant, 219 maximum flow
in Zeepipe IIB and 80% flow in Zeepipe IIB, respectively.
                                          
219 Source: Fact Sheet (1999) section 17 specifies Kollsnes; max. capacity at 100 MSm3/d.
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In order to calculate the compressor power, the compressor’s suction
pressure and delivery pressures must be defined. These values are assumed to
be, Ps = 76 bar and P1 = 120 to 186 bar, respectively. 
220 Based on (Eq. 3.3.6)
through (Eq. 3.3.9) the theoretical compressor power requirements are
calculated for different outlet pressures and the results are shown in the Figure
18 below.
Figure 18.  Theoretical compressor power
At full capacity i.e. at a flow of 100 MSm3/d and at an outlet pressure of
186 bar from the compressor the power requirement is approximately 154,7
MW. This figure corresponds well with actual values. 221
 The last step here is to calculate the variable costs as a function of the
fuel consumption. The compressor drives can either be electrical motors,
which is the case at Kollsnes or they can be gas-fired turbines. The fuel costs
are thus dependent on the type of drives that is installed. Further, in the case of
gas fired turbines the fuel costs are dependent on the location of the
installation, being either offshore or onshore. In the case of an offshore
installation the owners must pay a carbon dioxide tax on each cubic meter of
gas burned, while this is not required for onshore installations. Taking such
considerations into the analyses, the following costs for electricity and fuel gas
                                          
220 Source: Statoil
221 At Kollsnes, 5 electrical driven compressor packages are installed. Each compressor
package delivers 25 MSm3/d and requires 38 MW at maximum capacity. The total power
requirement is thus 4*38= 152 which is some few percentage lower than the figures
calculated in this example. Source Statoil.
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are stipulated:
Onshore el-costs:          cel = 2928 NOK/MWday = 12,2 øre/kWh 
222
Offshore gas fuel costs: cgt  =  0,85 NOK/Sm
3 223
Onshore gas fuel costs:  cgt  = 0,60 NOK/Sm
3 224
The variable costs for compressing gas into the pipeline for the three
different fuel cost alternatives can thus be found by multiplying the fuel costs
with the power requirements calculated for the drives according to (Eq.
3.3.10) and (Eq. 3.3.11). This will yield the following equations:
el
elel
W
cVC
h
·
*= (Eq. 7.4.2)
·
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*
**
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GCV
cVC
gtfuel
gtgt h
606024
(Eq. 7.4.3)
Here, the terms have the following meaning:
VCel     is the variable cost based on electricity, NOK/d
VCgt       is the variable cost based on fuel gas, NOK/d
GCVfuel  is the heating value of the gas, assumed to be 40*10
6 J/Sm3
The variable costs for transporting a maximum flow of 70 MSm3/d in
Zeepipe IIB is shown in Figure 19, calculated for the three fuel alternatives as
listed above. The variable costs for delivering gas at a flow rate of 70 MSm3/d,
at the outlet pressure of 186 bar is 0,602 MNOK/d if we use the carbon tax as
fuel cost (equal to the offshore fuel cost of 0,85 NOK/Sm3). The figure is
reduced to 0,425 MNOK/d if we use the sales gas price as the cost of fuel
(assumed here to be 0,60 NOK/Sm3).
Another way of expressing these costs is to compare the variable costs
with the revenues from gas sales. If we, for example, assume an offshore
                                          
222 In the report NOU 1998: 11 “Energi- og kraftbalansen i Norge mot 2020”, issued by
MPE, at page 97, table 7.8, the value of electricity in the Norwegian market for large
industrial purposes is specified at: 12,2 øre/kWh. Actual values may likely be somewhat
higher from time to time.
223 According to the Petroleum Law
224 The fuel cost is set equal to the gas price as applied in this work, see Section 7.4.2.10.
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installation and a corresponding carbon tax as the fuel cost, the total revenue
of selling 70 MSm3/d will yield 42 MNOK/d while the VC will yield 0,6
MNOK/d or approximately 1,4 % of the gas sales value.
As a note here it can be mentioned that according to the rules laid down
in the prevailing regime and transportation agreements the fuel gas is provided
“free of charge” by the shippers. Any inclusion of cost of fuel gas
consumption is thus not included in the tariff formula.
Figure 19. Theoretical VC for transporting gas in Zeepipe IIB
Observation 7.29. The variable costs are large in absolute terms, but
small in relative terms as they comprise typically less than 3,8 % of
total average costs (see sub-section 7.4.2.6). As many of the compressor
drives are gas fired, there will always be incentives to reduce the fuel
gas consumption due to environmental and economic reasons. These
facts are considered in later analyses of the work.
For the sake of completeness and for use in the next sub-section the
equations (Eq. 7.4.2) and (Eq. 7.4.3) can be written as shown below.
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7.4.2.5 Short-run marginal cost and average variable cost
Marginal cost pricing constitutes an important base case for tolling and
it gives proper incentives for optimal usage of the system (provided there is
sufficient capacity). Economic literature often refers to marginal cost pricing
as the first best solution, see Section 3.4.5.3 on page 46. In order therefore
better to understand how the marginal cost function behaves and how to
quantify and assess its numerical values as flow rates and pressures changes,
some formulas for marginal costs are developed below.
Marginal costs in the short run, when no new capacity is being
developed, can be found from the partial derivatives of the compressor cost
functions (Eq. 7.4.4) and (Eq. 7.4.5) with respect to flow and pressure. All
other cost elements being parts of the total cost function are treated as fixed
costs and they contribute nothing to marginal costs.
Marginal costs are often referred to as short run or long run marginal
costs. In order to specify the difference between “short run” and “long run”
some few definitions are suggested here. The short run period is defined to be
a time period where no new investments are done and this period may
typically be thought of as one year.
The long run may be understood as the licensing period or alternatively
the systems technical lifetime. A long run perspective may thus typically be
20-25 years or even 50 years. During this period of time new investment or
unexpected maintenance and repair may occur.
The last unit of time to be suggested here is the time span of 1 “time
unit” set equal to 24 hours. This time frame is equal to the time it takes to
deliver the lowest level of a transportation service to a customer. The lowest
time unit is defined as the “gas day” according to the provisions of the
prevailing transportation agreements. 225
In order to calculate numerical marginal cost values the short run
marginal cost can be approximated as the incremental cost defined as the costs
of increasing the flow by 1 Sm3 and simultaneously increasing the pressure by
1 bar from any given delivery condition. These definitions thus constitute the
lowest level of a transportation service provided. The lowest level of an
                                          
225 In later years hourly delivery rates are becoming common, but this is not included here.
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incremental transportation service is thus a flow of 1 Sm3 of dry gas with a
delivery pressure of 1 bar during a time period of 1 day. 226
As can be seen from the equation (Eq. 7.4.4) and (Eq. 7.4.5) above, the
variable compressor costs are dependent both on the compressor delivery
pressure as well as the mass flow assuming that all other parameters are kept
constant. The short run marginal cost and average variable costs can be
calculated by either keeping the mass flow constant and calculating the cost
for changing the delivery pressures or by keeping the outlet pressure constant
and calculating the marginal cost for changing the mass flow. This will give
the following two pares of short run marginal costs and short run average
variable costs: 227
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226 In the USA’s gas industry, the lowest production unit is defined as 1 Dth/day = 1*106
Btu/day = 1055 MJ/day = 0,293 MWhr/day = 12,21 KW = 26,38 Sm3/day. (1 Sm3/d yields
40 MJ/day). Source: Columbia Gas verbal information and Christensen (1998) appendix 6
and Katz (1990) page 707.
227 In this case the gas turbine cost function is chosen. The following considerations will
remain the same if the electrical motor cost function had been chosen instead.
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Constant pressure, changing mass flow
The short run average (variable) costs and the short run marginal costs
(per day) can be found by partial derivation of equations (Eq. 7.4.7) and (Eq.
7.4.9), which can be written:
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In Figure 20 below A-values are calculated for different values of
pressures, P1 = {120,186} and the fuel cost is set equal to the carbon dioxide
tax at 0,85 NOK/Sm3. In the figure the A-values are plotted on the “y-axis”
and the values have been converted into units of øre/Sm3 (rather than øre/kg).
Figure 20. Marginal cost of increasing flow at constant outlet pressures.
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In these equations, A (øre/kg) is a constant for each choice of P1 and the
marginal cost and the average costs are constant for all values of the
throughput. This conclusion simply means that the variable costs are
proportional to the mass flow at a constant delivery pressure. Further, SRACgtm
= SRMCgtm = A, which means that the variable cost function exhibits constant
return to scale. 228
Constant mass flow, changing pressure
The next step in the analysis is to develop formulas for marginal and
average variable costs in the case where the mass flow is kept constant but the
pressure is changing. Equations (Eq. 7.4.6) and (Eq. 7.4.8) can be written
accordingly:
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 Here B is a constant as follows:
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The values of SRACgtp and SRMCgtp are calculated and shown in Figure
21 for a constant flow of 1 Sm3/d.
                                          
228 See Nicholsen (199 ) page 357
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Figure 21. SRMC and SRAC for compressor at constant flow
The total marginal cost function can now be found by considering both
these contributions as shown below:
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 The equation (Eq. 7.4.14) will thus give the total marginal cost (or
incremental cost) of increasing the flow and pressure with one unit equal to 1
Sm3 and 1 bar per day from any given output condition. Figure 22 illustrates
this situation by reference to the Kollsnes plant and the numerical example
chosen is calculated as incremental costs at full capacity.
In Figure 22 the two incremental contributions are calculated and
combined. At an output of 100 MSm3/d it costs 0,86094 øre to increase the
flow with 1 Sm3/d at constant delivery pressure. This situation is illustrated by
moving from point 1 vertically up to point 2 in the figure. This cost element is
the same as illustrated in Figure 20. The next contribution is the incremental
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cost by increasing the outlet pressure by 1 bar calculated to yield 0,00585
øre/Sm3. This situation is illustrated as moving from point 2 to point 3 in the
figure – also illustrated separately in Figure 21. The total marginal cost is thus
the sum of these two contributions yielding 0,86679 øre/bar/Sm3.
Figure 22.  Total incremental cost
These results of course are equal to the differences in VC between the
two operating modes. The same incremental values are obtained directly from
equation (Eq. 7.4.5) and as shown by principles in Figure 19, by first
calculating the VC (100 MSm3/d + 1 Sm3/d, 186 bar) minus VC (100 MSm3/d,
186 bar) which represents the step from point 1 to point 2. This will yield the
numerical values in øre: 86.094.236,58160 - 86.094.235,72066 = 0,86094 (as
calculated above). Then the VC (100 MSm3/d + 1 Sm3/d, 187 bar) - VC (100
MSm3/d + 1 Sm3/d, 186 bar) is calculated, representing the move from point 2
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to point 3. The result is divided by the total flow in order to find the
incremental cost per unit of flow. This will yield the following results:
(86.679.222,35850 - 86.094.236,58160)/100.000.001= 0,00585 øre/bar/Sm3
(yielding once again the same result as above).
The following three observations are suggested based on the analyses
above:
Observation 7.30. The short run marginal cost comprises less than
approximately 3,8 % of total average costs. This figure is based on
100% utilization. At 80% utilization the short run marginal cost is
approximately 2,2 % of total average costs.
Observation 7.31. The short run marginal cost is dependent on the flow
rates, the outlet pressures and the fuel costs. These parameters are all
constantly changing.
Observation 7.32. The marginal cost is different from system to
system, albeit these differences are small.
7.4.2.6 Total and average costs
Average cost is defined as the total cost of gas transportation divided by
the volume of gas being transported. If we for simplicity disregard pressure as
a variable parameter but treat it as a constant, the total cost of transportation
will comprise the following cost elements:
· Irreversible costs due to investments, termed FCI  229
· Reversible costs due to operation and maintenance, termed FCO 229
· Variable cost due to fuel consumption, termed VC(Q)
In mathematical terms the total cost function can be expressed in a
general form as follows by applying the notations as defined in this work. The
unit is in NOK (per year):
TC(Q) = (FCI + FCO + VC(Q))*Q (Eq. 7.4.15)
The average costs can thus simply be expressed as follows and with a
                                          
229 Note that fixed cost strictly considered, also dependans on the volume as a given annual
throughput volume is specified in order to calculate the fixed costs.
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unit of NOK/Sm3 (per year):
AC(Q) = FCI  + FCO  + VC(Q)           (Eq. 7.4.16)
In the preceding text all the cost elements that are included in the total
and average cost functions have been discussed and quantified and they can
now be combined to show average costs for selected pipeline systems. The
pipelines presented here are the five pipelines listed in Table 5. For each
pipeline three sets of cost elements are calculated. Please also note that the
level of maximum capacity for each pipeline is derived from the Fact Sheet
(1999) and as tabulated in Table 5. 230
In Figure 23 below the costs are compiled and shown for each of the
pipelines assessed.
Figure 23.     Indication of costs for five Norwegian pipelines 231
Several calculations had to be carried out in order to establish the
                                          
230 The exact maximum transportation capacity for a given pipeline is dependent on a
number of factors and the capacity may thus vary from one operational mode to another.
The figures that are stated in Table 5 might thus be somewhat different from those applied
elsewhere in this work.
231 The “weighted values” are based on the volumes shipped in the different pipeline
systems.
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variable costs shown in the figure above. For each pipeline the required input
pressure is calculated so that the corresponding compressor’s outlet pressure
can be established. The pipeline’s outlet pressures are all set at the lowest
values possible based on contractual requirements. Further, the pipeline inlet
pressures are calculated here at an 80% utilization level. In order to do these
calculations the Wheymouth’s equation (Eq. 3.3.1) is applied. Having
calculated all required outlet pressures from the compressor the variable costs
are calculated for each case.
A few points about the Figure 23 are worthy of note. The FCI element is
calculated based on an interest rate of 7% before taxes and with a licensing
period of 20 years. Further, if the FCI element were calculated based on a
100% load factor, the capital cost would be reduced accordingly as was
illustrated in Figure 17. A 100% load factor would result in a 20% reduction in
the capital costs, yielding a weighted average capital cost element of 0.093
NOK/Sm3 rather than 0.116 NOK/Sm3.
Thirdly, the FCO are spread equally across all pipeline systems. This is a
simplification and minor error, since operational costs of Norpipe are not
included in the FCO. Should they be included FCO would be somewhat higher.
Finally, the VC calculated here are based on 80% load factor. If a higher
load factor applies, these costs will, of course, be somewhat higher. The VC
element as given in Figure 23 above is, as it is defined, equal to the average
variable cost. According to equation (Eq. 7.4.10) the average variable cost is
equal to the short-run marginal cost when we keep the pressure constant (i.e.
the gas is delivered at a constant pressure). In other words, short-run marginal
costs are 2.2 % or less of average costs, considering the dry gas system as a
whole.
Observation 7.33. Total average costs are differently spread among the
different pipelines primarily due to different historic investment costs.
The above analyses still give a fairly adequate overview of the total
costs of transportation and these figures may add valuable information
to be utilized later when different toll regimes are discussed and
analyzed.
7.4.2.7 Cost and revenues from “Linepack”
In order to get an indication of the linepack volumes that are available
for storage in the pipeline system, an example is provided below. This is due
to the assumption that in a liberalized regime such gas volumes may play a
role in connection with gas spot sales and the like.
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        154
In the example to follow, the calculations are based on the Zeepipe
system and we assume that the gas deliveries are requested at a rate of 80 % of
maximum pipeline capacity. It is also assumed that the gas is delivered to the
customers at the minimum contractual delivery pressure. Given this situation,
the pipeline has a capacity to store some additional gas. The limiting factor for
how much gas that can be stored is the maximum inlet pressure of the
pipeline. These conditions are illustrated in Figure 39 of Appendix 11.7.5, see
page 282.
Three questions must be answered. First how much additional gas can
be stored in the pipeline? Secondly, how much does it cost to inject the
additional volume of gas into the pipeline, and thirdly how much value does
this gas represent if sold?
Size of linepack volume. The first question assessed is the size of the
linepack volume. Again the Weymouth’s equation is applied to calculate the
inlet pressures and outlet pressures for the different operational modes shown
in Figure 39 of Appendix 11.7.5. The results are shown in Table 6 below. 232
 Table 6. Flow, inlet and outlet pressures at different operational modes
Mode Flow rates,
MSm3/day
Inlet pressures,
bar
Outlet
pressures, bar
Maximum allowable flow Q = 34 P1,max = 122 
233 P2,min  = 80
80 % flow, no linepack Q = 27,2 P1       = 108 P2,min  = 80
80 % flow, max linepack Q = 27,2 P1,max = 122 P2         = 98
For each of the two latter operational modes, 80% flow, max linepack
and 80% flow, no linepack, the corresponding pipeline inventory at standard
conditions are calculated according to equations (Eq. 3.3.4) and (Eq. 3.3.5).
These volumes yield 105,3 MSm3 and 90,0 MSm3, respectively and the
linepack volume available is thus: 105,3 – 90,0 = 15,3 MSm3.
Cost of storing. The additional volume of gas to be stored is thus 15,3
MSm3/d. The maximum rate available for injecting additional gas is 6,8
                                          
232 Please note that linepack volumes as calculated here are theoretically values based on an
assumption of a steady state flow condition. In the real world there will normally be
transients that will affect on the usefulness of the linepack volume and the rate of
withdrawal and injection, see Dahl (1998-B)
233 In reality the actual maximum allowable pressure is higher. The listed maximum flow in
the Fact Sheet (1999) is lower than actual value.
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MSm3/d = (34,0 - 27,2 MSm3/d). By this rate of injection 2,25 days are needed
in order to inject 15,3 MSm3.
Further the variable cost of increasing the inlet pressure from the
original mode (108 bar, 27,2 MSm3/d) to the required maximum allowable
inlet pressure and flow (122 bar, 34 MSm3/d) 234 is calculated by means of the
variable cost function (Eq. 7.4.5). These costs are 84,9 kNOK/d and 145,5
kNOK/d, respectively. The incremental cost is thus 60,6 kNOK/d which will
yield a total cost of (60,6*2,25) = 136,4 kNOK. In these calculations we have
assumed a cost of fuel equal the CO2 tax, and all other parameters are as
specified earlier in the work.
Revenues of selling linepack gas. The linepack volume of 15.3 MSm3
equals 56 % of a full gas day delivery. At a delivery rate of 27,2 MSm3/d the
linepack volume equals thus a “survival time” of approximately 13,5 hours.
The pipeline can “supply” gas delivery to a customer for these hours in case a
full curtailment in gas production should occur. The economic value of the
linepack volume is 9,18 MNOK, assuming a gas border delivery price of 0.6
NOK/Sm3. In other words, an investment in additional variable costs of 0,136
MNOK will potentially yield additional revenue of 9,18 MNOK.
Another way of visualizing the attractiveness of linepack is the fact that
it will pay off to hold the linepack stored in the line for as much as
approximately 290 days before a potential gas sale takes place! 235
Observation 7.34. One important observation to be made here is the
assumption that, in liberalized regime, the transportation system
operator will seek to store linepack to a larger extent than what is
common today, especially if spot sales become a normal event. Even
though the linepack volumes are small in sizes they are inexpensive to
obtain and they have the potential of significant gains. They also
represent an inexpensive tool to optimize daily operations.
                                          
234 In the calculations performed here a constant pipeline pressure of 122 bar is applied. The
actual pipeline inlet pressure (equal to the compressor exit pressure) will however increase
over time as the linepack volume increases. The results presented here will thus give
somewhat too high energy consumption. This effect is neglected here.
235 The daily compressor costs at the conditions  (flow: 27,2; pressure 108) and (flow: 27,2;
pressure: 122) are 84,9 kNOK and 116,4 kNOK respectively, yielding a daily incremental
cost of 31,5 kNOK. It will take 290 days before the accumulated incremental costs are
rising above the sales figure of 9,18 MNOK.
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7.4.2.8 Linepack, energy consumption and variable cost reductions.
In Section 3.3.4 the author suggested a technical efficiency criteria for
measuring the level of efficient utilization of the pipeline system from an
energy consumption point of view. The notion here is that an efficient
operation seeks to deliver the gas flow through the pipeline systems at the
lowest consumption of fuel gas possible. In order to measure such conditions
an efficiency criterion was designed as expressed in equation (Eq. 3.3.12)
stating that 
·
= WQSCtech /h .
The higher the value of techh  is, the more efficient the operation is. We
immediately see that if the operator increases the linepack the efficiency will
be reduced, as flow remains constant, but power increases. This fact visualizes
one of the many trade-offs to be done in daily operation. The use of linepack
may prove to be quite attractive from an economic point of view as it may
increase the revenues significantly, but its usage on the other hand requires
more energy consumption. The latter is contradicting the efficiency measure
expressed in the reasonable and prudent effectiveness measure which specifies
energy conservation, see Section 5.4.3.
Finally, a last question is at what throughput level is the operation most
energy efficient? In the proceeding text a numerical example is provided to
answer this question. In Table 7 below different values of techh  is listed against
the throughput, required outlet pressures from the compressors and the power
requirements. In the numerical example Zeepipe is applied and in all of the
calculations the compressor suction pressures are set constant at 76 bar and the
pipeline delivery pressures are set constant at 80 bar.
 Table 7. Power requirements, pressure and flow
Flow in pipeline,
MSm3/d
3,4 6,8 10,2 13,6 17 20,4 23,8 27,2 30,6
Outlet pressure
from
compressor, bar
80,5 82,1 94,5 88,0 92,1 96,9 102,3 108,2 114,5
Power
consumption,
MW
0,3 0,8 1,7 3,1 5,1 7,8 11,2 15,3 20,2
“Quasi”
efficiency, techh
Sm3/Wd
11,4 8,4 6,1 4,4 3,3 2,6 2,1 1,8 1,5
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This little exercise shows a trivial conclusion; namely that the most
energy optimal operation is “not to transport gas at all”. Based on this purely
theoretical approach the results indicate that transportation of natural gas
becomes more and more energy inefficient the higher the flow is. In reality
there are several other conditions that influence on this result to some extent.
One important factor is the design of the compressors and the compressor
characteristics and utilization curves. The compressors may be designed for
example to work most efficiently at a high level of utilization.
Several observations of a general nature can be suggested here based on
the result in Table 7 above.
Observation 7.35. If there is a possibility to reduce the flow, energy
consumption will be reduced accordingly.
Observation 7.36. Energy efficiency is generally improved if flow is
equalized as much as possible in the different pipelines, assuming that
the pipelines and compressors have the same configuration and design.
In the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems there are some few
pipeline systems that can be utilized as alternative transportation routes - to
some extent  - in order to ship gas between the same entry and exit locations
especially at lower rates of total utilization of the total system. These are some
of the pipelines to Germany and the two pipelines from Kollsens.
To illustrate the Observation 7.36 a numerical example is provided. In
this example we apply the data from Table 7 and we assume that a total flow
of 34 MSm3/d shall be shipped between the two points. We assume that there
are two alternative routes comprising two equal pipelines with physical
characteristics as Zeepipe between the entry and exit points. If the flow is split
at a ratio of 90/10 % between the two pipelines the total power requirement
would be 20,2 + 0.3 = 20,5 MW (equal to the flow of 30,6 + 3,4, respectively).
If the flow is split at a ration of 50/50 the total power requirement would have
been 5,1 + 5,1 = 10,2 MW which is only 49 % of the power requirement of the
former option.
This latter conclusion thus leads to a subsequent argument namely:
Observation 7.37. To the extent the organization setup of the
operations may affect this issue, a coordinated operation may be
preferable. This is a valid argument provided the organization has been
given a mandate to conduct such overall physical transport
optimization.
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This topic may be quite essential when it comes to optimizing spare
capacity – a topic to be discussed in Section 7.5.
7.4.2.9 Transaction costs
A well-defined and quantitative understanding of the level of
transaction costs is considered to be important in relation to discussing
liberalization in utility industries. 236 In a traditional regime a high degree of
vertical integration is typically present and one positive effect of integration,
according to Teece (1990), may be the low transaction costs. If the industry
liberalizes, segregation of services into independent entities may be required
as discussed earlier in the work. This will often increase transaction costs.
Some authors like the IEA (1994) study report and Teece (1990) point to this
fact, also saying that little research is available identifying how these
transaction costs increase as integration splits up.
The political judgement often concludes that increased transaction costs
are accepted in order to obtain reduced costs elsewhere. It is believed that such
cost reductions will exceed the increments in transaction costs. Some authors
believe that the total effect of gas-to-gas competition increases welfare, even
though some parts of the industry experience increased costs. A related
argument is that equal access to transportation services may enhance
competition between suppliers causing ultimately enhanced competitive power
on the NCS. 237
The Norwegian dry gas transport operation’s transaction costs may be
defined to consist of the sum of administration costs and dispatching costs.
Transaction costs may also be defined to include costs related to negotiating
sales-, transportation- and upstream agreements. The former of these costs is
included in the VC-element as defined in this work. As can be seen from
Figure 23 these costs are fairly low in the current regime in relative terms and
the irreversible costs will remain to play the most dominant cost element in the
future as well.
As there are presently a number of uncertainties related a future
Norwegian organization of transport operations no further work is done here
in order to stipulate future transaction costs, except for offering some few
observations collected from the assessment activities.
The first observation is simply a recognition of the fact that much of the
transaction costs are caused directly by the choice of a regulatory regime, and
these costs are thus to a large extent independent or outside managerial
                                          
236 Teece (1990), IEA (1994)
237 This argument is listed in St. prp. nr 36 (2000-2001) page 13.
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influence of the transportation system operator.  238 This leads to the following
observation:
Observation 7.38. The regulatory body must carefully evaluate how
different regulatory regimes result in different levels of transaction
costs.
Secondly, if the current vertically integrated transport operations are
segregated into an independent transportation company (as suggested by the
Norwegian St. prp. 36 (2000-2001)) increased transactional costs may
probably occur due to increased costs of knowledge and information transfer
between different organizational units. If the prevailing integrated
organizational structure is broken up into two or more independent business
units, the author assumes that other and more expensive and cumbersome
routines for technology and information transfer will arise. Some few
prominent examples of efficient interdepartmental knowledge transfer in
Statoil are:
· transfer of knowledge between transport operations and engineering
support
· transfer of technical gas composition data from daily gas operations into
pipeline inspection program development
· transfer of operational experiences into transport and project
development
· transfer of operational experiences into field allocation
recommendations and gas sales assignment recommendations (FU)
· transfer of operational experiences into negotiations of agreements
(upstream-, transport- and sales- agreements (GFU)).
Based on these observations the following observation is suggested by
the author:
Observation 7.39. The author is of the opinion that transfer of
information as listed above will inevitably be more cumbersome and
more costly in a liberalized context due to several reasons.
These reasons are firstly that much of the information above is
                                          
238 Kolbe et al.(1993) examine the risk of different regulatory principles
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considered to be proprietary. If this information shall be released to external
shippers that are not pipeline system owners, a much closer filtering of
information is called for to prevent release of proprietary information.
Secondly, the information must be free from all kinds of contractually related
information. This will once again call for a screening of information to a more
detailed extent.
7.4.2.10  Prevailing Norwegian toll regime
Little information has been published about tolls in Norwegian dry gas
transportation systems. 239  Brottemsmo et al. (1993) 240 refer to some average
costs applicable to Statpipe and Europipe I, but offer no detailed breakdown of
the toll structure. They do indicate a toll in the range of 0.10–0.39 NOK/Sm3,
and predict the toll for Europipe to be approximately 0.13 NOK/Sm3 at a load
factor of 75% utilization. Bjerkholt et al. (1990) refer to the transportation cost
for Norwegian gas as being in the range of 0.044–0.435 NOK/Sm3. 241
Golombek et al. (1998) indicate a toll to Germany of 0.20 NOK/Sm3. 242
Transportation agreements specify the transportation toll formula.
Nielsen 243 offers a description of the formula, and a general outline is also
provided in the IEA transportation study. The formula typically takes the
following form:
xn
n
n
xsnnpipexn QQ
O
QEICT *+***=  (Eq. 7.4.17)
)()(
n
n
npipexn Q
O
EICt +**= (Eq. 7.4.18)
Here, the terms have the following meaning:
                                          
239 Such data is specified in stakeholders’ transportation agreements.
240 Brottemsmo et al. (1993); see Table 2.3. The costs are based on annual operating costs
and an annualized total investment cost at a 7% real discount rate.
241 Bjerkholt and Gjelsvik (1992) in Table 7 specify costs in the range 0.14–1.38
USD/MBtu. 1 USD = 8 NOK, 1 Btu = 1.055 KJ, and 1 Sm3 = 40 MJ.
242 Golombek et al. (1998, Table 1) specify costs for offshore gas transportation to
Germany equal to 3.75 USD per 100 km per TOE. 1 TOE = 42300 MJ, 1 USD = 8 NOK, 1
Sm3 = 40 MJ. In the above example, Europipe is applied at a length of 716 km.
243 Nielsen (1999), p. 109. The information provided here is basically taken from this
reference.
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n  is year n,
x is shipper x,
Txn  total tariff for year n for shipper x (NOK/yr),
txn unit tariff for year n for shipper x (NOK/ Sm
3/yr),
C capital cost element (1/Sm3),
Ipipe Investment (NOK) in the pipeline system,
En  escalation factor for year n,
On  total operating cost for year n (NOK),
Qn  total quantity transported for year n (Sm
3/yr),
Qxn  actual quantity transported for shipper x for year n  (Sm
3/yr),
Qxsn  the higher of the actual quantity transported or the ship-or-pay
(SOP) quantity for shipper x for year n (Sm
3/yr).
The capital cost element, FCI shown in Figure 23 equals the term
C*Ipipe*En  (assuming En = 1), and the On/Qn equals the term FCO. The VC(Q)
for fuel gas consumption is not part of the toll formula and is set equal to zero.
The gas consumption is measured and treated as loss. A number of
observations can be concluded based on the characteristics of this particular
toll formula and the formula’s inherent tolling characteristics: 244
Observation 7.40. The formula secures the pipeline recovery of all
costs plus a given rate of return.
Observation 7.41. The formula gives a constant tariff over time
(provided throughput is according to plan).
Observation 7.42. The formula secures the transport owner against
reduced throughput by means of the SOP provision.
Observation 7.43. The toll formula may offer incentives to increase
throughput if shippers are favored with rebates on additional volumes,
essentially passing on to them the declining average costs benefit.
Observation 7.44. The prevailing toll formula may be characterized as
a combined “rate of return regulation” and an “average cost pricing
formula”, even though the ship-or-pay requirement may act as a
booking charge element and thus indicating that the formula may look
like a two-part toll. The function of the formula however is to be
                                          
244 See IEA (1994), pp. 139–140.
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considered basically as an average cost pricing mechanism.
For a more detail discussion of the prevailing toll formula see Section
7.4.4.4 on page 201. The shippers also pay for the variable operational costs,
i.e. the fuel gas as they supply the gas “in kind” and pro-rate their volumes
shipped. A rebate or refund system is in force based on an annual post
calculation of all revenues. As the pipeline’s return is regulated excess
revenues from tolls are transferred back to the initial shippers (i.e. the firm
shippers).
7.4.2.11  Prevailing gas pricing principles and delivery conditions
The gas price is calculated based on a netback market value pricing
formula, linked to the price of other alternative energy sources, as for example
oil products. The IEA distribution study of 1998 discusses this pricing
mechanism. Austvik (1997) provides an overview of these matters as well. 245
In Figure 24 below the netback market value pricing principles are shown.   
The price formula is specified in the sales agreements. Brautaset et al.246
give a description of this formula and a typical gas price formula in a
Norwegian gas sales contract reads:
P = P0 + 0,6 (AE1 – AE10) * EKAE1*0,85 (Eq. 7.4.19)
 + 0,4 (AE2 – AE20) * EKAE2*0,90
Here the above terms have the following interpretation: P is the gas
price, P0 is an agreed initial basis gas price, (AE1 – AE10) is actual minus
historic price of an alternative energy source, and (AE2 – AE20) is actual
minus the historic price of another alternative energy source. EKAE1 and EKAE2
represent energy conversion factors. The gas price is calculated based on the
current prices of the alternative energy sources. There is a typical time lag of 3
to 5 months of the gas price adjustment. The gas price is subject to re-
negotiations every three to five years, according to Brautaset et al.
Figure 25 illustrates these relationships in a conceptual manner.
                                          
245 IEA distribution study (1998), see page 76, figure 4. See also Austvik (1997) page 1001-
1004
246 See Brautaset et al. (1999) page 250
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Figure 24.  Netback market value pricing
Figure 25.  Gas pricing principles
No further review of the prevailing gas pricing principles is given here
except for specifying some main observations noteworthy in relation to the
research conducted:
Observation 7.45. As a result of GFU negotiations and signing of gas
sales contracts, gas prices are fixed for given periods of time, typically
three to five years.
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During the “fixed price” periods, the gas price may fluctuate, since it is
linked to the price of alternative energies, usually oil; from a practical point of
view, however, the gas price is exogenously given in the short run. Prices
remain those specified in gas contracts, regardless of the gas quantity taken by
buyers under normal delivery conditions. 247 There are no ways to utilize the
pricing regime established by a contract after it has been signed to
discriminate between customers or markets, or to exercise market power.
There are also no means for buyers to obtain rebates or reduced prices in
periods of excess production capacity or the like.
Observation 7.46. Negotiated long-term “take-or-pay” (TOP) gas sales
contracts constitute the backbone of gas transportation system
development and much field development, as well. Take-or-pay
contracts and ship-or-pay (SOP) provisions in transportation agreements
have established a measure of risk sharing between stakeholders that
insures pipeline owners against high risks. 248
Finally, the gas sales agreements specify the gas price and no
stakeholders publish these prices. However, some indicative figures are
available in the literature. Stern, for example, quotes some border prices for
six different European countries for the year 1996. In Germany, for example, a
border price of approximately 1,35 Pf/kWh or 0,62 NOK/Sm3 is listed, 249 and
the end user prices for domestic households are 4,62 Pf/kWh (equal to 19
øre/kWh) or 2,12 NOK/Sm3. The domestic price is thus 3,4 times the border
price. The quoted German figures were also specified in the same range in a
Norwegian newspaper “Dagens Næringsliv” on Nov 7, 1997. The information
was based on released data from the German Ministry of Commerce and
“Bundesverband der deutschen Gaswirtschaft”. 250
                                          
247 Special provisions cover unexpected events such as curtailment and “force majeure.”
248 This paper does not discuss or analyze how to optimize risk sharing between the
stakeholders.
249 Stern (1998) page 75, table 3.13. In the conversion calculations above, the following
rates are applied: 100 DEM = 413 NOK and 1 Sm3 yields 40 MJ.
250 Two other examples are: “Finansavisen”, Jan 22 1997, in which Statoil President P.
Mellbye indicates that 6 Gm3/year over a 25 years period was sold for approximately 90
GNOK. Assuming equal and average deliveries for 25 years, the average price is thus 0.60
NOK/m3. According to “Aftenposten”, Jan. 6, 1997 the Statoil transportation system
operator indicates that the daily value of approximately 100 MSm3/day is 65 MNOK/day,
giving a gas price of 0.65 NOK/Sm3.
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7.4.2.12  The Norwegian bundled and merchant gas sales services
The bundled service offered by the TOP contracts is a product of
complex relationships and interactions between stakeholders. In order to
understand how the final gas sales product is achieved an analysis of the
different stakeholder roles is presented below. In Figure 1 on page 5 some of
these relationships are illustrated.
The production field owners are owners of all hydrocarbons produced in
the field, according the production license. In order to sell the gas or store the
gas, agreements have to be made to this effect. These agreements are the
agreements identified earlier in Section 5 and they comprise the upstream
agreements, the supply agreements, the contractual gas sales agreements and
the gas sales agreements negotiated by GFU. Based on these agreements, the
companies became gas owners and they need to enter into transportation
agreements with the transport system owner, in order to transport the gas. The
gas owners now act as shippers.
The transportation system owner receives the shippers’ gas at a given
location, handles and transports the gas to a given delivery point, and re-
delivers the gas to the shipper. If this redelivery takes place at the shore
terminals the shippers acts as sellers. The seller sells the gas to the buyers
according to the conditions specified in the sales agreement entered into by
GFU.
Some observations can be concluded here:
Observation 7.47. In the current regime there are close relationships
between the production fields, gas owners, gas shippers and gas sellers.
These relationships are all regulated by a large number of agreements.
These agreements are largely proprietary and the arrangements are
largely non-transparent.
Observation 7.48. An organizational segregation of any of these
stakeholder positions (for example like the one suggested by St. prp. 36
(2000-2001)) will inevitably cause that several of the agreements must
be renegotiated or revised. An overview how liberalization impacts the
documents is indicated Section 7.6.
One essential issue in the context of this work is the vertically
integrated pipeline ownership structure combined with the gas sales function.
Many companies are simultaneously owners in the production facilities as
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well as the transportation facilities, 251 and they own the gas. As indicated in
Figure 1, a specific company’s revenue is thus the aggregated revenue
obtained from oil, NGL including heavier petroleum products and dry gas
sales. As the companies normally also are transportation system owners, they
receive tariffs (as system owners), but at the same time they also pay tariffs (as
shippers).
Observation 7.49. In a Norwegian context the majority of gas shippers
simultaneously act as gas transportation system owners. This is a quite
special regulatory regime that according to the knowledge of the author
is not the case anywhere in North America. Due to this specialty some
distinct incentives for cost efficiency and rationing efficiency are
established. The magnitude of the incentives is quite dependent on the
individual company’s specific share of ownership versus shipper share
in a particular pipeline. These relationships must be further analyzed in
the proceeding work. 252
Owners of gas enter into transportation agreements with transportation
system owners and thereby become shippers. Such agreements are negotiated
and entered into, in many cases, “internally” within a given company. This is
due to the fact that the same company is often the owner of the gas (and thus,
represents the shipper) as well as owner of the transportation system (and thus,
represents the system owner with whom the shipper must negotiate).
Observation 7.50. The prevailing transportation agreements differ
somewhat from traditional agreements in the legal sense. Normally the
parties are independent and have different interests while the parties’
interests often are coinciding in said agreements. This fact is discussed
and commented upon by Nielsen (1999, see page 6). A potential
segregation of stakeholder roles may alter these relationships and
agreements significantly.
Observation 7.51. In connection with the St. prp. 36 (2000-2001),
which suggests a segregation of transport operations into an
independent company, the legal validity of the transportation
                                          
251 Fact Sheet (1999)
252 A long lasting debate has been the debate on finding the right owner share versus the
shipper shares in a given pipeline in order to create right incentive for economic efficiency.
This topic is discussed in Section 7.4.3.
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agreements and incorporated documents must be assessed.
Observation 7.52. The transportation system itself never owns any gas;
the gas is always the property of the shippers.
7.4.2.13  Regularity in gas deliveries and daily utilization of the systems.
The delivery goal is set to 100% regularity in gas deliveries to
customers as was pointed out in the effectiveness measures. The regularity is
calculated as aggregated daily regularity. The daily regularity is defined as the
actual delivery figure divided by the gas buyer’s specified nomination figure.
In Table 8 below, the regularity figures for the period 1991 – 1999 are
shown.253 Based on these figures some few observations are concluded.
Observation 7.53. The coordinated planning and development of
facilities and systems, together with centralized system operations, have
resulted in very high delivery and quality regularity over the years ¾
typically close to 100%.
 Table 8. Annual regularity and utilization in Norwegian dry gas systems
Regularity and
(Utilization)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Statpipe/
Norpipe
99.2 93.8 97.7 99.6 100
(85)
99.8
(85)
99.7
(87)
99,96
(71)
100
(52)
Zeepipe 100 100 100
(48)
99.99
(70)
100
(80)
100
(82)
100
(69)
Europipe I 100
(54)
100
(77)
99,99
(73)
100
(92)
FranPipe 100
(50)
100
(59)
Vastly diverse agreements are developed to secure individual and
mutual needs for gas storage, modulation, regularity support, and swap and
supply arrangements. These are the agreements assessed in Section 5 of this
work. One observation may be suggested here:
Observation 7.54. The stakeholders - at least to some extent - enjoy
many economic benefits caused by a vertically integrated industry
                                          
253 Source: Statoil
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ultimately resulting in high delivery results, as noted by Teece. 254 Such
benefits, or economic efficiencies, are related to capital utilization;
aggregation economics; transactional, informational, and operational
efficiencies; and credible supply commitments. The difficult question is
to what extent these benefits will be adversely affected by liberalization.
As this is largely a political question no further work is done here to
assess the question.
The utilization of the systems has varied largely over the years as shown
in Table 8. In some periods the utilization has been low and this fact
contributes to the high regularity. The system is highly utilized during the
winter periods and curtailments in deliveries, if they occur, usually come
during these periods.
A major reason for the general low utilization of some systems is
explained by the fact that the overall system capacity has been increased
regularly over the years to meet an ever-increasing demand. The capacity is
increased in steps as the Figure 26 below illustrates.255 Figure 26 shows the
level of annual throughput (the line drawn) versus the aggregated
transportation systems’ capacity for the time period 1992 through 2003.
Figure 26.   Yearly production and pipeline capacities
                                          
254 Teece (1990).
255 Source: Pipeline capacities: Fact Sheet (1999), Production curve: Statoil (See Appendix
11.1)
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One observation can be concluded:
Observation 7.55. The utilization of the systems will increase in the
years to come as full delivery commitments are approaching. This will
result in a more stringent operation. The need for offering interruptible
supplies may be found advantageous in order to utilize the systems at a
high level, rather than offering firm capacity and thus limit the
transportation to a lower level of average annual utilization.
7.4.2.14  Gas requests, oil and NGL production.
An interesting consideration is to identify the sensitivity of oil,
condensate and NGL production from the NCS, versus fluctuation in dry gas
nominations. If one considers the dry gas system as defined in this work, the
gas customers’ nominations will be aggregated as delivery instructions at the
four entry locations shown in the architecture model, see Figure 9 of Section 5
on page 86. A brief overview of the sensitivity of reduced dry gas requests on
oil and NGL production is displayed in Table 9 below, aggregated to the four
entry locations.256
As can be seen from the Table 9 the current system is fairly robust
against reductions in dry gas requests with regards to the oil production. The
condensate and NGL production is a direct function of the rich gas production,
and it will be reduced linearly with reduced dry gas nominations. Broadly
speaking, the total revenues gained from the selling NGL as a separate product
is approximately 150% the revenues of selling NGL as blended into the
commingled dry gas stream.
Observation 7.56. A high production of dry gas out of the treatment
terminals is always an attractive objective, as any reduced dry gas
deliveries will reduce NGL production almost linearly.
Another observation, visualized in Table 9 is the fact that the
sensitivities of oil cuts due to declining dry gas nominations are differently
spread between the four locations. This fact causes challenges for negotiators,
production planners, and day-to-day operations, in order to optimize the total
production on the NCS, especially during periods of (extremely) low buyers
                                          
256 Source: Statoil. The data is based on year 2005 forecasts. Please note that these figures
are of an indicative nature only and that changes occur continually. The data is dependent
on issues such as different operational modes, injections modes and new facilities put on
stream.
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nominations or system interruptions. A last observation is thus concluded:
Observation 7.57. In order to optimize simultaneously the dry gas
operations and oil, condensate and NGL production, an integrated
operation is imperative. This observation supports the view that only
one transport organization unit must be in charge covering all
transportation systems.
 Table 9.  Effects of reduced dry gas requests on oil and NGL production
Four
locations
where dry
gas enters
into the dry
gas system
Request, qn,
for gas
delivery at
this  location
(% DCQ) 257,
258
Reduced oil and
condensate
production at the
location and/or
aggregated losses
on production units
upstream the
location
Reduced NGL
production at the
location
and/or aggregated
losses on production
units upstream the
location
Kårstø A < qn <110
qn < A
No effect
Oil and condensate
production reduces
Linear effect
Linear effect
Kollsnes B < qn <110
qn < B
No effect
Oil and condensate
production reduces
Linear effect
Linear effect
Sleipner C < qn <110
qn < C
No effect
Condensate
production reduces
Linear effect
Linear effect
Oseberg/
Heimdal
D < qn < 110
qn < D
No effect
Oil production
reduces
Linear effect
Linear effect
7.4.2.15  Gas quality
An important and a last issue analyzed here is “gas quality”. The gas
quality issue has its root in some basic facts. First, the different fields deliver
gas with different gas heating value. Secondly, the gas production at the fields
may contain H2S and CO2 from time to time.
The gas sales contracts specify limits for contamination as well as
                                          
257 Daily contract quantity (DCQ)
258 The parameters A, B, C and D are proprietary information. The values are all fairly low.
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ranges of acceptable heating values. This range is subject to nominations
according to specified rules.
Experience has shown that the gas quality issue requires close daily
operational attention and the Transportation System Operator must always
keep the blending of gas aspect in mind.
In order to illustrate the magnitude of this task, an example is provided
below. Two different fields are considered and the heating values from the
fields, termed A and B are assumed to be:
GCVA  = 38,7 MJ/Sm
3
GCVB  = 42,4 MJ/Sm
3
If we assume that field A delivers 40 MSm3/d and field B delivers 20
MSm3/d, the commingled gas stream will have a heating value of (40*38,7 +
20*42,2)/60 = 39,9 MJ/Sm3. We may assume for example, that the allowable
range is ± 2% deviation from the mean value. The acceptable range of heating
values will thus be 39,1 - 40,7 MJ/Sm3. Given this constraint a production
curtailment at field B of approximately 75% can be accepted. But if field A’s
production is reduced more than 56%, the field B production must be held
back, in order to prevent off-specification gas.
Two observations can summarize this issue:
Observation 7.58. In daily operations the transportation system
operator must blend the different gas streams into commingled gas
streams so that the gas delivered to customers meets sales specification.
This task requires an integrated operation and once again, an efficient
organizational set-up is to have only one operator conduction the work.
Observation 7.59. To blend gas correctly may from time to time be a
challenging task for the operator and it may introduce significant
constraints on operations. From a conceptual and an analytical point of
view however, the task is fairly strait forward and this issue is thus not
treated any further in this research.
7.4.2.16  Summary of this sub-section
Based on the observations listed in the preceding text some main
conclusions can be synthesized and suggested here. These are as follows:
Conclusion 7.10.  The future development of the industry in a
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liberalized regime must continue to utilize the natural gas transportation
system’s significant economies of scale and declining average cost
benefits. A comprehensive and centralized planning function that
includes experiences from transportation system design and operations
will enhance such a development. See Observation 7.17 through
Observation 7.20 and Observation 7.25 and Observation 7.53.
Conclusion 7.11.  If the future operation of the highly integrated
Norwegian natural gas pipeline systems is organized into one (and only
one) organization unit the following features are enhanced:
- cost efficiency (i.e. minimization of variable and fixed
operational and maintenance costs), see Observation 7.21 and
Observation 7.28.
- energy efficiency (i.e. an operation that causes as little fuel
consumption as possible), see Observation 7.29 and Observation
7.35  through Observation 7.37.
- optimized utilization so that the deliveries have high regularity,
see Observation 7.34 and Observation 7.53 through Observation
7.55.
- optimized blending of gas streams so that the deliveries meet gas
sales specifications and thus avoiding penalties and maximizing
revenues, see Observation 7.58 through Observation 7.59.
- enhancement of resource management on the NCS in daily
operations. See Observation 7.56 through Observation 7.57.
Conclusion 7.12.  The irreversible cost is the largest contributor to the
transportation cost and it comprises approximately 88-90 % of this cost.
The reversible operation and maintenance cost contributes with
approximately 7-8 % and the variable cost contributes approximately
with less than 3-4 %. The latter cost may also be interpreted as short run
marginal cost. The empirical data on costs derived here is interesting
background information when it comes to designing a future tariff and
toll regime. See Observation 7.24, Observation 7.26 through
Observation 7.27 and Observation 7.29 through Observation 7.33.
Conclusion 7.13.  Most of the transportation cost can not be influenced
by the owner or operator’s managerial decisions. Nor do they have
much influence on the revenues (in the short term and considering no
new sales or investments). The costs are however, largely influenced by
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political decisions and the level of costs are implicitly specified by
regulatory bodies. This conclusion is based on the fact that the
regulatory body specifies the level of rate of return, licensing periods
and volume of gas that constitutes the ship or pay volume. Further, the
regulatory regime highly and in an indirect manner affects the level of
transaction costs. Liberalization may affect on these issues. See
Observation 7.22 though Observation 7.23 and Observation 7.38
through Observation 7.46.
Conclusion 7.14.  The current regime is based on a vertically integrated
structure. If transport operations shall be segregated into an independent
organization unit a number of documents will be affected and they must
be revised in order to maintain a valid and legal framework and
hierarchy of requirements governing the operations. See Observation
7.47 through Observation 7.52. This topic is further discussed in
Section 7.6.
7.4.3 Feasibility analyses - prevailing incentive structures and liberalization
7.4.3.1 Objectives and the economic background
On the NCS today there are several transportation systems owners and
owner groups (joint ventures) as well as many shippers. The pipeline system
owners are assigned a specific owner’s share in the different pipeline systems.
This assignment takes place in the licensing process. In addition to being
owners the majority of the participating companies also act as shippers in the
same pipeline systems. Further, many of these companies are vertically
integrated and they are owners in field production licenses. They consequently
have revenues and costs associated with oil, NGL and gas sales and
production and transportation of said products, as indicated in Figure 1.
The prevailing Norwegian regulatory regime specifies that the toll to be
paid by shippers shall be based on a typical toll formula as discussed in
Section 7.4.2.10 on page 160. This toll formula acts basically as an average
cost pricing formula, based on a regulated rate of return (even though it may
look like a two-part toll and it actually acts like one given some quite specific
conditions). 259
The toll is based on the historic investment costs for the particular
pipeline system in question. The pipeline systems were developed in the first
place based on a defined annual throughput volume (i.e. the ship-or-pay
volume) and the shippers are obliged to ship this volume of gas, effectively
                                          
259 This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.4.4 on page 191
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ensuring a financial security for pipeline owners.
But as was stated above, the fact that the majority of the pipeline system
owners simultaneously are shippers leads to some quite specific economic and
regulatory advantages and disadvantages. In general, conflicts may arise
between different companies caused by uneven ownership shares versus
shipper shares in a specific system. Uneven shares combined with the given
toll formula may cause that different (vertically integrated) companies have
different preferences related to two important issues in the context of this
work. These two important issues are studied in the proceeding text and they
are:
· A given company’s incentives for cost efficient investments and
operations
· A given company’s preferences for which pipeline system to utilize (i.e.
where to route the gas).
Why is it important to analyze these questions in an analytical manner?
The first striking answer is that the Norwegian authorities repeatedly confirm
that this regime shall persist even in a liberalized context. WPs have been
issued stating this fact and the latest publication issued by the Norwegian
Government reconfirms that this part of the prevailing regime shall continue
unchanged. The recently issued Norwegian St. prp. 36 (2000-2001) documents
that the prevailing tariff regime and ownership structure shall continue as a
regulatory principle.
Another reason for performing this analysis is, as far as the author has
observed, the lack of such analysis in the literature. 260 There are however,
many authors that indicate that average cost pricing is not a preferred solution
in a liberalized regime due to many reasons. Actually, economic literature has
taught for long that average cost pricing is associated with several
disadvantages. Nese (1998) may serve as an example of such an author and he
summarizes these disadvantages as follows: “inefficient use of capacity,
incorrect investment signals and weak incentives for cost efficiency”. Further,
according to Nese (1998), page 43: “Average cost pricing will give the
pipeline owner weak incentives for cost efficiency since financial costs are
recovered by the price under any circumstances. An example of average cost
pricing is rate of return regulation, which is the usual way of regulating the
natural gas transportation on the NCS.”
                                          
260 Brottemsmo (1994-A and -B) give some quite similar analyses. The focus of
Brottemsmo’s analyses however is somewhat different from the one presented here.
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There is however one important distinction that apparently seems to
have been overlooked, or at least not mentioned, in the indicated conclusion
given by Nese. Nese’s comment regarding the average cost pricing rule’s
improper incentives for cost efficient investments and operations may be true
in general terms, but it is not fully correct in the Norwegian case. The core
issue here seems to be that the analysis has not taken into consideration the
fact that the pipeline owners are also the users of the system. This fact usually
shifts the incentives for cost efficient investments and operations from
improper to proper.
In order therefore to fully understand how the prevailing regulatory
regime causes incentives for proper or improper investments and cost efficient
operations and how it influences on the shippers’ preferences for where to
route the gas in the system, a detailed analysis is carried out here. The ultimate
objective is to clarify if this regime may be recommended as an appropriate
regime fit for a liberalized context, or whether it has to be adjusted or changed
to some extent.
7.4.3.2 Assumptions and constraints
In the analysis conducted here the following assumptions are made:
· The gas price and the gas volumes to be shipped are exogenously given
and they are kept constant.
· The transportation toll is given by the toll formula as specified in
equation (Eq. 7.4.17) which is the prevailing formula. In these analyses
we do not evaluate the functionality of the toll regime as such nor its
ability to enhance rationing efficiency.
· No taxation considerations are considered here. Further no profit or toll
considerations are analyzed considering a fully depreciated system.
The economic background for the assumption made in the first bullet
point is taken from the prevailing gas sales contracts. This assumption is based
on the fact that the gas is sold under take-or-pay contacts. In these contracts
both the volume and the price are fixed for a substantial period of time.
The economic background for the second bullet point above is taken
from the prevailing toll formula. The only issue of interest here is to study
how shippers will respond given that there exist different tolls in different
systems and provided they have different levels of owner shares in these
systems. The assumption made here is that the total capacity of the system is
set equal to its predefined ship-or-pay throughput level and thus there is
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always sufficient total capacity in the total system. In the analyses we do not
treat the total flow through the system as a variable. The only issue to be
analyzed here is where a given company will prefer to route his gas only on
the conditions of different tolls in different systems and his owner interests in
the systems. (i.e. we assume that the shipper has a need to ship in the system
and that the systems considered by the shipper are equal geographical
alternatives). The assumption made here means in practical terms that if there
are only two shippers and one shipper is allowed to chose the routing of his
gas first, the second shipper has no choice but is forced to ship the gas where
the first shipper decided not to go. The toll is therefore treated as exogeniously
given but different from one pipeline system to another.
Are the above realistic assumptions? Given the prevailing regime they
are, and as will be shown, there are some inherent problems associated with
the practice.
7.4.3.3 The basic profit function
Figure 1 on page 5 illustrates the vertically integrated structure of the
Norwegian gas industry. We now introduce a given company, x, and we
assume that this company is vertically integrated meaning it is an oil and NGL
producer and seller, gas producer, shipper, transportation system owner, and
gas seller combined. This company will have costs and revenues associated
with sales, production and transportation of the hydrocarbon products.
Based on (Eq. 3.4.1) in Section 3.4.3.1 a general profit function for the
company can be developed. This profit function must include all the revenue
and cost elements. In order to ease the set-up of the function Table 10 may
assist the thought.
 Table 10. Revenues and costs for company x in year n
Stake-
holder
roles:
Oil
producer
NGL
producer
Gas
producer
Ship-
per
Transportation
system owner
Gas
seller
TRxn = Qoil*Poil QNGL*PNGL Txn Qxn*Pgas
TCxn = Qoil*Coil QNGL*CNGL Qxn*Cgas Txn )( n
f
n
n
xn IrO
Q
Q
+
The total profit function for the company, x, in year, n, can thus be
written as follows:
xnxnxn TCTR -=Õ (Eq. 7.4.20)
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Here the terms have the following meaning:
TR is total revenue from sale of hydrocarbon products and
transportation services, NOK/yr
TC is total cost of production and transportation of hydrocarbon
products, NOK/yr.
The terms for total revenue and total cost are thus defined as follows:
xngasxnNGLNGLoiloilxn TPQPQPQTR +*+*+*=          (Eq. 7.4.21)
)(*/ n
f
nnxnxngasxnNGLNGLoiloilxn IrOQQTCQCQCQTC +++*+*+*=
(Eq. 7.4.22)
Here,
In is the (annual) investment for the pipeline company in year n.
 rf is the interest rate in the capital market (or financial opportunity
costs)
The toll is given by the toll formula as follows (reproduced here):
xn
n
n
xsnnpipexn QQ
O
QEICT *+***=         (Eq. 7.4.17)
In order to simplify the analyses we stylize the formulas slightly. The
first formula to be simplified is the toll formula above (Eq. 7.4.17) and we
may write it in a stylized form as follows:
)( OIr
Q
Q
T rxx +=
yxiOIr
Q
Q
TT rii ,,)( =+== å å
Here x and y represent two companies: x and y. The equation above will
thus simply read:
T = rrI + O (Eq. 7.4.23)
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Here,
rr is the regulated rate of return as specified by the regulator
O is the total (annual) operating costs
The next step is to introduce an expression for the owner shares by
specifying that the company x has an ownership share in the transportation
system equal to a percentage share a . This will have the following two
implications for the company. First, the company is entitled to collect a
percent of the total toll received by the transportation company (in which he is
an owner). Secondly, the company must pay a  percent of the total costs that
the transportation company has to cover.
We now assume for simplicity that there are only two owners, company
x and company y. This implies that company y will be entitled to (1-a )
percent of total toll and cost coverage.
Further, we assume that company x ships gas in the system equal to b
percent of the total gas volume shipped.  Applying now the assumptions listed
above the following relationships can be listed for the two companies:
T =  Tx +  Ty, Tx = b T, Ty = (1- b )T (Eq. 7.4.24)
Q = Qx + Qy, Qx = b Q, Qy = (1- b )Q (Eq. 7.4.25)
I  =  Ix  + Iy, Ix =a I, Iy = (1-a )I (Eq. 7.4.26)
The revenues and costs for these two companies can now be tabulated
as shown in Table 11. Again, the expressions are somewhat simplified and
stylized here without loosing coherence and continuity. All revenues and costs
related to production of oil and NGL are disregarded as well, and the gas
production costs and gas sale prices are assumed to be the same for both
companies. The latter assumptions may be perfectly true as the shippers may
be two companies in the same production field and they may sell their gas in
the same market.
 Table 11. Revenues and costs for company x and company y
Stakehold
er roles:
Gas
producer
Shipper Transportation
system owner
Gas seller
TRx = a T Qx*P
TCx = Qx*C Tx a (O+rfI)
TRy = (1-a )T Qy*P
TCy = Qy*C Ty (1-a )(O+r
fI)
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If we now consider the profit, revenues and costs for company x, by
applying the elements of Table 11 and the profit function (Eq. 7.4.20), the
following profit function can be specified for this case:
[ ])(*** IrOTCQTPQ fxxxx +++-+=Õ aa
Inserting equations (Eq. 7.4.24) through (Eq. 7.4.26) into the equation
above and simplifying, the equation will now yield:
[ ] [ ]IrOTTCPQ fx --+--=Õ ab )( (Eq. 7.4.27)
Equations (Eq. 7.4.27) now represents a stylized profit function for the
company x and several propositions can be concluded from it by changing the
values of a  and b . These propositions are summarized and discussed in the
following sub-sections.
7.4.3.4 Case one: the company is only an owner
The first case to be studied is specified by (a = 1, b = 0). This means
that the company is the only owner and it does not ship at all in the system.
Equation (Eq. 7.4.27) will now read as follows:
OIrT fx --=Õ (Eq. 7.4.28)
Three propositions can be made:
Proposition 7.1. If a company is solely a transportation company that
does not ship any gas in the system it has an incentive to increase its
profit by increasing the toll, provided rr > rf. The toll may be increased
by excessive investments in pipeline systems (gold plating and the
“Averch and Johnson” effect 261).
Proposition 7.2. If a company is solely a transportation company that
does not ship any gas in the system it is indifferent to the level of
transport operations and maintenance costs.
                                          
261 See Hope (1994) chapter 3.1 (or Hope (2000) page 253) where a more detailed
discussion is given of this effect.
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Proof: These two propositions are shown directly from equation (Eq.
7.4.28) by inserting (Eq. 7.4.23) into the equation. A positive profit is obtained
provided rr > rf , as seen directly from the equation (Eq. 7.4.29) below.
 )( frfrx rrIOIrOIr -=--+=Õ (Eq. 7.4.29)
The higher value of I the higher the profit will be. This conclusion is the
classic argument as stated by Nese (1998). We also see that the company is
indifferent to the operations costs as these are cancelled out. This simply
means that operations costs are passed on to the shippers. Faced with these
facts the following observation is made:
Observation 7.60. If the Norwegian regulatory regime should assign all
of the pipeline system ownership to an independent transportation
system company that is not allowed to ship own gas in the system the
current regulatory regime must be changed in order to create correct
incentives for cost efficient investments and operations. 261
7.4.3.5 Case two: the company is only a shipper
The second case to be studied is specified by (a = 0, b = 1). This
means that the company is the only shipper and it does not own the system at
all. The equation (Eq. 7.4.27) will now read as follows:
TCPQx --=Õ )( (Eq. 7.4.30)
The following proposition can be made:
Proposition 7.3. If a company is solely a shipper and it does not own
the pipeline system the company has an incentive to have the toll
reduced in order to increase its profit.
Proof: This conclusion is seen directly from equation (Eq. 7.4.30) and it
is a quite obvious and trivial conclusion.
There are however some few comment to be made here. Generally we
may assume that most shippers are also pipeline owners in a Norwegian
context. But this may not always be the case and there may be requests for
transportation from shippers who do not own the pipeline. This latter situation
may particularly arise as a consequence of the Gas Directive.
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One interesting question is to analyze if the toll formula as specified in
(Eq. 7.4.17) is an appropriate toll formula, for firm capacity, for a potential
shipper who is not a pipeline owner, provided the other (vertically integrated
shippers) pay the same toll for the same service – and still assuming there is
sufficient capacity.
If we assume and stick to the notion that those shippers who request
firm capacity shall cover the fixed costs (see Section 7.4.4 where this notion is
discussed) the following can be argued. The “third party shipper” will be in no
worse or better situation than any other shipper, as the users of the system
shall cover the fixed cost regardless of who owns the system. Actually, and
assuming that most of the other shippers are “over-shippers” or balanced this
situation will benefit him as the incentive structure forces the other shippers
(and the owners) to focus on keeping the costs a low as possible (see the next
two sub-sections). The independent shipper will thus know that the toll is at its
lowest possible level and the rate of return regulation makes sure that no
pipeline system owners are in the position of exercising excessive tolls.
If the toll should be set at a higher or lower level for the “third party
shipper” than the toll paid by the incumbent shippers, discrimination is
introduced. Such discrimination will presumably be in conflict with the Gas
Directive’s requirements of equal access for all shippers.
7.4.3.6 Case three: the company is balanced
The third case to be studied is specified by (a = b > 0). This means
that the company is balanced and his sipper share is exactly equal to his owner
share in the given system. By rearranging the profit function (Eq. 7.4.27) the
equation will read as follows:
)()()( baab -++--=Õ TIrOCPQ fx (Eq. 7.4.31)
Now the following relationships apply: Qx=a Q = b Q. If these
expressions are inserted into (Eq. 7.4.31) the profit function will yield:
)(
Q
Ir
Q
O
CPQ
f
xx ---*=Õ  (Eq. 7.4.32)
In the special case of  (a = b =1) the equation will simply read:
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        182
IrOCPQ fx ---*=Õ )(  (Eq. 7.4.33)
Based on the equation (Eq. 7.4.32) or (Eq. 7.4.33) two essential features
of the current incentive structure can easily be visualized.
Proposition 7.4. If a company has even ownership shares and shipper
shares the company will seek to reduce costs in gas production and gas
transport operations in order to increase its profits.
Proposition 7.5. If a company has even ownership shares and shipper
shares the company will seek to reduce costs in pipeline system
investments in order to increase its profit.
Proof: These two propositions are derived based on the assumption that
the gas price and the gas volumes sold are exogeniously given in the short run
and the only variables left for considering are transport operation costs, gas
production costs and investments. The propositions are seen directly from
equation (Eq. 7.4.32) and (Eq. 7.4.33).
Osmundsen (1999) reaches the same conclusions as stated above. 262 He
states that “companies in general are cost minimizers and that the regulatory
regime does not encourage for gold plating.”
There are however some few comments to be made here. Some
economists may argue that if the ownership share is relatively low, the
company (which we now assume is the operator and the one that can influence
on the operating costs) will have weak incentives for heavy cost reduction
efforts. This is due to the fact that the “lions share” of these reductions will be
taken by the other owners and the State in particular (tax on revenues), while
the company itself must solely take all the unpleasant efforts as for example,
discussions with the labor organizations and unions.
This argument was indeed stated by the Norwegian Minister of
Petroleum and Energy. 263 His argument was that this observation is a prime
reason for why the Norwegian oil companies shall be offered to buy higher
owner shares in the different licenses on the NCS, as suggested in the St. prp.
36 (2000-2001). The ultimate goal is to increase the oil companies’ incentives
and efforts for cost efficient operations and thereby improving their
                                          
262 Osmundsen (1999) discusses risk sharing and incentives in Norwegian petroleum
extraction.
263 At a public meeting in Haugesund, Norway on the Feb. 15, 2001
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competitive edge in a long-term perspective.
On the other hand, representatives of the oil companies may claim that
the current incentives are proper in the present form, and proper incentives for
cost efficient operations and investments are already in force.
7.4.3.7 Case four: the company is over-shipper
The fourth case to be studied is specified by (a < b ). This means that
the company is an over-shipper. Based on equation (Eq. 7.4.31) a new
proposition can be stated:
Proposition 7.6. If a company has an ownership share that is less than
its shipper share it has an incentive to reduce operational costs,
investments and the toll in order to increase its profit.
Proof: The statement is seen directly from (Eq. 7.4.31). We see that any
increase in investment costs and operations costs and the toll will yield a
reduced profit.
The above proposition is likely the cause of a notion that for long has
been governing Norwegian regulation. The notion is that “the companies shall
be allocated a less ownership share in the transportation system than in the
production fields” (i.e. the shipper interests). The quotation is taken from the
White paper no. 46 (1986-87) page 69. See also the next sub-section and
Proposition 7.8.
7.4.3.8 Case five: the company is over-owner
The fifth case to be studied is specified by (a > b ). This means that the
company is an over-owner. By inserting the stylized toll formula (Eq. 7.4.23)
into the profit function we derive a general formula for profit as a function of
investments:
)()()( baab -++--=Õ TIrOCPQ fx       (Same as: Eq. 7.4.31)
))(()()( baab -+++--=Õ OIrIrOCPQ rfx
OIrIrIrOOCPQ rfrx bbaaab ---+-+-=Õ )()()(
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)()()( OIrrrICPQ rfrx +--+-=Õ bab  (Eq. 7.4.34)
In equation (Eq. 7.4.34) the first term on the right hand side is the well-
known expression for profit obtained from gas sale minus production costs.
The second term shows that the company will yield a return on the
investments according to his owner share. The last term expresses the costs for
utilizing the system and from (Eq. 7.4.23) we see that this term is exactly
equal to the total toll times the company’s shipper share.
The interesting question is now to study whether an increase in
investment costs would yield a higher profit for the company. This can be
analyzed by studying the derivative of the profit function (Eq. 7.4.34) with
respect to the investment I, which will yield:
rfrx rrr
dI
d
ba --=
P
)( (Eq. 7.4.35)
When 0=
P
dI
d x
 the company is indifferent. This situation thus takes
place when:
fr
r
rr
r
-
=
b
a
 (Eq. 7.4.36)
Based on (Eq. 7.4.35) and (Eq. 7.4.36) a proposition can be concluded:
Proposition 7.7. A company will only seek to increase investments in
order to increase its profit if the ratio of ownership shares versus shipper
shares is larger than the ratio rr/(rr-rf). In mathematical form this
condition yields only if a / b > rr/(rr-rf).
Proof: Based on equations (Eq. 7.4.35) and (Eq. 7.4.36) we see that if
rfr rrr ba >- )(  the derivative of the profit function will yield a positive
value, which means that the company has an incentive to increase the
investments and thus the toll as this will increase his profit. If, however
rfr rrr ba <- )(  the opposite will take place and the company has an
incentive to reduce the investments and thus the toll.
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A corollary to Proposition 7.7: If we introduce some numerical values
for the rate of return and the opportunity cost the proposition can be illustrated
numerically. If for example, rr = 7% and rf = 5% the ratio between ownership
share and shipper share will yield 3.5. If we for example, assume that the
company owns the entire pipeline the company will be indifferent at (a  =1)
and b = 0.29. As this case represents the ultimate ownership share, the
corollary means that whenever a company is shipping approximately 29% or
more in a pipeline it will have proper incentives for keeping the investment
low. Or to put it somewhat differently, the “Averch-Johnson” effect is
eliminated given this condition.
Finally and for the sake of completeness we can also verify the results
and propositions derived above by means of equation (Eq. 7.4.35). If we
specify a  = 1 and b = 0 (the company is only an owner) this function will
yield: 
frx rr
dI
d
-=
P
, which complies with Proposition 7.1 and Proposition
7.12 (see case six below). The function will always be positive which means
that excess investment is always attractive.
If we specify a  = 0 and b = 1 (the company is only a shipper) the
function will yield: 
rx r
dI
d
-=
P
. This result complies with Proposition 7.3.
The function will always be negative which means that excess investment will
never be attractive.
If we finally specify that a  = 1 and b = 1 the function will yield:
frfrx rrrr
dI
d
-=--=
P
. This result complies with Proposition 7.5. The
function will always be negative and constant at –rf, which means that excess
investment will never be attractive.
A last analysis of interest is to study how the profit seeking company
will behave if it is allowed to negotiate the rate of return with the regulator.
From (Eq. 7.4.34) we can calculate that:
)( ba -=
P
I
dr
d
r
x
(Eq. 7.4.37)
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The following proposition can be suggested:
Proposition 7.8. A company that both owns and ships in a pipeline
system will seek to increase the rate of return (if possible) only if its
owner share is larger than its shipper share.
Proof: From (Eq. 7.4.37) we see that this equation will yield a positive
value only if a  > b .
7.4.3.9 Case six: two companies and two pipelines
In the proceeding analyses we expand the study case to include two
different pipeline systems, termed a and b and written as subscripts in the
equations. The two companies x and y mutually own the systems and they
both ship in the systems. We now assume for simplicity that Pa = Pb = P (i.e.
an exogeniously given price) and Ca = Cb = C (i.e. equal production costs for
the gas).
We assume further that Qxa = xab Qx and Qxb = xbb Qx and xab + xbb = 1
yielding that Qxb = (1- xab )Qx, and Qx = Qxa + Qxb = constant. We also assume
that the total volume of gas shipped in both systems by both shippers (i.e.: Q =
Qx + Qy) is constant and that the total volume is exactly equal to the total ship-
or-pay volume. This is the volume applied (by the regulator) as the base
volume for calculating the regulated rate of return.
This latter assumption subsequently yields that the toll elements Ta and
Tb are constant. This is so due to the fact that the pipeline systems are assumed
to be utilized at their regulated throughput levels which will yield a constant
toll according to the toll formula (Eq. 7.4.17). Finally, we also assume that the
ownership shares, xaa , xba  are exogeniously given as part of the licensing
approval procedures. We will later relax this latter assumption.
The reason for suggesting these strict assumptions is to eliminate the
toll formula’s potential rationing efficiency capability (or lack of such
capability). This will allow us to study the behavior of the shippers
independently from their potential incentives to increase or decrease the
shipped volume as a function of the toll formula. This means that we do not
analyze the features of the toll formula as such. Another way of expressing
this is that we do not analyze the toll formulas’ capability to reduce
deadweight losses caused by any inefficient rationing capability of the toll
formula. This all means that the only question studied is the shipper’s
preference for where to route gas as a function of his shipper share and owner
share.
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By applying equation (Eq. 7.4.27) the profit functions for company x
pertinent to systems a and b yield:
[ ] 21)()( kkIrOTTCPQ xaafaaxaaaaxxaxa +=--+--=Õ bab  (Eq. 7.4.38)
[ ] 43)1()()()1( kkIrOTTCPQ xabfbbxbbbbxxaxb +-=--+---=Õ bab
           (Eq.7.4.39)
The task now is to maximize total profit for company x by manipulating
the routing of the gas volumes to be shipped i.e. deciding the sizes of xab and
xbb . We remember that xbb  is given implicitly by xab so the task can thus be
expressed as follows:
[ ]xbxa
xa
Max Õ+Õ
b
 (Eq. 7.4.40)
The derivative of the profit function (Eq. 7.4.40) with respect to xab  can
be expressed as follows:
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b (Eq. 7.4.41)
From (Eq. 7.4.41) two propositions can be concluded.
Proposition 7.9. If a company ships gas in two pipeline systems it
will seek to shift the gas volumes over to the pipeline system that has
the lowest toll. This is a fairly obvious conclusion, though.
Proof: If we specify that 31 kk >  then 0
)(
>
Õ+Õ
xa
xbxa
d
d
b
 which will
yield a positive profit. The inequality above can be simplified by inserting Pa=
Pb = P and Ca= Cb = C, yielding:
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bxax TCPQTCPQ -->-- )()(
Tb>Ta (Eq. 7.4.42)
Proposition 7.10. The optimization decision of where to ship gas is
independent of the company’s owner shares in the pipelines in question.
Proof: This conclusion is derived from the fact that the ownership
shares are constant and does not influence on the decision as shown in the
inequality (Eq. 7.4.42).
If we now relax on the assumption that the ownership shares are
exogeniously given, but we rather assume that the companies are allowed to
increase or decrease their shares, a profit maximization behavior can be
studied. The task is now once more to maximize the profit function by
choosing the optimal values for xaa  and xba . We assume for simplicity
however, that company x has a constrained investment possibility in such a
way that xaa + xba = 1, xba  = 1 - xaa .
We assume further that the operation costs are the same in both systems
and they are constant. We also assume here that even the toll is equal in both
systems (and the reason for so doing is given in the main conclusions specified
at the end of this sub-section). The profit function can now be found from
equations (Eq. 7.4.38) and (Eq. 7.4.39).
[ ]xbxa
xa
Max Õ+Õ
a
(Eq. 7.4.43)
The derivative of the profit function (Eq. 7.4.43) with respect to xaa
can be calculated and the result is as follows, applying the assumptions listed
above:
[ ] [ ] )()( abfbfaf
xa
xbxa IIrIrOTIrOT
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a
 (Eq. 7.4.44)
Proposition 7.11. If a company can shift its owner shares between
pipeline systems in which it ships gas and where the toll is equal in both
systems, the company will seek to invest in the system that has the
lowest investment cost as this will increase its total profit. If the
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investments are the same in both systems the company is indifferent as
long as the toll is the same in both systems.
Proof: If ab II > the derivative of the profit function is positive and the
company will invest in system “a”.
If the tolls however are not the same in the two systems the equation
(Eq. 7.4.44) will have a more general form:
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 (Eq. 7.4.45)
The following proposition can be stated based on (Eq. 7.4.45):
Proposition 7.12. If a company can shift its owner shares between
pipeline systems in which it ships gas and where the toll is set at a
regulated rate of return, it will seek to invest in those systems that have
the highest investment costs (and toll) as this will increase its total
profit.
Proof: If we study the inequality 0
)(
>
Õ+Õ
xa
xbxa
d
d
a  we find that this
condition holds if b
f
ba
f
a IrTIrT ->- . If we now insert the simplified toll
function of (Eq. 7.4.23) the inequality reads: )()( frb
fr
a rrIrrI ->-  or
simply : ba II > .
We note that Proposition 7.11 and Proposition 7.12 yield different
results.
7.4.3.10  Summary of this sub-section
This sub-section has shown that dependent on the values of the two
parameters a  and b  a vast variety of incentives are derived. Four main
conclusions are suggested here as the main inferences from the analyses of
this sub-section:
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Conclusion 7.15.  Generally all shippers will seek to ship in the pipeline
system that has the lowest toll, if they are allowed to choose between
equal transportation possibilities in systems where the sizes of the tolls
are the only differences. Further, such preferences are independent of a
shipper’s owner shares in the systems. An introduction of a unitized toll
would prevent such a behavior and eliminate such shipper preferences.
(See Proposition 7.9 and Proposition 7.10).
This conclusion is quite interesting in relation to optimization of the
systems at high levels of system utilization. As will be shown in Section 7.5
on page 203, it is important to have as few restrictions as possible that specify
or dictate how to route the shippers’ gas physically in the integrated network.
If the shippers are allowed to specify where to route their gas in the systems,
“internal” physical constrains are created that may effectively reduce an
optimal overall utilization.
Based on this physical fact and the conclusion above the author will
argue that the current regulatory regime and the prevailing toll formula
hamper physical optimization of gas transportation, especially at high levels of
utilization.
Conclusion 7.16.  If a unitized toll is introduced in all pipeline systems
but the owner shares are unevenly spread distortions are introduced
resulting from reduced profit or excess profit for some pipeline owners.
This conclusion is due to the fact that the pipeline systems have
different (historic) investment costs, Ia ¹  Ib. An introduction of a re-
ownership arrangement into a unitized ownership scheme (i.e. all
pipelines belong to only one owner group) or a similar arrangement of
some kind or re-allocation of revenues, must be done if a unitized toll is
introduced. (See Proposition 7.11 and Proposition 7.12).
Conclusion 7.17.  If the Norwegian public authorities regulate that no
shipper has an owner share larger than rr/(rr-rf) times his shipper share,
incentives are created for cost efficient investments. The incorrect
investment signals and weak incentives for cost efficiency usually
associated with average cost pricing regimes are eliminated. As this
condition is normally always fulfilled in the Norwegian context proper
incentives for cost efficient investments and operations exist - in theory.
(See Proposition 7.4 through Proposition 7.7). Further, only when the
owner share is less than the shipper share a right incentive is created for
simultaneously decreasing operations costs, investment costs and the
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rate of return in order to increase the profit for a company that owns and
ships in the same pipeline system. (See Proposition 7.8).
Conclusion 7.18.  If an independent transportation company is
established and this new company is assigned the entire ownership of
the systems, the classic difficulties of the “Averch-Johnson effect” will
occur. Under such circumstances alternative incentive structures should
be sought for that – in theory – would be superior to the prevailing rate
of return regime. (See Proposition 7.1, Proposition 7.2 and Observation
7.60).
7.4.4 Analytical discussion of possible toll regimes in a liberalized context
7.4.4.1 Main features of applicable toll regimes – a summary
If we now recapture the main elements of the economic tolling theory
discussed in Section 3.4 we can summarize the theory shortly as follows:
· The main purpose of the toll regime for the Norwegian natural gas
transportation system is to ensure:
- rationing efficiency i.e. an optimal usage of existing capacity.
- cost recovery i.e. coverage of the fixed costs.
- cost efficiency i.e. the toll regime shall feature an incentive
structure that enhances cost minimization.
Generally, a toll regime is often designed to capture several other
important features as well. These features are not considered here due to
several reasons as discussed in the preceding work. The features found not to
be included here as prime objectives for a future toll regime in a Norwegian
context are:
· Dynamic efficiency
· Allocative efficiency
The different toll regimes have different features that comply and
capture the main objectives in different ways and to a different extent. This
may be summarized as follows:
· Toll set equal to marginal costs of transportation secures an optimal
usage of the system. Marginal cost pricing does not contribute to cover
financial costs and fixed operational and maintenance costs i.e. fixed
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costs in the case of natural gas transportation due to the fact that the
marginal costs are always substantially lower than average costs.
· Toll set equal to average cost covers fixed costs, but it does not secure
optimal usage of the system or it provides only sub-optimal usage.
Further, such tolling will not give proper incentives for cost efficiency if
an independent system operator operates the system and he also solely
owns the system.
· Two-part toll can ensure both an optimal usage by pricing transport
equal to marginal costs and also cost coverage by means of the fixed
part of the toll. The shippers sort themselves into groups according to
their willingness to pay toll and according to their needs for services.
This may result in different values of the fixed part of the toll dependent
on the different services offered.
· Ramsey pricing can ensure to some extent an optimal usage and also
cost coverage provided the shippers demand functions are known. The
rule is also known as the inverse elasticity rule and the shippers are
discriminated in such a way that the fixed costs are charged in that
portion of the market that can bear the costs the best. This is the market
that is affected the least in utilizing the capacity when the toll is
increased. This type of tolling is often referred to as second best tolling
as it ensures cost coverage and at the same time minimizes the
deadweight loss. Ramsey pricing will in theory also combine the two
basic principles of tolling as written in the bullet points below.
The toll may be based on two basic principles, namely:
· costs based tolling
· value based tolling
The former principle is quite dominant in relation to natural gas
transportation in several regions of the world. In North America cost based
tolling has long been recognized as a basic principle, see Conclusion 6.6 on
page 114. The Norwegian point of view has so far recognized the same
principles, see Section 5.3.2.4 on page 69. Further, the Gas Directive requires
that cost of transportation is made transparent, see Section 6.4.5 on page 110,
indicating that a cost based toll regime is in compliance with the Gas
Directive.
Further, a value based toll regime will require information that is
currently not available to a large extent, see Section 3.4.3.4 on page 38. In
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order to obtain such information significant legal and constitutional barriers
are envisaged to occur simply because existing agreements and licensees all
must be renegotiated. The main conclusion made here is thus:
Observation 7.61. The future toll regime for Norwegian natural gas
transportation must preferably be cost based in order to cover fixed
costs in a foreseeable future. If a future evolution of the European gas
market progresses a shift to value based tolling may prove necessary.
This will however require paradigmatic changes into Norwegian law
and regulations. Value based tolling is thus not considered in this work.
Ramsey pricing
Ramsey pricing was discussed theoretically in Section 3.4.5.8 and
Ramsey pricing has in theory several promising and attractive features. As has
been shown, the implication of Ramsey pricing is to set the toll closer to
marginal cost in the elastic market and farther from marginal cost in the
inelastic market. This means that the shipper with the most inelastic demand
curve for transportation services is discriminated against others and he pays a
higher toll than the shipper with a more elastic demand curve. This is an
attractive feature as the transportation system owner may cover fixed cost with
the least distortion on the system utilization.
There are however several difficulties regarding its applicability in a
real Norwegian and European context. Similar difficulties are experienced in
Canada as well and Mansell and Church (1995) list four of them. Firstly, the
information requirements to implement Ramsey pricing are formidable. From
the formula we see that there are two important parameters to be decided in
order to calculate the toll for an individual shipper. The first parameter is the
marginal cost. Even though marginal costs are constantly changing and differ
somewhat from pipeline to pipeline these costs are manageable and some kind
of average marginal cost can be applied for all shippers.
The largest difficulty is to set the individual shippers’ elasticity of
demand for transportation services correctly. We may assume for example,
that the interruptible shipper has a more elastic demand than the firm shipper,
but how much? Further, how stable are such elasticities if they are obtained in
the first place – do they change from time to time or from season to season?
How will for example, all the Upstream Agreements effect on a shipper’s
willingness to pay toll? Will for example, an Upstream Arrangement be a
more attractive possibility in given situations as soon as the shipper has
learned that his toll has been increased for a given transportation service? Is it
likely that shippers will disclose such information – as a strategic move – if
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the they know that the operator will use this information to discriminate
shippers? These types of questions are hard to answer.
The second difficulty is that a move from the existing toll regime to
Ramsey pricing will cause winners and losers. This can be seen by the fact
that Ramsey pricing is discriminating shippers for example, in an off-peak
situation where both firm and interruptible services are running concurrently.
The notion would be to apply Ramsey pricing in such a way that the firm
shippers should pay the higher toll. This principle could be expanded even
further in such a way that there were different tolls between the individual
firm shippers.
Assuming this situation, who is the shipper with an inelastic demand?
If we apply the Gas Directive the shippers can be anyone – the “traditional
producers” (i.e. sellers) or the downstream buyers. In a liberalized context we
may assume for example, that the interruptible shipper will be the one who has
an access to gas storage, typically the “traditional downstream buyer”. This
shipper may have a fairly elastic demand. The traditional producer, if being a
shipper, may have a more inelastic demand, due to the fact that the gas being
shipped may be associated gas. It is important for him to have the gas shipped
so that he can collect revenues from his oil and NGL production. Given such
assumptions, Ramsey pricing may discriminate Norwegian hydrocarbon
producers – they may be the losers – and the downstream buyers may be the
winners.
The third implication mentioned by Mansell and Church is that such
prices are not strictly cost based and the last one mentioned is closely related
to the former one, namely that Ramsey pricing may “run afoul of legislation”.
There are at least two issues noteworthy here.  The first issue is whether tolls
shall be allowed to deviate from a cost based toll whatsoever, and the second
issue is whether discrimination is allowed as a recognized principle as such. In
the prevailing regime neither of these possibilities are normally accepted. In a
liberalized regime, and strictly following the Gas Directive the former issue is
not fully clarified, see Dyrland and Moen (2000) page 20. The latter issue
seems to be more clarified in the Gas Directive as rules based on
discrimination are generally not accepted, see again Dyrland and Moen (2000)
page 32.
A fifth and last difficulty, in the opinion of the author is the fact that
Ramsey pricing would introduce different tolls for different shippers (and for
different parts of the system) which will be counteracting the notion of a
unitized toll. In Section 7.4.3 and Section 7.5.5 this author has argued that in
order to enhance the physical utilization of the system it is important to
eliminate any shippers’ preferences for internal specified routing in the
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integrated network. The benefits and disadvantages of Ramsey pricing must
thus be compared with the substantially improved rationing efficiency of a
unitized tolling regime.
As it has become apparent from the discussion above and based on the
approach taken in this work, this author has not done any in-depth analyses
based on Ramsey pricing. If that should have been done the difficulties
identified above must be sorted out first. This leads to the following
observation:
Observation 7.62. This work has indicated that there are several
difficulties in implementing Ramsey pricing as an applicable tolling
mechanism in Norwegian natural gas transportation. This pricing
mechanism is thus not evaluated any further here.
Two-part toll
The two-part toll based on a cost of service approach can be designed in
such a way that different tolls are designed for different services. The shippers
may then - according to their own preferences - decide which services they
will go for and thereby disclose information of their willingness to pay. The
shippers are thus not discriminated in the sense that they pay a different toll
for the same transportation service (as Ramsey pricing would have done), but
shippers simply sort themselves into groups according to their needs and
willingness to pay for different services.
Observation 7.63. Two-part toll based on a cost of service approach
and a differentiated product selection (the transportation services, which
comprise firm, interruptible and peak load supplies), will sort shippers
into groups according to their needs and willingness to pay. If the
services and the related tolls are correctly designed rationing efficiency
is obtained and the fixed costs are covered.
The main task then becomes to design appropriate services for
Norwegian natural gas transportation and to allocate the correct tolls to the
services. The former task is already addressed as an efficient product
selection. The latter task will call for further economic analyses and
discussions. These two topics are therefore analyzed in the next two sub-
sections.
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7.4.4.2 Efficient product selection
The main services inferred by the work so far applicable for a
liberalized regime are:
· Firm transportation
· Interruptible transportation
· Peak load transportation
All the prevailing “ship-or-pay” contracts may be categorized into the
first type of service. It is a political goal to maintain these contracts as much as
possible and we may assume that these contracts will tie-up a substantial
portion of the system capacity for quite some time, see Observation 5.14 on
page 72. We make one observation here:
Observation 7.64. The existing ship-or-pay transportation agreement
may be characterized as firm capacity and it may act as a two-part toll if
the ship-or-pay volume it treated as a “booked capacity charge.”
If spare capacity exists in the system and if the booked capacity is not
fully utilized some capacity exists that in the current regime – as well as in a
liberalized context – can be utilized for other transportation services. These
services may be any of the three different types identified.
Several new types of services can be thought of for utilizing this
capacity, see Observation 6.7 on page 105. In liberalized regimes elsewhere in
the world the unused portion of the booked capacity plays a significant role in
a capacity release market. Here transportation rights are traded. 264 Based on
the existing transportation agreements specified rules exist in the prevailing
regime for how to utilize the booked but not utilized capacity.
There are also other types of conceptually identified spare and scarce
capacity as illustrated in Figure 27. In order to utilize this capacity in a
liberalized context, and based on Conclusion 7.9 on page 131, the following
observation can be suggested:
                                          
264 An observation is quite apparent in this respect. If the gas price is high in the
downstream market the shippers will request high nominations and thus leaving less
opportunities for the gas sellers to offer spot market sales. In periods of low gas sales prices
in the downstream market the situation may be the opposite. The gas sellers thus become
marginal suppliers. Denny Ellerman, MIT, addressed this observation as a likely effect of
liberalization.
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Observation 7.65. In a liberalized context, an independent
transportation system operator must be given the right to allocate spare
and scarce capacity in a rationing efficient manner and he must not be
restricted by the regulator or the pipeline system owners or other
shippers.
Figure 27.  Different transportation services 265
Interruptible transportation can – from a conceptual point of view as
well as a practical point of view – be offered during off-peak periods and
during peak periods. It may be difficult to find out in advance how much of
the available capacity that actually will be requested as interruptible supplies
or how much of the capacity that will be so attractive that shippers will
“compete” for it in an auction. The final answer will probably not be revealed
before an auction actually has taken place.
7.4.4.3 Components of the future toll formula
A major concern is how the toll shall be designed for the different
services. One approach is to treat the firm capacity as the peak utilization of
the system, while interruptible service is off-peak usage. Based on this
approach some economic principles can be applied and some rules are defined
                                          
265 Source: Statoil
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for how to allocate the fixed costs between the different types of services.
According to Kahn (1988), 266 the economic principle is absolutely
clear, (provided that full coverage of average costs is the aim): “if the same
type of capacity serves all users, capacity costs as such should be levied only
on utilization at the peak.” If this principle is used, firm shippers shall be
charged a toll which – when integrated over all shippers  - covers all fixed
costs.
The fixed part of the two-part toll may be designed to cover these costs.
This may thus be understood to be an access charge or a demand or capacity
charge. In the fixed cost element a rate of return may be included in a similar
manner as the current rate of return.
By the same token the interruptible toll shall not contribute to the
coverage of fixed costs, but shall be charged only to cover marginal costs.
This would imply a commodity toll equal to the marginal costs at peak
demand (which equals the marginal cost or total average variable cost).
Further:
Observation 7.66. The variable part of the two-part toll may be set
equal to the variable unit costs.
There are of course several caveats to the above suggestion. By
applying the empirical data provided in this work the interruptible toll would
be approximately 4% of the firm toll. If there is substantial excess capacity in
the system a clear motivation is created for the shippers to shift their volumes
from firm to interruptible transportation. The rule may thus be altered slightly
to compensate for this effect by increasing the toll for interruptible services.267
These principles, applied in several regimes in North America, are
called straight fixed/variable methodology (SFV). 268 Modifications to the rule
are specified in such a way that peak users (i.e. shippers who compete for
scarce capacity) also cover part of the capital costs, in essence shifting a larger
portion of risk from shippers to transport system owners. The above
discussion may be summarized as follows:
Observation 7.67. A two-part toll may be designed in such a way that
the fixed part covers fixed costs and this part is levied on the firm
                                          
266 See Kahn (1988), Chapter 4/I, page 89/I.
267 In theory a tolling regime based on Ramsey pricing could have solved this problem, but
as pointed out earlier, such tolling is difficult to implement.
268 See Mansell and Church (1995), page 60.
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capacity. This toll is based on a cost of service approach.
Observation 7.68. Variable costs plus a minor portion of the fixed costs
may constitute the toll for interruptible transportation when no capacity
constraints exist.
Observation 7.69. The existing toll regime and the ship-or-pay
agreements comply – in a conceptual manner – with the above
suggested toll principles regarding firm capacity, see the prevailing toll
formula in Section 7.4.2.10 on page 160 and Observation 7.44 on page
161.
Observation 7.70. The fixed part of the toll for interruptible services
may be set at a level that is less than the fixed part of the firm capacity
when there is spare capacity in the system. When capacity constraints
exist an auction of capacity is suggested, see Section 7.5 on page 203.
Another difficult economic consideration is how to treat old and new
historic investment costs in the base rate for tolling and calculation of the
fixed cost element (old or new “vintage” considerations). We may also include
here the economy of scale effect. Table 5 on page 133 clearly shows the
difference in fixed costs between old and new systems. Table 5 shows for
example, that the ratio of investment/capacity in Europipe II is only 33% of
the same ratio for Zeepipe. The question is then, shall shippers be
discriminated depending on which system they use — the old or the new?
Shall tolls be calculated based on past or present costs?
In addition to the differences in historic investment costs, older systems
are depreciated to some extent and the capital cost element may thus have
vanished or been significantly reduced – in theory. 269
Kahn (1988) offers a clear view on this issue and he states that: “prices
should reflect marginal costs at the time of sale – not at some time in the
past”; similarly, he recommends “the use of reproduction instead of original
cost as the basis for computing capital charges.” 270 If this principle is applied,
shippers’ tolls should reflect costs in newer pipelines, and the owners of older
systems would thus not fully cover their capital costs — a situation creating
the well-known situation of stranded costs.
                                          
269 This assumption depends on how to calculate depreciation. In some regimes
depreciation is not included.
270 See Kahn (1988) page 109/I.
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However, Mansell and Church (1995) for example, point to a number of
arguments suggesting that tolls shall reflect an average capital cost for old and
new systems considered as a whole. Such arguments relate to the fact that the
aggregated demand of all shippers gives rise to the need for additional pipeline
capacity, and no shipper (in a liberalized context) has an acquired right to ship
in one particular pipeline system.
Operational considerations support the latter view, as well. In order to
comply with the gas quality specifications some blending of gas must be
performed in the transportation network. All shippers thus benefit from this
possibility, and no shipper can claim that he utilizes only one single portion of
the network independently. All shippers are benefiting from the integrated
transportation system operations. Several empirical cases and operational
considerations have been provided in this work supporting this view, see
Conclusion 7.11 on page 172. The following conclusion is therefore suggested
as a feasible approach in a Norwegian context:
Observation 7.71. The fixed cost element for firm capacity shall
generally be calculated as an average fixed cost based on historic costs
(and potentially corrected for depreciation) for all pipelines that are
included in the Norwegian dry gas system.
There are some objections to this rule. First, none of the rich gas
pipelines are included here as these may impose costs on the shippers in the
dry gas system that may not be appropriate for some shippers. Further, the
Norpipe system inevitably distinguishes itself somewhat from the other
pipelines as it is significantly more expensive in investments and in operations
due to offshore compression.
A final important consideration is whether the toll shall be “mileage-
based” or “postage-stamp” allocated. A typical consideration in many network
utilities is whether tolls should be allocated based on distance utilized, or
should serve essentially as postage stamps. Tabors et al. (2000) 271 identify
some useful indicators for choosing between the two options in relation to
natural gas transportation. Specifically, they suggest that a postage stamp toll
is appropriate if:
· The cost of service does not vary significantly between customers using
the system.
                                          
271 Tabors (2000).
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This may be the case if the market is located at one end of a pipeline,
with producers are located at the other. In a Norwegian context this condition
is met to a large extent. The interesting cost here is the variable costs. As we
have seen these costs contribute less than 4 % of total costs and there are only
minor differences between the different pipelines.
· There is a clustering of all compressors at one end of a pipeline, with no
intermediate compressor stations along the way. This condition is met
with the only exception of Norpipe.
· There is an absence of receipt and delivery points along the way.
This condition is also met if we disregard some very minor deliveries of
gas at Karmøy to a local distribution company (Gasnor). The following
observation is thus made:
Observation 7.72. Norwegian systems comply to a large extent with the
above criteria, suggesting postage-stamp tolling to be a feasible
approach, at least for major parts of dry gas transportation systems.
7.4.4.4 Summary of this sub-section
The main conclusion of these sub-sections and the observations listed
here can be summarized into the following conclusions:
Conclusion 7.19.  The existing toll formula may partly be characterized
as a combined rate of return regulation and a two-part toll if the ship-or-
pay volume is taken as a fixed booking charge, or it may be
characterized as an average cost pricing toll if the shipped volume
exceeds the ship-or-pay volume, see Observation 7.64.
Conclusion 7.20.  The prevailing toll regime should continue to
constitute the base principles for a future toll for firm transportation
provided sufficient capacity exists in the system and provided the fixed
part is treated as a “booking charge”. This latter provision means that
the shippers shall pay a fixed unit toll for booking rights in the system,
see Observation 7.67.
Conclusion 7.21.  The fixed part of the toll may include the fixed
(annual) operations and maintenance costs or these costs may
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alternatively be charged separately as a variable part (per unit of gas),
see Observation 7.66.
Conclusion 7.22.  Conclusion 7.15 through Conclusion 7.18 in Section
7.4.3.10 at page 189 must be observed. These conclusions state in sum
that a unitized toll for firm capacity must be established and it must be
set equal for all pipeline systems that comprise dry gas system. The
entire dry gas transportation system must be treated as one zone only
and entry and exit points must be established. A unitized toll for firm
capacity will require either unitization of the ownership structure or a
payment mechanism that secures that no shipper receives extra profit or
loss due to the unitization.
Conclusion 7.23.  The fixed cost element of the two-part toll is set equal
to the average historic costs for all pipelines in the dry gas system and
the fixed part of the two-part toll is thus the same for all dry gas
pipeline systems. New incremental investments if developed must be
included in the fixed part of the toll, see Observation 7.61, Observation
7.63 and Observation 7.69 to Observation 7.71.
Conclusion 7.24.  A two-part toll shall be treated as a postage stamp
toll, meaning that the same toll will be charged regardless of the routing
of the gas between the entry points and the exit points of the dry gas
system, see Observation 7.72
Conclusion 7.25.  The variable part of the two-part toll must be set
equal to the marginal unit cost at full capacity for a representative
pipeline times the volume transported by the shipper. Alternatively the
variable part of the toll can be charged as per today – “in kind”, see
Observation 7.69.
Conclusion 7.26.  A two-part toll formula for interruptible services must
be developed on the same format as the toll for firm capacity, but the
fixed part must be set somewhat lower than the fixed part of the firm
capacity toll, see Observation 7.70.
Conclusion 7.27.  The aggregated annual revenues from the tolls (firm,
interruptible and peak load) must be balanced with the regulated
allowable pipeline owners’ return. If the revenues exceed regulated
limits the firm shippers shall be refunded or charged accordingly and
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pro-rata their firm capacity - at least in theory, see Observation 7.69 and
Observation 7.44.
Conclusion 7.28.  In order to enhance cost efficiency in operations and
assuming that an independent transportation system operator is
established, some new incentives must be introduced in order to ensure
cost efficiency in operations and incentives for optimization of the
transport operations, see also Observation 7.65. This topic is discussed
in Section 7.6.
7.4.5 Summary
In this section the hypothesis C.4 has been tested. The hypothesis states:
“It is possible to develop new economic methods and rules in order to fulfill
the future economic requirements.” The hypothesis is argued to be true given
the assumptions of the work. Many observations are identified and several
conclusions are drawn regarding future principles for regulation, tariff and toll
in a liberalized context. (These conclusions are all documented in the
preceding text so they will not be reproduced here).
7.5 Allocation of spare capacity – principles, methods and toll
7.5.1 The hypothesis C.5
The hypothesis C.5 states: “It is possible to identify solutions that are
feasible from a gas flow optimization point of view by applying the
GassOptTKL program.” In this sub-section the hypothesis is tested. The main
issues to be derived here are some technical and operational principles for
allocation of spare (and scarce) capacity, provided there is not sufficient
overall capacity in the system to serve all shippers. If such principles can be
produced the hypothesis is true.
The first activity of this sub-section is testing of the GassOptTKL linear
programming expert computer tool. The purpose of the testing is to verify the
extent to which this program can be applied as an optimization tool for
optimizing physical gas flows in the integrated pipeline system.
The second issue dealt with is the development of a case study
concerning a future situation where shippers bid for spare capacity. The case
study is based on principles suggested by Nese (1998) 272 concerning
auctioning of spare capacity in a network. The basic idea is that different
shippers bid for capacity by selecting different options for routing of the gas in
the network. Each suggested routing is accompanied by a bid regarding the
                                          
272 Nese (1998) chapters 6 and 7.
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shipper’s willingness to pay a toll for utilizing the specified pipeline segments.
The third part of this sub-section analyzes the physical flow patterns in
the system resulting from the different shippers’ choices of routing. As will be
shown, it is almost impossible for a shipper to select an optimal physical
routing. Different routes will yield different flows that typically are lower than
an optimized flow.
Fourth, a method for calculating shadow prices on capacity constraints
is suggested.
Fifth, a study case is provided that assigns economic values to the
shippers’ bids. By assessing the total values of the different bids some
plausible principles for auctioning of the spare capacity are inferred. Finally,
the last sub-section derives some conclusions.
7.5.2 The GassOptTKL program
7.5.2.1 Test data and verification of the program’s accuracy
The GassOptTKL program has never before been applied by Statoil to
solve problems as identified here. In order therefore to solve such problems a
testing of the program was deemed necessary in order to verify its usefulness
to solve the task identified here. The main purpose of the testing is to obtain
some information on how accurately the program calculates pressures
compared to real pressures and taking into consideration transient conditions
in the pipeline system.
In connection with transportation of natural gas in the very long and
highly pressurized Norwegian natural gas pipelines transients occur regularly.
Transients may be understood to be the pressure waves moving inside the
pipeline due to the fact that the gas is a compressible fluid and caused by the
fact that the operator increases or decreases the linepack. Transients are
present during the time it takes for the system to move from one steady state
condition into a new steady state condition. Transients are caused by the fact
that the flow into the pipeline may be set differently at a given point in time
than the flow out of the pipeline.
If the flow in the pipeline is at a steady state condition, meaning that the
flow into the pipeline is exactly the same as the flow out of the pipeline, and
the conditions are stabilized, the GassOptTKL will calculate pressures
correctly. This is due to the fact that the program is calibrated based on such
conditions. Data from steady state transport conditions are obtained and
collected during comprehensive capacity testing of the pipeline systems done
from time to time by the Transportation System Operator.
The test of the program was conducted by comparing calculated
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pressures from GassOptTKL with on line data collected from the SCADA 156
system at the Bygnes Control Center, Karmøy in a random time period chosen
to be Oct. 12-17, 2000. The program was tested on three individual pipelines,
Zeepipe, Europipe I and Franpipe.
The test data contains the following information from each of these
three pipelines using here the Zeepipe as an example: pressure and flow at the
inlet of the pipeline at Sleipner: (P-SLR) and (F-SLR) and pressure and flow
at the outlet of pipeline in Zeebrugge: (P-ZBR) and (F-ZBR). These sets of
four data values were obtained from the SCADA system every minute. Five
sets were taken for each day and fed into the GassOptTKL.
The data applied, as input for GassOptTKL is the flow (F-ZBR) and
pressure (P-ZBR) at the outlet of the pipeline and the program calculates the
pressure at the inlet of the pipeline at Sleipner (P-SLR). As GassOptTKL
calculates only steady state conditions the flow is assumed to be constant all
the time. The calculated inlet pressure is finally compared with the true value
at that exact same point in time and the difference between true and calculated
value is presented.
7.5.2.2 Test results
The results are displayed in Figure 28 below and we can see that there
are differences between the calculated pressures at Sleipner and the true values
in the range of +/- 2% most of the time, with one shorter peak value of  + 6%.
The test results from the two other pipelines are in the same range.
When the natural gas transportation system is utilized at high deliveries
the pressures are very close to the maximum allowable working pressures. In
this respect the range of deviation in pressures obtained by testing the program
are significant due to the existence of transients. The following observations
can thus be concluded:
Observation 7.73. Based on the principles for calibration of the
program and the testing conducted of the GassOptTKL, the program
will give satisfactory results for situations that are very close to steady
state transportation.
Observation 7.74. In relation to the conceptual discussion conducted in
this research the GassOptTKL program can be applied for analyzing the
suggested principles for allocation of spare capacity in an auction.
Observation 7.75. If the program shall be applied as a daily tool some
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further testing is recommended on data deliberately chosen to contain
large transient conditions in order to evaluate its usefulness for
conducting such tasks. Presumably there will be a need for accurate
methods and predicting tools in order to establish the exact capacity that
is available for auctioning from time to time.
Observation 7.76. Transients will always be present to some extent and
this will inevitably affect on the possibilities for predicting the existing
spare capacity at any given point in time and definitely for any point in
the future.
Figure 28.  Testing results of GassOptTKL – Zeepipe 273
7.5.3 Development of a test case
7.5.3.1 The initial flow conditions and stipulations of spare capacity
Prior to assessing how a specific auctioning of spare capacity can be
conducted, a study case must be suggested. An initial base case is therefore
suggested and presented in Figure 29 below (all flow data is in MSm3/d).
                                          
273 Please note that the actual pressure and flow data are deleted on the left-hand side axis
as they are proprietary information
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Here, a very simplified section of the dry gas system is considered comprising
the Kollsnes terminal and the pipelines shown. The spare production capacity
and the pipelines’ maximum design capacities are shown in Figure 29 together
with the planned production forecasts for the following day.
The GassOptTKL has been applied to optimize the routing of the
planned production from Kollsnes. This means that the presented flows in the
figure below are those that cause the least pressure drops in the system. These
flows are those that cause the most energy efficient routing.
If we study the information displayed in Figure 29, we see that there are
apparently sufficient capacities in Zeepipe IIA and the “crossover” to transport
the entire additional production capability at Kollsnes (i.e. 12) down to
Draupner (Dr). It also seems to be almost enough capacity to transport this
amount of gas through Zeepipe IIB as well (spare capacity is 11,6).
Figure 29.   Planned transportation prior to auction of spare capacity
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7.5.3.2 The shippers bid and preferred routing
We now introduce three shippers, Shipper A, B and C. These shippers
are all interested in bidding for the spare production capacity at Kollsnes and
they would like to have the gas shipped to Dornum and Dunkerque. We now
assume that the information displayed in Figure 29 is released to the shippers
causing three bids as shown in Table 12 below.
 Table 12. Shippers’ bids
Max
Cap.
Planned
Prod.
Bid from
Shipper A
Bid from
Shipper B
Bid from
Shipper C
Kollsnes 99 87 + 12 + 12 + 12
Dunkerque 52 43 + 6 + 9 + 3
Dornum 55 44 + 6 + 3 + 9
ZP IIA 70 28.6 + 12 + 12 + 1
ZP IIB 70 58.4 + 11
Crossover 44.9 28.6 + 12 + 12 + 1
Franpipe 70 43 + 6 + 9 + 3
Europipe 70 44 + 6 + 3 + 9
We see that Shipper A would like to bid for the total capacity at 12 and
he would like to have it routed entirely in Zeepipe IIA and the “crossover” and
then split in 6/6 into Franpipe and Europipe respectively. Shippers B and C
have also put forward bids as shown.
7.5.4 Flow optimization
7.5.4.1 Flow results based on shippers routing
The interesting question is now to find out if it is possible – from a
physical point of view – to successfully meet the shippers bids based on their
suggested routing. In order to do so we have used the GasOptTKL program to
calculate how much gas it is actually possible to transport through the system
by transporting the gas in the pipeline segments specified by the bids. The
results are displayed in Table 13 below.
We see that quite a substantial portion of the spare capacity at Kollsnes
is not utilized due to technical constraints in the transportation system. These
constraints restrict therefore a full production at Kollsnes. We also see that the
different choices of routing will yield different results. In sub-section 7.5.4.3
below a detailed explanation of the results is given clarifying what is actually
happening here.
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 Table 13. Shippers’ bids and physical results
Max Plan
prod
Bid
A
Result
A
Bid
B
Result
B
 Bid
C
Result
C
Kollsnes 99 87 + 12 + 5.3 + 12 + 5.3 + 12 + 7.2
Dunkerq. 52 43 + 6 + 3.2 + 9 + 3.2 + 3 + 3
Dornum 55 44 + 6 + 2.1 + 3 + 2.1 + 9 + 4.2
ZP IIA 70 28.6 + 12 + 5.3 + 12 + 5.3 + 1 + 0
ZP IIB 70 58.4 + 11 + 7.2
Crossover 44.9 28.6 + 12 + 5.3 + 12 + 5.3 + 1 + 0
Franpipe 70 43 + 6 + 3.2 + 9 + 3.2 + 3 + 3
Europipe 70 44 + 6 + 2.1 + 3 + 2.1 + 9 + 4.2
7.5.4.2 Flow results of optimized routing
The next interesting assessment is to disregard the shippers specified
routing and optimize the flow in the system only constrained by the shippers
final wishes for delivery locations. Once again we optimize the flows in the
system by means GassOptTKL and the results are displayed in Table 14.
 Table 14. Optimized physical results
Max Plan
prod
Bid
A
Result
A
Bid
B
Result
B
Bid
C
Result
C
Kollsnes 99 87 + 12 + 9.1 + 12 + 7.3 + 12 + 8.4
Dunkerq. 52 43 + 6 + 3.9 + 9 + 4.3 + 3 + 3
Dornum 55 44 + 6 + 5.2 + 3 + 3 + 9 + 5.4
ZP IIA 70 28.6  - 2.5  - 4.3 - 3.2
ZP IIB 70 58.4 + 11.6 + 11.6 +11.6
Crossover 44.9 28.6  - 2.5 - 4.3 - 3.2
Franpipe 70 43 + 3.9 + 4.3 + 3
Europipe 70 44 + 5.2 + 3 + 5.4
We see immediately that the optimization process will cause more gas
to be transported in each case. Indeed, every optimized case yields a better
result compared with any of the shippers suggested routes.
The results can be summarized as shown in Table 15 below by
expressing how much of the spare capacity that is actually utilized and
shipped under the different options. We clearly see that the optimized routes
yield better results.
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 Table 15. Maximum volumes possible to deliver as percentage of bid
Shipper A Shipper B Shipper C
Shippers specify route 44% 44% 60%
Optimized route 76% 61% 70%
7.5.4.3 Discussion of results
The example provided above is a simplification of reality in several
quite significant ways. First, the case does not include the fact there are
several other pipelines entering and exiting from the Sleipner riser platform
and the Draupner riser platform. This fact means that the optimization
algorithm must include the effects from all physical gas streams that enter and
exit into other pipelines. These gas streams introduce pressures and back-
pressures in the pipeline manifolds that are not included in the optimization
done above.
Secondly, the gas quality issue is not considered at all in the example
provided above. In the above example only Troll gas quality was considered.
If gas streams coming from other sources are included, and the gas quality
tolerance is set in such a way that it introduces constraints on the level of
blending, the optimization task gets even more complicated.
Another observation to be addressed is simply the question: does this
example show that it is not possible to utilize the entire production capacity at
Kollsnes? The entire capacity at Kollsnes can of course be utilized if a portion
of the gas is routed into other pipelines than those included here. The example
however, clearly shows that it is not possible to route the entire gas stream
from Kollsnes solely through the Draupner platform. This therefore inevitably
leads to the recognition that the physical gas streams are all commingled gas
streams comprising gas molecules originating from different sources.
Finally, what is the physical explanation of the events illustrated by this
example? In order to give an explanation an illustration is provided in Figure
30 below. In this figure several lines are drawn illustrating pressures in the
different pipelines.
The first step here is to study the pressures in the systems as they appear
prior to the bidding process. The line between the points marked A and D
represents the pressure drop line in the two pipelines Zeepipe IIB (from
Kollsnes to Draupner) and Europipe (from Draupner to Dornum), see Figure
29. A and D represent the inlet pressure and the outlet pressure, respectively.
At Draupner a resulting pressure equal to C will yield. Similarly, at Sleipner
the pressure B is the inlet pressure in the crossover pipeline. The outlet
pressure from the crossover pipeline is equal to C.
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The optimization process will now start to increase flow in the system.
At Kollsnes the pressure will thus start to increase and it moves from A in the
direction of A*. The delivery pressure in Dornum is kept constant at D, but the
resulting pressure at Draupner will increase and it moves from C to C*. The
fact that the flow is increasing in the two pipelines between Kollsnes and
Dornum is illustrated by the fact that the pressure drop line is shown to be
more steep in the drawing (between A* and D).
Figure 30.   Illustration of flow optimization
In order not to shut in the flow from Sleipner the pressure in the
crossover pipeline must increase as well and the pressure at Sleipner moves
from B to B* and the pressure at Draupner moves from C to C*. We see that
at this point, and so far, no increase in flow has taken place in this pipeline,
but only a lifting of the pressure (i.e. a higher level of linepack). This fact is
illustrated by letting the pressure drop line between B* and C* run in parallel
with the line B to C. When the pressure at Sleipner has reached the level of B*
the maximum design capacity is reached in the crossover pipeline. We now
realize a quite important fact:
The only physical way to increase the outlet pressure from the
crossover line (from C* to C**), as the pressure B* is kept fixed, is to reduce
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the flow in this pipeline. This is illustrated as the line B* to C** is less steep
than the line B* to C*. The optimization challenge thus becomes to reduce the
flow in the crossover pipeline simultaneously as increasing the flow in the
pipeline Kollsnes to Dornum so that the outlet pressure from the crossover
pipeline balances exactly the Draupner pressure at C**.
Having this technical knowledge in mind, we easily see why the
resulting flows according to the shippers specified routing turned out as they
did. In the case of shippers A and B, they “unfortunately” specified to have the
gas routed in the “weakest link”, namely the crossover pipeline. In this case
the maximum allowable pipeline design pressure (B*) limited a higher total
transportation, see Table 13. Shipper C to the contrary obtained a better result
as he chose to route in Zeepipe IIB. But as the shippers, of course, are not
allowed to suggest reductions in flows in specific pipelines, no optimization
by means of flow reduction in the crossover pipeline took place, effectively
limiting the outcome of all shippers’ bids.
In the optimized case, see Table 14, Zeepipe IIB is fully utilized in all
cases and the flow is at its maximum capacity of 70. We also see how
GassOptTKL has reduced the flows in the crossover pipeline in each case. The
differences between the three cases are now caused by differences in the
pipeline configurations downstream Draupner, local pressure drop conditions
at Draupner and the shippers’ specified delivery requirements in Dornum and
Dunkerque. Another way of putting it is that there is not sufficient total
pressure “left” at Draupner to meet both delivery requests, and an optimization
is conducted on how to use the remaining pressure capacity at Draupner.
Based on these analyses, simulations and numerical examples some
observations can be concluded as follows:
Observation 7.77. It is not feasible or possible to let the shipper specify
any preferred or optimized routing of spare capacity in the Norwegian
natural gas transportation system.
Observation 7.78. The Transportation system operator is the only
stakeholder who shall decide how to physically route the gas in the
network.
Observation 7.79. The shippers are in no position to calculate and
optimize the routing, as an optimization algorithm requires information
that is not available to the shippers. If such information should be made
available it must contain on-line SCADA information of the entire gas
network and corresponding contractual delivery instructions, linepack
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        213
considerations and so on. Such information is only available to the
Transportation System Operator.
A last question to be discussed here is to find out the extent to which the
above observations are applicable for allocation of spare capacity that is well
within capacity limits. Is it for example feasible to have the shippers
suggesting specific routes for transportation of firm capacity? Again, if the
shippers should be given such a right many “internal” constraints are
introduced limiting the transportation system operator to optimize the total
throughput in the system. The results will be the same, reduced total flow and
an inefficient rationing of capacity.
Observation 7.80. The author will thus argue that the principles stated
in Observation 7.77 through Observation 7.79 are valid under all
circumstances, also for allocation of firm capacity.
7.5.5 New auction principles – an example
It has been argued in this work that liberalization will cause higher
levels of system utilization or even full utilization of the entire transportation
capacity during peak periods. When the system is fully utilized one difficult
question is how to allocate spare capacity between shippers in a rationing
efficient manner. In the proceeding text this question is analyzed by means of
providing an illustrative example.
So far we have followed the idea suggested by Nese (1998) and have
asked the shippers to bid a preferred routing of the gas. Nese (1998) however,
identifies one possible caveat to the idea, but disregards its effect in his
analyses; namely “the problem of interaction between pipelines where
physical characteristics like pressure, diameter, capacity etc. of one pipeline
influence on the transportation possibilities in other pipelines”. As we have
seen from the Observation 7.77 through Observation 7.79 above the idea of
having the shippers specifying the routing is neither technically and implicitly
contractually feasible nor rationing efficient.
In order therefore to suggest some possible auctioning principles that
are compatible with physical characteristics and technical operations some
other, very simple and basic principles for auctioning are suggested here.
The first principle is to define the level of information that shall be
released to shippers in order to make an auctioning feasible. Based on the
lessons learned above there is no reason to disclose information on pipeline
pressures, internal flow rates and so forth. The only information needed is
information on spare production capacity at defined production units and the
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spare delivery capacities at defined delivery terminals. This implication may
thus be formulated into another observation and it is shown in principle in
Figure 31 below.
Observation 7.81. The entire dry gas transportation system ought to be
treated as one “black box” and the only information released for
auctioning is the spare production capacities at defined entry points (i.e.
the production platforms and terminals) and spare delivery capacities at
defined exit points (i.e. the continental delivery terminals). All bidding
shall take place as requests for gas to be shipped between any of these
entry and exit points.
Figure 31.  The suggested entry and exit points for bidding of spare and
scarce capacities in the Norwegian dry gas system
The next task is to decide what information the shippers (the bidders)
shall disclose to the Transportation System Operator. We suggest here that
they have to specify how much of the spare production capacity at a given
production unit they would like to utilize. Then they have to instruct where
they will have the gas delivered. Finally, they have to specify the size of toll
they are willing to pay. Alternatively, they may also specify for how may days
they would bid for the spare capacity.
If we now apply Shippers A, B and C’s bids as posted in Table 12 and
we introduce some additional information as suggested above the bids may
now appear as shown in Table 16 below. We see that the shippers have
included information on toll and days.
The Norwegian dry gas system
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 Table 16. Shippers’ bids
Rate: MSm3/d Shipper A Shipper B Shipper C
Toll: øre/Sm3 Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days
From Kollsn. 12 12 12
To Dornum 6 20 5 9 30 5 3 28 5
To Dunkerq. 6 20 5 3 30 5 9 28 5
If no physical constraints in the transportation system should be
considered (which will be a quite faulty approach as proven above) we
immediately see that the successful bidder is Shipper B.
The physical constraints however are quite imperative and in each of the
shippers’ suggested routes, constraints are present reducing the values of the
bids. For the sake of completeness, we may first see the values of the different
bids given that the shippers are allowed to specify the routing. The results are
displayed in Table 17 and we see that the successful bidder is shipper C.
 Table 17. Value of the shippers’ bids based on specified routes
Rate: MSm3/d Shipper A Shipper B Shipper C
Toll: øre/Sm3 Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days
From Kollsn. 5.3 5.3 7.2
To Dornum 3.2 20 5 3.2 30 5 3 28 5
To Dunkerq. 2.1 20 5 2.1 30 5 4.2 28 5
Total value 5.3 MNOK 8.0 MNOK 10.1 MNOK
 We now apply the principles suggested here and cancel out the
possibility for specified routing. The flows are now optimized only on the
condition that as much as possible of the production from Kollsens shall be
delivered at the exit terminals (Dornum and Dunkerque) constrained by the
shippers’ preferences for deliveries here (i.e. this will yield the flow results
shown in Table 14). The values of the bids are displayed in the Table 18.
 Table 18. Value of the shippers’ bids based on total flow optimization
Rate: MSm3/d Shipper A Shipper B Shipper C
Toll: øre/Sm3 Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days Rate Toll Days
From Kollsn. 9.1 7.3 8.4
To Dornum 3.9 20 5 4.3 30 5 3 28 5
To Dunkerq. 5.2 20 5 3 30 5 5.4 28 5
Total value 9.1 MNOK 11.0 MNOK 11.8 MNOK
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Given the assumptions listed here the successful bidder is shipper C.
Dependent on the individual bidder’s choices we immediately see that a
variety of outcomes are possible. We see for example, that the duration of the
bid may significantly improve a given shipper’s possibility for succeeding. We
also see that the bid, which requires the highest level of gas production, is not
necessarily the most valuable bid. We shall remember however, that even
though this may take place, an optimized routing for the most valuable gas has
been conducted. This simply means that there is no more transportation
capacity left for other shippers to utilize.
Further, several auctioning techniques can be applied as suggested by
Nese (1998). Such techniques may introduce other problem areas. For
example, a recognized principle is to set the toll equal to the second best bid
(the first looser), which in this case will yield a toll equal to 30 øre/Sm3, which
is higher than the successful bidder! This will presumably not be accepted and
other principles must be worked out.
A detailed assessment and refining of auctioning principles will most
likely call for a large debate among stakeholders and we leave this discussion
here only summarizing some further observations.
Observation 7.82.  The above analyses have shown that the Norwegian
natural gas transportation system - to a very large extent - is to be
considered as one integrated system and that actions conducted at one
location in the system significantly may impact delivery conditions
elsewhere in the system.
Observation 7.83. Auction theories or other theories for optimizing
networks that may work well in other industries or even in other gas
distribution systems may not necessarily be appropriate in a Norwegian
context. Such theories and principles must be refined and they must take
into consideration the specific physical and operational characteristics
of the Norwegian natural gas transportation system.
Observation 7.84. In order to evaluate shippers’ bid for auctioning of
spare (and scarce) capacity in the Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems an optimization algorithm of physical gas flows may improve
the rationing task.
Finally then, and by referring to the discussions above a very basic tolling
regime for spare capacity can be suggested here.
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        217
Observation 7.85. The toll for peak load capacity shall be based on an
auction where shippers disclose their willingness to pay a unit toll for a
specified upper limit of gas to be transported between selected pre-
defined entry and exit points.
Observation 7.86. The auctioning principles must be further refined.
7.5.6 Calculations of shadow price of capacity constraints
A last topic to be discussed here is the issue of shadow prices on
capacity constraints. In Hope (2000) 274 the notion of shadow prices is
illustrated and discussed in relation to the power markets in Norway. By
applying this notion into the present situation we may define the shadow price
of capacity constraints as follows:
PSP= QNS*TAuction (Eq. 7.5.1)
Here:
PSP is the shadow price in NOK/d.
QNS is the volume of gas that the system is not able to transport due to
technical capacity constraints. This volume is thus equal to the
difference between the maximum production capacity and the
actual volumes shipped in each case. The unit is MSm3/d.
TAuctionis the value of the transportation toll offered in the bid in each
case, in NOK/MSm3.
If we apply the suggested formula in (Eq. 7.5.1) and introduce the
numerical values applied in the example provided so far we obtain the shadow
prices as displayed in Table 19 below. Please also note that the shadow prices
are allocated to the physical facility that is representing the limiting factor as
was clarified in connection with Figure 30 and the related discussion.
We see that the shadow prices yield higher numerical values for all
cases where the shippers have suggested the routing, which is quite expected
based on the foregoing analyses. This leads to the following observation:
Observation 7.87. The methodology suggested here might be a feasible
approach in a future context for identifying the numerical values of the
“bottlenecks” in the system. In this respect the auctioning principles
may assist the decision making process regarding allocative efficient
                                          
274 See Hope (2000) page 75 and figure 2.
Norwegian transport operations in a new regime
        218
reinforcement of the facilities when and where needed. This recognition
is also an argument supporting the Conclusion 7.10 on page 171,
arguing that the transportation system operator must have a close liaison
with those stakeholders who are responsible for the future development
of the transportation systems.
 Table 19. Shadow prices on capacity constraints for this example
Bids Shadow price in
“crossover”
   MNOK/d
Shadow price in
Zeepipe IIB
 MNOK/d
Shipper A specified routing (12-5.3)*.20=1.34
Shipper A optimized routing (12-9.1)*.20=0.58
Shipper B specified routing (12-5.3)*.30=2.01
Shipper B optimized routing (12-7.3)*.30=1.41
Shipper C specified routing (12-7.2)*.28=1.34
Shipper C optimized routing (12-8.4)*.28=1.01
7.5.7 Summary
Based on the preceding discussions the hypothesis C.5 is true provided
the gas flow is very near a steady state flow condition. If transients are
present, which they are frequently, the analyses have shown that it is even
more difficult to accurately predict the range of spare and scarce capacity. The
lessons learned here however, and as expressed in the observations above are
valid regardless of the existence of transients. If the influence of transients
shall be included in the evaluations the considerations will be even more
complex, a fact that reinforces the conclusion made here.
Conclusion 7.29.  The GasOptTKL is a feasible tool for optimizing
spare and scarce capacity given ideal steady state conditions. In reality,
where transient conditions exist in the pipeline system, the optimization
task gets more complex and a more accurate tool for flow optimization
is needed. See Observation 7.73 through Observation 7.76 and
Observation 7.82 and Observation 7.84.
Conclusion 7.30.  The transportation system operator is the only
stakeholder who shall decide how to route gas physically in the
Norwegian natural gas transportation systems. See Observation 7.77
through Observation 7.79.
Conclusion 7.31.  The entire dry gas transportation system must be
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treated as one unit from an allocation of capacity point of view, and not
as a collection of individual pipeline systems. Defined entry and exit
points must be established. See Observation 7.81.
Conclusion 7.32.  All transportation rights shall be allocated to the
specified entry and exits points and the shippers shall not specify any
“internal” routing. This principle applies for both firm, interruptible and
peak load services. See Observation 7.80 and Observation 7.85.
Conclusion 7.33.  Some kind of an auctioning system for spare capacity
must be established. The transportation system operator discloses
information on spare production and delivery capacities and the shipper
discloses information on his willingness to pay toll, the volumes to be
shipped between the selected entry and exit points and potentially also
information on how many days he will ship gas. The auctioning
principles must be further refined. See Observation 7.83, Observation
7.84 and Observation 7.86.
Conclusion 7.34.  An auctioning of spare capacity will make the
calculation of shadow prices for capacity constraints possible and thus
enhance the procedures for future development of reinforcements in the
system. This will also enhance allocative efficiency. See Observation
7.87.
7.6 Modified information models
7.6.1 The hypotheses C.6
Hypothesis C.6 specifies that “It is possible to modify the information
models so they unambiguously specify future operations”. In Section 5
information models were developed that described prevailing transport
operations. The challenge is now to study how these models must be altered in
order to describe the conduct of transport operations in a new regime.
The information models focused on requirement traceability and
ordering of functions into working processes and the two core models applied
are the requirement traceability model and the behavior model. The task now
becomes to analyze how the identified new requirements will alter these two
models.
There is however one significant obstacle here. As we have seen the
models require detailed information and quite specific requirements in order to
be constructed. The behavior model in particular is dependent on leaf-level
requirements, which are the lowest level of requirements possible. Presently,
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we do not have such detailed information about future requirements. This is
due to the many uncertainties and pending political decisions regarding the
implementation of the Gas Directive. 17 The hypothesis above has therefore
not been fully tested in this work.
This work has however identified several presumable changes and new
requirements demanded by liberalization and it has expressed these changes as
revised effectiveness measures and test case scenarios. Further, these revised
effectiveness measures and test case scenarios are analyzed. As a result of
these analyses several observations are derived and these are aggregated into
conclusions, see Section 4.3.6 and Figure 4 on page 59. Based on all the
inferred conclusions the most relevant conclusions are chosen and discussed in
the proceeding text. Even though it is not possible to conduct a full
information modelling at this stage, an assessment of the work’s conclusions –
so far – will yield some insight with respect to the directions in which working
processes and documents must be altered.
7.6.2 Results –  modified information models
7.6.2.1 Documents and requirements that must be altered
Figure 32 is a synthesis of some of the documents and requirements that
will be affected by the liberalization process addressed in this work. The
results presented in Figure 32 are derived based on an assessment of Fig 1.1 –
Fig. 1.10 in Volume II of the work. 147 Representatives from the
Transportation System Operator have briefly reviewed the results. A detailed
assessment of how to change the requirements and documents identified in
Figure 32 is premature at this stage and no further detailed work on this issue
is reported here. The observation made here can simply be summarized as
follows:
Conclusion 7.35.  A majority of the documents assessed in this work
must be revised and amended in order to incorporate the requirements
of change caused by the Gas Directive.
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Figure 32.   Indications (C) of  which documents to change due to
liberalization
Rules for trade-off calculations – UA,
OpFlex, linepack optimization *1 *2
Participants Agreements
Upstream Agreements
Regularity support agreements
Modeling agreements
Substitution agreements
Supply agreements
Storage agreements
Rules for upstream agreement handling *1
Transportation Agreements and Heads of Agreements
Rules for gas quality monitoring and control
Interface Manuals
Rules for handling of gas delivery instructions and nominations
Rules for handling of availabilities
Rules for trade-off calculations – nominations and instructions
Rules for shortfall handling
Measurement Manuals
Rules for verifying gas energy contents of gas delivered
Operations Philosophy Manual
Rules for handling of physical gas
Tariff procedure
Rules for tariffing
Rules for trade-off calculations – valve set points and compression
Procedure for linepack arrangement between transportation
systems and operational flexibility arrangement between fields
Rules for optimization of gas sales and resource management
Rules for dispatching of operational flexibility
The shipper's dispatching representative appointment procedure
Rules for upstream agreement dispatching
Rules for field imbalances handling and dispatch
*1 Note: These two rules apply for all upstream agreements
*2 Note: This trade-off includes optimization of both upstream agreements and
operational flexibility
The Petroleum Act and Decree
Transportation license application and approval process (PAD)
C?
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C?
C
C
C
C
C
C
C?
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7.6.2.2 Organizational considerations and working processes
The Norwegian legislation specifies a regulatory regime that causes the
transport operations to be vertically integrated - as outlined in Section 5. In the
current regime Statoil conducts several of these integrated functions and
processes. Different stakeholders carry out different functions, but many of the
stakeholder roles are allocated to the same business unit in Statoil.
The chairman of GFU is employed by this business unit, as is the
secretariat in the FU. The business unit is a significant seller and it is
appointed as many seller groups’ representative and dispatching
representative. The same organization is a major transportation system owner
and it acts as the transportation system operator and shipper. It also acts as the
shippers’ representative and shippers’ dispatching representative. The same
organization unit also does similar functions regarding the gas storage
currently available.
This work has clearly shown that the natural gas transport operations
shall be conducted in a neutral manner, see Section 9.1 on page 236. This
requirement of change will inevitably affect the existing organization one way
or another. One particular area of interest for this work is the relationship
between the transportation system operator and the shippers (and sellers)
including their representatives and their dispatching representatives.
In a liberalized regime the transportation system operator and the
shippers representative will represent counterparts and their interaction must
be clearly defined. Today these interactions are interwoven, non-transparent
and conducted by the same company in many cases. Further the transportation
system operator currently carries out many of the shippers’ dispatching
representative functions (i.e. the same individuals hold both stakeholder
positions). It is noteworthy to remember that the B.0 activity concluded that
these relationships were difficult to identify clearly and accurately in the
present regime.
By studying the requirement traceability model (Fig. 1.6 of volume II)
and the behavior model (Fig 3.2 of volume II) we identify another issue of
interest. We see that the optimization process is quite dependent on the
successful dispatching of the upstream agreements and the dispatching of the
operational flexibility and use of linepack. There are many documents
developed to support this optimization and dispatching. The transportation
system operator must probably develop more transparent services for handling
of Upstream Arrangements and the like to meet the requirements of
liberalization.
Further, if the transportation system operator shall handle and keep
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accounts of the gathering of gas at the field for each individual shipper a new
and quite expanded accounting system must be developed together with new
balancing rules.
The above observations lead to the following conclusions:
Conclusion 7.36.  The current organization must be changed and a more
specific regulation is required regarding the future roles of the
transportation system operator and the shipper/seller representatives and
dispatching representatives. These stakeholders will be formal
counterparts in a liberalized regime and no longer members of the same
organization unit as they often are in the prevailing regime (in Statoil).
Conclusion 7.37.  As the above stakeholder relationships closely
interact with quite essential and complicated working processes for
optimization of transport operations and resource management in daily
operations, new working processes and means for interactions between
stakeholders must be carefully designed so that these goals are still met
in a liberalized regime.
7.6.2.3 Incentives for conduct of work
In Section 7.4.3 it has been shown that the current regime normally
features incentives for cost efficient investments and operations – at least
conceptually. Further, this work has shown that the vertically integrated
structure gives incentives of optimizing operations in order to achieve a high
regularity in gas deliveries and optimized production of hydrocarbons from
the NCS.
The interesting question is now to study how these incentives will be
altered if an independent transportation system operator is established. The
following incentives may probably be affected:
· Incentives for cost efficient development of new capacity.
· Incentives for cost efficient operations (dispatching and administration)
and product management.
· Incentives for cost efficient inspection, repair and maintenance of the
pipeline systems.
· Incentives for optimizing operations during periods of capacity
constraints and peak periods.
Generally, the problems identified here are of the principal/agent type,
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as discussed by Pratt and Richard  (1985). 275 No detailed analyses will be
presented here of these types of problems and their solutions. In the following
text only a brief review of some of the issues is presented and some indicative
solutions are suggested in order to correct the distortions. These topics will
definitely be subject for further analyses when future requirements are settled.
Proper incentives for the task identified in the first bullet point may
largely be maintained as they are today, provided the regime of having
shippers also being owners persists. This assumption is based on the fact that
regardless of who operates the system, the toll (as suggested in this work) will
be a function of costs. As long as the majority of the shippers at the same time
are owners the incentive for cost efficient investment, as discussed in Section
7.4.3, is in place.
There is however one important note to be made here. This work has
identified that there is a need to have a well functioning transfer of operational
information to the developers of new capacity. This is true whether the
capacity needed is removal of bottlenecks or substantial development of new
capacity. As liberalization may split the currently integrated organization into
two or more functionally separated organizational units some new routines
must be developed so that important operational aspects are communicated to
the development projects. For further details see Section 7.4.2.9 on page 158
that discusses transaction costs in relation to liberalization and Observation
7.39 on page 159.
The incentive mentioned in the second bullet point is of less
importance, as the cost contributors are small numbers in relative terms and
they contribute very modestly to the toll. Further, such costs are quite
transparent and they are subject to limited managerial influence.
The topic identified in the third pullet point however, may cause some
conflict of interests under given situations and ought to be closely looked into.
These costs also represent large portions of the daily operations and
maintenance costs, see Section 7.4.2.3 on page 139.
If we assume that an independent inspection and repair agent on behalf
of the transportation system operator conducts this activity, but is paid by the
shippers, improper incentives exist for cost efficient work by the agent. This
may be so if the transportation system operator is allowed to pass on to
shippers the agent’s fee. The transportation system operator will then be
indifferent with respect to the agent’s size of the fee. Conceptually one may
also argue that he may be indifferent to the quality of the agent’s work, as the
pipeline system itself does not belong to the company, but to the
                                          
275 Pratt et al. (1985)
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shippers/pipeline owners. As such inspection is closely related to the safety
and integrity of the facilities, correct lines of responsibilities and incentives
must be sorted out.
The fourth and last bullet point also represents a condition that should
be carefully looked into. The costs of potential losses of wrong operations may
be significant. A potential lack of motivation to optimize the operations under
periods of capacity constraints may in a similar manner cause reductions in
revenues for shippers and gas sellers. See Section 7.5.6 on page 217 where
some numerical data was presented illustrating the value of constraints. Today
there are good incentives for operational optimization due to the vertically
integrated structure of the industry.
In the future, proper incentives for optimization of the throughput must
be designed, as this probably will be more important than ever before. If we
assume that the transportation system operator should be functionally
separated from the gas sales activities, his only revenues will be the toll or part
of the toll. This will cause reduced incentives for optimization if the operator’s
revenues and costs are regulated and his performance is no longer directly
influencing on his revenues and profit.
The incentives for optimal usage may be even further deteriorated if the
independent transportation system operator shall have its cost covered by
annual budgets from, let us say, the Norwegian State 276 – with no linkage to
performance at all.
The author will therefore suggest that an incentive structure must be
introduced in such a way that the operator is measured and rewarded based on
his ability to optimize operations. In this respect, at least two issues are of
concern. The first issue is to make sure that the shippers obtain deliveries
according to their daily instructions. Here, a feasible method can be to reward
the operator according to his ability to meet the shipper’s request for
deliveries. A possible mechanism can be to apply the regularity measure. A
high annual regularity may thus trigger a reward.
The second issue is to create an incentive that motivates the operator to
utilize the spare capacity of the system, see Figure 27 on page 197 - whenever
needed. Here, for example a reward can be offered as a function of the
volumes being auctioned. The higher the aggregated annual value of the
auctions is the higher the reward. For further details regarding incentive
regulations see for example Mansell et al. (1995). 277
                                          
276 This is suggested in the St. prp. 36 (2000-2001) page 122 – 123.
277 Mansell and Church (1995) and Armstrong et al. (1994) provide an overview of
alternative regulations that aim to improve the performance of regulated firms.
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To summarize this discussion a simple conclusion is drawn:
Conclusion 7.38.  The regulator must carefully design proper incentives
that enhance optimization of the physical flow in the transportation
system given a liberalized regime.
7.7 Trade-offs performed
The hypotheses C.7 states that: “The systems engineering process will
provide means for making satisfactory trade-offs between identified
requirements and solutions in order to obtain consistent information models
and unambiguous descriptions and solutions”. There are at least two
implications of this hypothesis. First, and as was discussed in connection with
the system re-engineering process, there will always be a need for doing trade-
offs in order to develop information models, see Section 5.5.6 on page 94. As
no detailed information modelling of future operations is conducted, no such
trade-offs are identified.
The second implication relates to all the trade-offs that have become
apparent throughout the conduct of this multidiscipline work. Several such
trade-offs are identified and are noteworthy. The author will thus argue that
the systems approach features a possibility to identify and treat such trade-offs
in an efficient manner. Some prominent trade-offs are listed below
accompanied by a short description. As all these tradeoffs are analyzed and
discussed in the work, no detailed review is repeated here.
· Energy conservation and profit maximization.
As we have seen from our discussion with linepack considerations the
potential profit from gas sales far exceeds the variable fuel costs, making
energy conservation a second priority in most cases.
· Shippers freedom to select routing versus physical optimization of
routing.
Ideally, one may argue that shippers shall have the freedom to choose
their own routing of where to ship gas in the network. As we have seen, this
may however cause physical constraints and reduce overall throughput. The
shippers must therefore be offered a limited possibility for choosing the
routing of the gas in the network.
· Cost coverage versus first best tolling rules.
As we have discussed in great detail many arguments and contradicting
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requirements must be balanced in order to obtain a feasible tariff and toll
regime. Such discussions are also largely influenced by the outcome of
political decisions and as specified in the legal and statutory documents.
· Reduced efficient tolling due to information asymmetry.
Another area of concern is asymmetry in information. As has been
discussed several times in this work toll rules that by nature feature attractive
qualities are in many cases simply not applicable. The main reasons are lack
of information or restricted possibilities for release of such information due to
many reasons.
· Improper incentive structures due to information asymmetry.
By the same token as specified in the preceding bullet point, may it be
difficult to create incentive structures that motivate an agent to comply with
all of the principals’ whishes.
· Constraints given in legal documents and the Gas Directive and
political outcome versus ideal solutions.
In this work the legislative documents identified are treated as a matter
of fact, and the solutions suggested are incremental steps that are building on
these documents. The solutions suggested may thus be categorized as an
“evolution” rather than a dramatic “paradigmatic” change. From an analytical
point of view it can be interesting to perform analyses based on ideal
conditions alone by disregarding existing law and regulations and all the
stakeholders’ existing documents such as gas sales agreements, transportation
agreements and upstream agreements. A “trade-off” has therefore to be done
in order to decide whether the research shall largely be based on ideal cases
rather than the real cases. The latter has been focused in this work, as the
former option would have broadened up the scope of the work too much. See
Section 8.2 on page 231 for further discussions of this topic.
· The producer interests versus consumer interests.
Another major issue is of course the classic difference in interests
between the producer and the consumer. In this industry these stakeholder
interests largely follow the national borderlines. These type of conflicts are not
discussed in this work in great detail, and again, the prevailing legislative
documents, including the Gas Directive is treated as a matter of fact with
respect to the research activities conducted.
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7.8 Summary
The hypothesis C.0 states that: “It is possible to develop a systems
engineering process for assessing, specifying and documenting future
operations”. The process is documented in the preceding text and a very brief
summary of the process is captured below.
As we have seen by the discussions and analyses of Section 6
hypothesis C.1 is true. In Section 7 the remaining hypotheses have been tested,
and C.2 was argued to be true as redefined effectiveness measures were
developed. This statement is made on the condition that the Gas Directive will
be implemented in a Norwegian context. By the same token, hypothesis C.3 is
true and two scenarios of change were developed.
In Section 7.4 many analyses are conducted based on empirical data and
by applying technical and economic theory. The main purpose of these
analyses has been to derive some plausible methods and basic principles for
suggesting a new or revised tariff and toll regime applicable for Norwegian
dry gas transportation in a liberalized regime. Given the uncertainties caused
by the still not implemented Gas Directive the hypothesis C.4 has still been
tested. The testing has suggested that new tariff and toll rules including
amendments to the existing tariff regime should be enforced and hypothesis
C.4 is argued to be true.
Similarly, new tariff and toll rules are suggested for allocation of spare
capacity and the hypothesis C.5 is thus argued to be true. Finally, the
hypothesis C.6 and C.7 are looked into, but these hypotheses are not tested
fully.
Given the above conclusions the author will argue that the hypothesis
C.8 is true as far as it is possible to conclude given the uncertainties that exist
in the present situation.
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8 Discussion of results
8.1 A systems approach for solving complex problems
It is tempting to begin this sub-section by borrowing some few words
from Carpenter, Jacoby and Wright’s (1986) report “Adapting to changes in
natural gas markets.” This report starts out with the following quotation taken
from Morris A. Adelman’s work of 1962:
“With constant changes in supply, demand and technology, relative
advantages must change, and some fuels or demands or sellers are under
pressure to give ground to others… An orderly retreat is, of all military
maneuvers, the hardest to carry out.”
The above quotation seems to reflect – and so do also the conclusions of
the said report – that liberalization in energy markets will not come easily.
Such processes are difficult to handle and conflicts may arise between
stakeholders.
As we have seen in this work, there certainly are many stakeholders
involved and many questions and analyses are needed to get a comprehensive
understanding of the tasks at stake. It is thus assumed that the lesser
asymmetry in information there is between stakeholders, the easier the
transition may be. This, solely is of course no guarantee of a smooth transition
(e.g. the information can deliberately be misused by the counterpart). A
reduced level of asymmetry however, may contribute to reduce the level of
misunderstandings and it may point to what is considered as relevant
discussions and analyses and so forth.
Further, in the INCOSE’ 99 paper (Dahl 1999) the author concluded
that the strength of a systems approach lies in its ability to identify the
stakeholders’ needs and systemize many requirements. Based on the systems
approach real problems are identified and in the systems engineering process
appropriate methods and analyses are conducted in order to find solutions to
the problems. The process includes multidisciplinary analyses and these are
needed since the decision-making and the trade-offs done in this industry –
and particularly during transition stages – involve multidisciplinary
characteristics.
This work has therefore focused on collecting, assessing and
systemizing information. The information is used to identify the real problems
as accurately and comprehensively as possible. Having identified the
Discussion of results
        230
problems, a search for relevant analyses and models is conducted so that the
problems can be solved adequately.
The main reason for why the chosen systems approach has been applied
may be summarized in the following statement, which also may be understood
as a presumption governing this work:
“A systems approach will yield more comprehensive, accurate and
relevant analyses and results that satisfy the stakeholders’ needs, compared to
what is obtained by field specific methods and “stand alone” approaches.”
This statement is argued to be true because the systems approach has an
inherent feature of assessing all information and requirements relevant and it
includes multidisciplinary research. These points are illustrated in Figure 33
below.
Figure 33.   Improved results caused by a systems approach
“Traditional results”,  field specific
“Traditional” approach
field specific
B.5 Documentation of current regime
B.0:The system re-engineering process
“Traditional results”,  field specific
C.0: The system engineering process
multidiscipline research
Improved results
Data base on Norwegian natural 
gas transport operations
New requirements
Gas Directive
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There exist technical, legal, institutional, economic, public and private
information and requirements that all together may be characterized as an
entire database regarding prevailing Norwegian natural gas transport
operations.  Then it exists an information domain related to the forces of
change such as those given by the Gas Directive. “Traditional field specific
approaches” will then – at least conceptually – make a selection in the
information domains and pick out those requirements, which are deemed
relevant for the field considered. Such approaches will therefore not include
solutions based on considering all requirements mutually. The outcome is
field specific results that only partly solve the problem, or they solve it
inaccurately or insufficiently.
The systems approach however, seeks to assess all information and
requirements available and then identify the most important problems to be
solved multidisciplinary. The brackets in the figure indicate this idea.
8.2 Improved results caused by the systems approach
The question now becomes: is the statement above true – has the
systems approach really yield more correct results than what we could expect
as the outcome of a traditional field specific analysis? This is a difficult
question to answer because the topic chosen in this work is very complex and
the academic fields applied are all huge and complex disciplines. A full
assessment of the validity of the statement above will thus be – in the author’s
opinion – a major task to prove. A full assessment of the issue would go
beyond the scope of this work. There are however several observations made
throughout the course of this work that indicate the correctness of the
statement above. These observations are summarized and listed below.
Observation 8.1: The systems approach has made it possible to
supplement economic models with relevant technical knowledge and analyses,
and thereby improving the analyses and the results.
Many network utilities are constrained in specific ways due to the
nature of the technology applied. Transportation of natural gas in pipelines has
some quite specific characteristics in general and the integrated Norwegian
sub-sea pipeline transportation system has its own fairly unique features in
particular. These features must inevitably be observed when a regulatory
regime shall be designed for tariff and toll purposes.
One illustrative example to this effect is the discussion of auctioning
principles for spare capacity. As was pointed out in Section 7.5.5 a recent
economic research report by Nese (1998) has suggested some auctioning
principles based on the assumption that there are no “interactions between
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pipelines.” The technical analyses conducted here have shown that there are
indeed significant interactions. This work has therefore suggested some
methods for auctioning of spare capacity, which observe the effects of
interacting pipelines.
Another topic often discussed in the literature is the marginal cost of
transportation. There is however no detailed analysis in the literature assessed
by this author, clarifying the exact nature of the marginal cost function for
transportation of natural gas in a pipeline system. This work has therefore
developed some general equations of marginal cost based on the compressor
power equations.
The exact marginal cost equation has enlightened the discussions as it
provides answers to several interesting questions. It has been shown for
example, that it is no difference in marginal cost for shippers in the same
pipeline system. It has been shown that three parameters typically influence on
marginal cost, i.e. the fuel cost for the compressor drive, the gas delivery rate
and the delivery pressure. It has been shown that the marginal cost largely
exhibit constant return to scale. And lastly, having developed the marginal
cost function, true marginal costs for some selected Norwegian pipeline
systems are calculated by applying empirical data.
Observation 8.2: The systems approach has made it possible to
supplement economic models with relevant empirical data and operational
experiences, and thereby improving the analyses and the results.
The systems approach has provided the research with correct empirical
data and relevant operational experiences. 278 This has made it possible to
obtain more knowledge on specific problems. Such problems have so far been
treated only conceptually in the literature or in some cases have the issues not
even been identified as potential problems that must be solved.
Some illustrative examples are the analyses of the break down of costs
into average costs, marginal costs, fixed costs, operational costs, and so on.
Other illustrative analyses are carried out based on empirical data such as for
example the linepack calculations, which compare costs, revenues and energy
consumption or the calculations of economy of scale and declining average
cost benefits.
Operational experiences are also relevant for other discussions initiated
by liberalization. Based on operational experience it has been shown for
example, that no shipper is a solely independent shipper in a pipeline, not
                                          
278 Please note that the data applied is normally taken from the public domain, see Section
2.4
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benefiting from services of other pipelines. Similar arguments, based on
operational experience, are used to suggest important tolling principles such as
unitized toll and postage stamp tolling.
Observation 8.3: The systems approach has made it possible to
supplement economic models and analyses with legal insight
This topic is considered by the author to be quite essential as the
systems approach effectively clarifies and narrows down the research into
relevant problems derived from the given legal requirements.
In the economic literature many potential effects of liberalization are
discussed. These discussions range typically from very broad analyses to quite
specific assessments and they are related to many key questions such as
regulation, organization and economic efficient development and utilization of
the industry. It is also a fairly comprehensive literature available discussing
and documenting foreign experiences. Finally, it is also a rich literature
available regarding related topics in other utility industries such as for
example the power industry.
A researcher seeking concrete solutions, that can be implemented
practically and realistically in a given context, may find it difficult to identify
which research issues that are most relevant and significant. Faced with the
huge scientific background and collection of experiences is it not
straightforward to identify neither the most important problems to be solved
nor their solutions.
The systems approach copes with such challenges as it narrows down
the research domain by identifying current and future legislative requirements.
These requirements are taken as a matter of fact (i.e. the requirements of the
Gas Directive must be complied with and the applicability of the requirements
as such are not subject for the research).
This method implies that prior to initiating a specific economic in-depth
analysis an initial evaluation is done regarding the applicability of the
analysis. If for example the input information required by the analysis is
proprietary or unavailable, difficulties may arise regarding its applicability and
the analysis may rather not be performed.
An illustrative example to this effect is the discussion of Ramsey
pricing. As we have seen, any introduction of Ramsey pricing will result in
many negotiations and legal discussions caused by the fact that Ramsey
pricing is a move away from the existing agreements, legal foundation and
licensing system. Further, Ramsey pricing is likely not compatible with the
Gas Directive. The discussion of the Ramsey pricing thus illustrates the
importance of including legal aspects into the analyses if the aim is to find
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practical solutions.
The last issue to be mentioned is the fact that the systems approach
incorporates a detailed assessment of the legal and constitutional aspects and
this may prevent misunderstandings and too simplified perceptions of the
problems to be solved. One illustrative example was given in Section 7.4.3.
Here it was shown that the typical economic notion of weak incentives for cost
efficient investments caused by average cost pricing is not necessarily always
true. Even though some authors claim that this fact is yielding in a Norwegian
context, a closer look has revealed that this condition does not exist as long as
the pipeline system owners are also pipeline system shippers. And as this
normally is a matter of fact in a Norwegian context, proper investment
incentives exist even tough average cost pricing is applied. This regime will
also continue to give proper incentives for cost efficient investments in a
liberalized context, if this regulatory principle is maintained.
Observation 8.4: Information models.
In Conclusion 5.11 on page 98 it was argued that the information
models were able to capture and describe more correctly the working
processes of the current operations than any other method applied by the
stakeholders of the industry in Norway so far. The requirement traceability
model and the behavior models provide an overview of the complexity of
transport operations that has not been documented before.
The systems approach has produced results that more comprehensively
and accurately than traditional methods specify which working processes and
functions that must be changed, given the Gas Directive. Similarly, an
indication is provided of where to change documents.
Summary of this sub-section
The analyses conducted in this work have been constrained by
requirements of prevailing and future regulatory regimes. The discussions are
tried to be quite specific and focused on the identified problems. In other
words, the analyses are not “opened-up” too broadly or made too general by
nature. This has been done quite deliberately in order to adhere to the main
objectives of the work.
In the author’s opinion the chosen approach both represents a potential
weakness as well as strength. Due to the fact that the analyses are kept fairly
close to what is assumed to be a realistic development, potential benefits and
insights from more general and basic analyses are not included in this work.
As an example, “in depth” analyses could have been carried out
regarding toll principles. One suggestion is a transfer of the ownership of the
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pipelines fully to the State. In this case the effect of tolling versus revenues
obtained by taxation could have been analyzed. Such analyses could evaluate
the effects on state revenues under different assumptions of national and
international shippers being served.
On the other hand, the author thinks that the chosen approach represents
strength. This view is based on the fact that the discussions conducted are
relevant for the present problems. The topics chosen are carefully derived by
means of the systems approach. The analyses conducted and the solutions
suggested are also supported by relevant experiences from elsewhere. 279 The
suggested solutions may therefore be thought of as minimum solutions
representing incremental steps in the evolution of the European gas market.
A final note to be made here is that some authors in the “economic”
literature domain also recognize the importance of the above observations.
Such authors point to the importance of holistic, multidisciplinary and systems
approaches. Some few examples are Megdal (1998), Kaijser (1988) and Smith
(1998). These authors point to fact that several different disciplines must be
approached in order to analyze effects of de-regulation in energy markets.
Hobbse et al. (1997) point to the importance of multi-criteria decision-
making approaches in order to quantifying stakeholder values. Blumstein et al.
(2000) in their abstract state that such approaches “stresses the importance of
theory-based market transformation, with tight linkages between existing
theory, program design, empirical testing of crucial assumptions, evaluation,
and theory development. Feedback and iterative learning are involved at all
stages. Because a clear understanding of market dynamics is crucial to this
approach, multidisciplinary research plays a key role”.
                                          
279 In a report prepared for the European Commission by “The Brattle Group” (2000)
similar ideas as those derived here (i.e. two-part tolls) are discussed as possible
recommendations in a European context. See
http://www.brattle.com/articles/method_gas_europe.pdf
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9 Conclusions and future research
9.1 Conclusions
The main hypothesis tested in this work is:
“It is possible to operate future Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems at a level that is approximately optimal, technically and economically,
with major stakeholders duly attending to requirements specified in the
Norwegian statutory framework and in the implemented “Gas Directive.”
Based on the testing of the preceding sub-hypotheses, the analyses
conducted and the conclusions derived in this work, the author hereby
concludes that the main hypothesis above is true provided the following five
recommendations are observed.
Recommendation 1 - regarding implementation of the Gas Directive
The prevailing regulatory regime governing Norwegian natural gas
transport operations has been assessed and analyzed in a systematic manner
[1.1]. 280 It has been documented that the current transport operations enhance
resource management [1.2] and that the operations comply with all major
success criteria identified [1.3]. It has been documented that the transport
operations are vertically integrated with production and sales activities [1.4]
and that the services to the customer are “bundled and merchant” [1.5].
It has been documented that the prevailing Norwegian legislative
regime does not generally comply with two distinct and imperative conditions
assumed in this work to be required by the Gas Directive:
· The prevailing regime does not normally feature a possibility for
domestic gas sellers to compete in the downstream market by marketing
and selling their gas individually [1.6].
· The prevailing regime does not normally feature access to the
transportation systems for those shippers who according to the Gas
Directive are defined as “eligible customers” and “natural gas
undertakings” [1.7].
                                          
280 The figures in the brackets refer to the bullet list below where all conclusions supporting
the statement are listed.
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Therefore, and provided it is a Norwegian political objective to comply
with the requirements of the Gas Directive, the Gas Directive must be
implemented into Norwegian legislation in order to comply with the new
requirements.
The above recommendation is inferred from the following conclusions
of the work:
· [1.1] Conclusion 5.1 through Conclusion 5.4 on page 96.
· [1.2] Conclusion 5.13 on page 99.
· [1.3] Conclusion 5.5 on page 96.
· [1.4] Conclusion 5.6 through Conclusion 5.8 on page 97.
· [1.5] Conclusion 5.14 on page 99.
· [1.6] Conclusion 5.9 on page 97, Conclusion 6.1 on page 113, and
Conclusion 7.1 on page 125.
· [1.7] Conclusion 5.10 on page 97, Conclusion 6.2 and Conclusion 6.3
on page 113 and Conclusion 7.9 on page 131.
Recommendation 2 - regarding development of new transportation
services
In order to facilitate access to the Norwegian natural gas transportation
systems for all eligible customers and natural gas undertakings (i.e. the
stakeholders qualifying to be future shippers) the future regulatory regime
must observe the following recommendations:
· An organization unit that has a transparent account of its transportation
services must operate the transportation systems. Alternatively, the
operations must be carried out by an organization that is functionally
separated from, and does not participate in, any gas marketing and sales
activities [2.1].
· Due to the fact that the Norwegian natural gas transportation systems
are highly physically integrated [2.2] having one and only one
transportation system operator is normally the best solution for
enhancing cost efficiency in daily operations, energy efficiency,
resource management in daily operations, optimized utilization and
optimized gas blending [2.3].
· The transportation services must be designed to meet the future needs
and requirements of the shippers and they must be offered to all
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shippers [2.4].
The above recommendation is inferred from the following conclusions
of the work:
· [2.1] Conclusion 6.4 on page 113.
· [2.2] Conclusion 5.13 on page 99.
· [2.3] Conclusion 7.11 on page 172.
· [2.4] Conclusion 7.2 on page 125.
Recommendation 3 – regarding development of new tariff and toll
regimes
The future transportation services must comprise firm service i.e.
booked and guaranteed transportation, and interruptible service i.e.
transportation being interrupted either during off-peak periods or during peak
periods and presumably also peak load service [3.1]. The services must be
offered to all shippers in an equal and impartial manner [3.2]. The services
must be supported by a transparent and feasible tariff and toll regime [3.3].
The toll regime must feature several properties that ensure cost recovery of
fixed costs, cost efficiency in operations and maintenance, and rationing
efficiency [3.4]. The toll regime suggested in this work must be just,
reasonable and fair [3.5] and cost-based [3.6].
This work has identified that the existing toll regime does not feature all
of the above properties [3.7]. This work therefore suggests that the existing
toll regime is re-designed and extended to include new elements so that the
future toll regime features these properties. Such properties are needed in
order to meet the future shippers’ requests for services.
The future toll regime must support services offered as firm
transportation
· The existing toll formula may partly be characterized as a combined rate
of return regulation and a two-part toll if the ship-or-pay volume is
taken as a fixed booking charge, or it may be characterized as an
average cost pricing toll if the shipped volume exceeds the ship-or-pay
volume [3.8]. This toll regime may continue to constitute the base
principles for a future toll for firm transportation provided sufficient
capacity exists in the system and provided the fixed part is treated as a
“booking charge”. This latter provision means that the shippers shall
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pay a fixed unit toll for booking rights in the system [3.9].
· The fixed part of the toll may include the fixed (annual) operations and
maintenance costs or these costs may alternatively be charged
separately (per unit of gas) [3.10].
· The variable part of the toll may be set equal to average marginal costs
per unit of gas, or be paid “in kind” as done in the current regime [3.11].
· New incremental investments in system capacity, if developed, must be
included in the fixed part of the toll [3.12].
· A unitization of the fixed part of the toll is suggested here. The
unitization schema shall include the existing ship-or-pay contracts and
any new firm contracts. The unitization will accomplish a possibility for
eliminating specific shippers’ preferences for where to physically route
gas in the system. This will subsequently improve rationing efficiency
at high levels of utilization of the system when there is a concurrent
need for auctioning of spare and scarce capacity [3.13].
· The unitized toll for firm capacity must be set equal for all pipeline
systems that comprise the entire dry gas system. The dry gas
transportation systems must be treated as one zone only and specific
entry and exit points must be established. [3.14].
· The fixed part of the toll must be calculated based on average historic
investment costs of all dry gas systems included in the unitized schema.
Further, the fixed part of the toll formula as well as the variable part
shall be allocated as a postage stamp toll (i.e. the same toll applies
regardless of the transportation route in the system) [3.15].
· A unitized toll for firm capacity will require either unitization of the
ownership structure or a payment mechanism that secures the shippers
no extra profit or loss due to the unitization [3.16].
· In the prevailing regime the individual companies act normally both as
shippers and pipeline system owners. This regime ensures proper
incentives for cost efficient development of new capacity and cost
efficient operations and this regime may continue to exist in a
liberalized context [3.17].
The future toll regime must support interruptible services for off-peak
periods
· A new two-part toll formula that in its form is equal to the firm capacity
toll must be developed for covering interruptible off-peak services. The
fixed part of the interruptible toll must be set lower than the fixed part
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of the firm toll [3.18].
The future toll regime must probably provide services for peak load
periods
· A new toll must probably be developed and be based on auctioning
principles for allocation of spare and scarce capacity in the system
during peak load periods [3.19].
· In order to facilitate the auction a tool is required for predicting the level
of spare capacity that is available from time to time and for optimizing
the total throughput based on the different auction bids [3.20].
· The auction bids shall refer to the pre-specified entry and exit points
and no shipper shall have a right to specify “internal” routing in the dry
gas systems [3.21].
The transportation system operator’s total revenues must be
harmonized regularly
· Total revenues shall not yield higher profits than the regulated return
and the balance (i.e. the balance can yield either a surplus or a deficit)
shall be levied – at least in theory – the firm transportation shippers
only [3.22].
The above recommendation is inferred from the following conclusions
of the work:
· [3.1]. Conclusion 7.3 on page 125 and Conclusion 7.8 on page 131.
· [3.2]. Conclusion 7.5 on page 125.
· [3.3]. Conclusion 6.5 on page 114.
· [3.4]. Conclusion 7.4 on page 125.
· [3.5]. Conclusion 6.6 on page 114 and Conclusion 7.7 on page 125.
· [3.6]. Conclusion 6.6 on page 114, Conclusion 7.12 on page 172 and
Conclusion 7.23 on page 202.
· [3.7]. Conclusion 5.10 on page 97 and Conclusion 7.9 on page 131.
· [3.8]. Conclusion 7.19 on page 201.
· [3.9]. Conclusion 7.20 on page 201.
· [3.10]. Conclusion 7.21 on page 201.
· [3.11]. Conclusion 7.25 on page 202.
· [3.12]. Conclusion 7.23 on page 202.
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· [3.13]. Conclusion 7.15 on page 190, Conclusion 7.22 on page 202 and
Conclusion 7.31 on page 218.
· [3.14]. Conclusion 7.22 on page 202 and Conclusion 7.31 on page 218.
· [3.15]. Conclusion 7.23 on page 202 and Conclusion 7.24 on page 202.
· [3.16]. Conclusion 7.16 on page 190 and Conclusion 7.22 on page 202.
· [3.17]. Conclusion 7.17 through Conclusion 7.18 on page 191.
· [3.18]. Conclusion 7.26 on page 202.
· [3.19]. Conclusion 7.32 through Conclusion 7.33 on page 219.
· [3.20]. Conclusion 7.29 on page 218.
· [3.21]. Conclusion 7.30 on page 218.
· [3.22]. Conclusion 7.21 on page 201.
Recommendation 4 – regarding documents, organizational issues,
working processes, and incentive structures
An implementation of the Gas Directive will introduce several
requirements that will affect existing regulation and provisions regarding
documents, organizational issues, working processes, and incentive structures.
The work has briefly discussed these issues, but due to the many uncertainties
no detailed assessments are conducted. Based on the assessments carried out
in the work some conclusions are made however, and these are listed below.
· Documents. A majority of the documents assessed in this work must be
revised and updated to reflect new requirements caused by liberalization
[4.1].
· Organization. More information is required in order to assign detailed
responsibilities to the future transportation system operator, especially if
an independent transportation system company shall conduct transport
operations. Given this assumption a comprehensive assessment is
needed in order to split the existing vertically integrated functions into
new and re-assign working processes and responsibilities. This is
particularly relevant for the future transportation system operator’s, and
the shipper and seller dispatching representatives’ functions. Finally, it
shall also be mentioned here that the Gas Directive, strictly taken, does
not require an independent transportation system company. This is only
a requirement of St. prp. 36 (2000-2001). [4.2].
· Working processes. A detailed specification of the future working
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processes must be clarified. This especially applies for how to optimize
the operations in a liberalized context. [4.3]. See also the former bullet
point, which is much related to this issue.
· Incentive structure. Carefully designed incentives are needed especially
for enhancing optimal usage of the network during capacity constraints
and peak load operations, given that an independent transportation
system operator shall conduct transport operations.  [4.4].
The above recommendation is inferred from the following conclusions:
· [4.1] Conclusion 7.14 on page 173 and Conclusion 7.35 on page 220.
· [4.2] Conclusion 7.36 on page 223.
· [4.3] Conclusion 7.37 on page 223.
· [4.4] Conclusion 7.13 on page 172 and Conclusion 7.38 on page 226.
Recommendation 5 – related to how to ensure allocative and dynamic
efficient development of new capacity
 In order to ensure allocative and dynamic efficiency on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf and in the transportation systems a centralized planning and
development system must be in force, such as the existing FU. No reasons or
arguments have been found in this work that liberalization contradicts such an
establishment. A centralized planning function is required to secure resource
management and utilization of the significant possibilities for economy of
scale. Further, the transportation system operator must have a close liaison
with these functions in order to share information about operational
experiences, capacity constraints and shadow prices. [5.1]. The above
recommendation is inferred from the following conclusions of the work:
· [5.1] Conclusion 7.10 on page 171 and Conclusion 7.34 on page 219.
9.2 Future research
Throughout this thesis several topics have been touched upon that may
be the subject for future research. In the list below these topics are
summarized.
· The tariff and toll regime must be further studied. This is especially
relevant for the allocation of numerical values to the different
components of the toll formulas, such as the fixed part components of
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the firm and interruptible tolls. Such studies will however be closely
related to actual cost figures and they will contain proprietary and
strategic information. The way, in which such information shall be
made transparent, as called for by the Gas Directive, must be further
clarified as well. The auctioning principles for spare and scarce
capacity, including a tailored tolling regime, must be further studied as
well.
· Revised and changed rules for allocation and balancing of pipeline
inventory imbalances must probably also be worked out.
· The principles for periodical calculation of the transportation system
owners’ revenues and the re-allocation and balance mechanisms for toll
surpluses and deficits must be worked out.
· The incentive structures for enhancing cost efficient operations and
optimized utilization of the gas transportation systems must be looked
into – especially given that an independent transportation system
operator is established.
The recommendations given in this work may be considered as
“minimum” solutions. They represent incremental steps that as far as possible
are aligned with the prevailing regime. Simultaneously, they comply with
requirements of change as specified by the Gas Directive. As liberalization
develops however, more dramatic changes may be envisaged compared those
identified here. Future research may thus open up for more paradigmatic
analyses and in-depth analyses of issues that are only briefly discussed here.
Provided the future European and Norwegian legislation will make it relevant,
tomorrow’s research prospects may focus on issues as:
· “The capacity release market” where shippers are allowed to trade their
non-utilized booked capacity in the market. Such capacity can be
utilized in different ways. For example, it can be “sold” to other
shippers at a regulated or non-regulated price, or the “booked capacity
owner” can utilize this capacity to offer “bundled” services to gas
buyers.
· New ownership structures. The ownership of the pipelines can be re-
assigned party or as a whole to specific stakeholders, for example to an
independent company that also is the operator. Alternatively, the State
may take over the entire ownership of the pipelines. Such re-allocations
of the ownership structures will inevitably cause a shift in the incentive
structures that must be carefully analyzed.
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If the future European liberalized regime allows for even more dramatic
changes in the regulation, compared to those issued identified in this work,
new and substantially different tolling methods may be looked into, such as:
· Value based tolling.
· Price capping of some of the services.
· Long-term marginal cost tolling for some specific systems or regions.
· Detailed incentive regulation for specific services.
All of the above methods will call for a substantial new European and
Norwegian legislation and they will introduce new elements of uncertainty
which again raise difficult questions regarding how such regimes ensure long-
term security of supply.
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11 Appendix
 
11.1 Gas sales commitments and European demand
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11.2 The transportation system
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11.3 Interview schedules
Statoil – Norway
Stakeholder Position Date
Transportation Operator
(Technical aspects),
Shippers Dispatching
Representative
Department Manager TCC
Control Center
21.05.99
26.05.99
Transportation system
operator
(Commercial aspects),
Transport Owner, Shipper
Lead Negotiator
Transportation agreements
25.05.99
Transportation system
operator, Shippers
Dispatching Representative
Department Manager TCC
Engineering Staff
26.05.99
Field Owner, Shipper Department Manager 28.05.99
Seller Sales Manager Belgium 28.05.99
Sellers Representative, Sellers
Dispatching Representative
Department Manager GSC
Control Center
03.06.99
15.06.99
Seller Department Manager
Commercial
03.06.99
Statoil Energy, Alexandria - Virginia
The meeting was conducted Nov. 29 to Dec. 3, 1999 with Senior Vice
President for Corporate Development, Senior Vice President for Producer
Services and Senior Vice President for Software Solution Center.
Columbia Gas, Fairfax – Virginia
The meeting was conducted Nov. 30, 1999 with Vice President for
Strategic Initiatives, Marketing Manager, Account Manager and Employee
Strategic Initiatives.
Columbia Gas, Charleston – West Virginia
The meeting was conducted Feb. 16, 2000 with Manager for
Commercial Services, Manager Marketing, Manager for Rate and Cost control
and some other employees working with topics such as gas control operations,
commercial services, facility running, price risk management, volume
management and rate design.
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TransCanada, Calgary - Canada
The meeting was conducted April 14 and April 17, 2000 with Director
for Pipeline Systems Operations, Senior Vice President for Customer Sales
and Services, Manager for Sales Strategy, Director for Sales, Vice President
for Technology Assessment, Director for Western Market Development.
National Energy Board, Calgary - Canada
The meeting was conducted Apr. 17, 2000 and the author met Chief
Economist, Professional Leadership Team and Economist in Applications
Business Unit.
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Calgary - Canada
The meeting was conducted Apr. 19, 2000 with Vice President for
Regulatory and Transportation Policy and General Counsel.
Tabors Caramanis & Associates, Cambridge
The meeting was conducted Nov. 2, 2000 with a Senior Associate.
11.4 The questionnaires
Statoil Norway - spring 1999
Introduction
The purpose of this activity is to collect empirical descriptive data from
Stakeholders. This information will be applied as input data to modelling the
“systems engineering optimization model”. The questions are organized into
two sections. The first section contains questions of a general nature, the
second section relates to general questions relevant for each stakeholder
including some questions which are tailored the individual stakeholders’
specific roles.
The questions, the general section:
1. Please identify the major stakeholders (Norwegian: “aktører”) being
involved in the Norwegian natural gas transport operations and their
major functions.
2. Please describe how these stakeholders interact (main flow only) and/or
identify any discrepancies or suggest amendments in:
3.1) Incose paper figure 3. (Attached)
3.2) NTNU report 99992 figure 3-1. (Attached).
3. Please identify the major interface documents regulating the Norwegian
natural gas transport operations.
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The questions, The specific section
4. Please clarify which of the interface documents that are specifically
important to you and which articles that are most relevant for you in
order to defining:
a) your major needs (in order to carry out your duties)
b) your major requirements to the system (so that the system provides
you with an   “output” that you will expect and require).
c) your major work tasks or functions
d) your major responsibilities.
5. Please clarify the means of interactions taking place between you and:
a) other stakeholders
b) how do the identified documents “influence and interact” upon your
function? (Is this influence “static and rigid” or is the influence more of
an “ever changing and dynamic type”)?
c) the hardware system .
6. Which parts or components of the hardware systems are monitored or
controlled by your function?
7. Please identify the major software computer programs acting and their
way of contributing.
8. How do you expect the Gas Directive will impact your functions?
9. Please define ”prudent” natural gas transport operations.
The questions, The tailored section – transport operator:
10. In the Incose paper a list is specified defining six major operating tasks.
These tasks are derived from the transportation agreements.
a) Are any tasks left out?
b) Can you priorities the tasks in some ways?
c) If prioritizing, by which means do you priorities between competing
tasks? (Can you provide examples)?
11. In daily operations do you consider to reducing energy consumption in
connection with the natural gas transport?
12. Which provision of the Transportation agreements is most likely subject
for amendments in order to cope with the Gas Directive?
The questions, The tailored section – shipper representative:
13. In daily operations which activities require most of your time.
14. In your opinion, which interactions are the most difficult to carry out in
a “prudent” manner?
15. Please identify your relationship with the field licenses.
16. Do you expect that “new type of shippers” may occur in the North Sea?
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The questions, The tailored section – gas seller
17. Do you consider new types of short-term gas sales a likely development
as a result of the gas directive?
Companies in Canada – spring 2000
Questionnaire – visit to TransCanda, NEB and CAPP in April 2000
1. Gas buyer behavior:
a) How did gas buyer behavior evolve as de-regulation progressed over
the years?
b) How did this affect the nature of gas sales contracts?
c) What are the conditions of the different gas sales contracts to day?
2. Shipper and transport owner behavior:
a) How did the gas transportation services evolve?
b) How did the transportation agreements between transport system
owners and shippers develop?
c) How did shipper requirements reflect the conditions or requirements
of the gas sales contracts?
d) Where there any operational constraints or considerations of
importance imposed by transport operations on either sales contracts or
transportation contracts?
e) What are the methods and measures for imbalance control and gas
quality, and measurements?
3. From the regulator's point of view:
a) What where the key issues and decisions made, in order to design the
rules for cost allocations and tariff regimes, in natural gas
transportation?
b) How are rules for allocation of sunk costs (investment in
transportation facilities) covered in tariff regimes (if they are (!))
c)  How is depreciation handled in the tariff regime?
d) What type of risk sharing exists between transportation system
owners and shippers, and between shippers and gas owners, and
between gas owners and gas buyers, especially in the context of
international gas export, as is the case in the Canadian context, when
you sell gas to the US buyer?
e) What are the rules for allocation of transportation capacity, during
periods of transportation restrictions or constraints or during periods of
shipper nominations exceeding transportation system capacity?
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11.5 Feasibility checks on RDD-100
The criteria are not prioritized.
Criteria RDD-100 Evaluation
Is the supplier easily
accessible within
traveling distance for the
author?
Offices in Bergen, Norway Acceptable
Is the program recognized
and used by other
organizations in Norway?
Applied by the Royal
Norwegian Navy on the
Frigate project.
Acceptable
Can the program be
installed on a PC laptop
based on Windows
configuration?
Yes (130 MB RAM required) Acceptable
Is a training course
available?
Two days training course
offered. Standard course fee
paid.
Acceptable
Is a “student’s user
license” available free of
charge?
Yes, the program was
installed free of charge.
Acceptable
Does the program support
information modelling
and requirement
traceably?
Yes, this is one of the
program’s main features and
purposes.
Acceptable
Is the program easy to
learn?
The program requires a basic
understanding of systems
engineering processes and a
good understanding of the
principles of information
modelling and the ERA
concept.
Manageable with
dedicated effort
Does the program easily
produce reporting from
the PC?
Not strait forward, postscript
treatment required.
Not so acceptable.
Print out should be
paced directly into
text processor for
editing.
Is program support
available in the USA?
Yes. The program is
developed in the USA and has
a widespread usage.
Support telephone
available. Much
valuable help
obtained.
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11.6 Information model printouts
In a separate Volume II of the dissertation all the information model
printouts from the RDD program are presented. The contents of this volume
is:
The prevailing regime:
Fig 1.1: Requirement traceability: Top view
Fig 1.2: Requirement traceability: Heads of agreement and Transport
agreement
Fig 1.3: Requirement traceability: Interface manual
Fig 1.4: Requirement traceability: Operation procedure
Fig 1.5: Requirement traceability: “Opfelx” procedure
Fig 1.6: Requirement traceability: “PAD” permission
Fig 1.7: Requirement traceability: “PUD” permission
Fig 1.8: Requirement traceability: Gas sales agreement, contract fields
Fig 1.9: Requirement traceability: Gas sales agreement, supply fields
Fig 1.10: Requirement traceability: The effectiveness measures
Fig 1.11: Requirement traceability: The effectiveness measures
Fig 1.12: Requirement traceability: The effectiveness measures
Fig 1.13: Requirement traceability: The effectiveness measures
Fig 2.1: System architecture: (Top view)
Fig 2.2: System architecture: Platforms
Fig 2.3: System architecture: Shore terminals
Fig 2.4: System architecture: Treatment terminals
Fig 2.5: System architecture: Productions facilities
Fig 3.1: Behavior model: Dispatching process
Fig 3.1: Behavior model: Optimization process
Fig 3.1: Behavior model: Handling of physical gas process
Fig 3.4: The merged behavior of the dry gas transport operations
Fig 4.1: The context system
Appendix
        265
11.7 Detailed results – assessment activity B.0
11.7.1 Main classes of information
A seemingly overwhelming amount of raw data was collected during
the assessment activity, and the need for classifying the information became
apparent. Dahl 281 originally suggested hardware, software, and bioware as
appropriate information classes. These were further disaggregated into the
following eight main classes.
· Source and lower-tier documents.
All documents containing requirements.
· Requirements
All specifications of functions, decisions, and components relating to
the dry gas transportation system and its operations.
· Functions
All actions allocated to stakeholders.
· Input/output
All discrete or time-related input/output from functions that are
“passive” and may cause an effect, e.g., oral or written instructions and
criteria defined to enable decision-making.
· Stakeholders
All personnel and other actors who perform one or more functions
within the system or who have a right to impose requirements on the
system as a whole or on any of its operations.
· Dry gas transportation system.282
All “main facilities” of the Statoil-operated dry gas transportation
system, as defined in the Transportation Agreements, which themselves
are decomposed into “components” such as valves, pipes, and the dry
gas itself.
· Communication and support systems.
All systems that support the transfer of technical data and other
information (oral, electronic, or written) among stakeholders and
components.
· Context systems.
All external systems that affect dry gas transport in any way.
                                          
281 Dahl (1999-B).
282 For simplicity the “dry gas system” is modeled. Much of the conclusions and
discussions are still quite relevant for the entire natural gas system, i.e. the inclusion of the
upstream “rich” gas system.
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In order to facilitate the creation of information models at a desired
level of accuracy the classes above were divided into sub-classes, through an
iterative process (the B.4 activity) to better organize the information.
Source documents
The source documents are classified into three sub-classes to reflect
different tiers in a hierarchical structure of documents. The three sub-classes
are:
· Public documents.
These are documents readily available in the public domain such as
acts, white papers or related textbooks, journal papers and different
symposium proceedings.
· Licensee’s documents.
These documents relate to a specific license such as for example a given
production or transportation license. MPE approves such documents
and these documents are normally not available in public. In this work
the sales contracts are categorized into this group.
· Operator’s documents.
These documents regulate the operator’s responsibilities and work
tasks.  These documents are normally developed, maintained and
implemented by the companies themselves. These documents are not
subject for an MPE approval nor are they available in public.
Requirements
Requirements are classified into two groups, 283 and the classification
takes place at the “leaf-level”. Higher-level requirements are not classified.
The two classes are:
· Behavioral requirements.
The behavioral requirements specify the functions of the system and the
operations. Behavioral requirements usually do not state how the system
is built or how to perform operations. They only communicate what the
system and the operations shall do. As was discussed in Section 3.2.5.2,
the leaf-level requirements specify functions, and in the behavior
information model, see Section 3.2.5.4, all input/output items to and
from the functions are identified.
                                          
283 The definitions of classes of requirements as suggested here are based on Asbjørnsen
(1992). See also Dahl (1999) and Oliver et al. (1997) and the “RDD-100” user manual.
Appendix
        267
The behavioral requirements are classified into three sub-classes: pre-
operational, operational and post-operational, of which the operational
behavioral requirements are prime focus in this work.
· Non-behavioral requirements.
These requirements specify all physical components and they specify
economic requirements and conditions. The non-behavioral
requirements also specify the stakeholders, see foot note 44.
Functions
Functions are classified into two groups:
· Discrete functions.  A discrete function is the lowest level of observable
behavior being modelled. 284
· Time functions.  A time function is an aggregated function consisting of
one or more discrete functions and time functions.
Input and output
The input and output of functions are classified into two groups:
· Discrete items. Discrete items are the lowest level of observable inputs
or outputs from functions.
· Time items. A time item is an aggregate of items.
Stakeholders
There are many stakeholders identified and the list of stakeholders is
long. The stakeholders may be grouped into seven major groups. There are
likely different ways of classifying this information and the suggested list of
groups is only one possible option. The groups applied here are authorities
and advisory committees, licensees, shippers, sellers, representatives,
operators and gas buyers.
Authorities and advisory committees
· The Ministry on Petroleum and Energy (MPE)
· The FU
· The GFU
                                          
284 RDD-100 User manual, page 179
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Licensees
· The production field owners. Each partner is a separate owner in the
license and there are many licensees on the NCS.
· The transport system owners. Each partner is a separate owner in each
license. There are several transport system licenses on the NCS.
· The gas storage owners.
Sellers
· The seller group. Each partner is a separate seller in each seller group.
The seller groups are listed into two categories to reflect their different
responsibilities in relation to the gas sales agreements. Some sellers
have the contractual responsibility for the contracts, while others have
the supply responsibility (or a combination of both responsibilities):
–    the contractual gas seller group
– the supply gas seller group
Operators
· The production field operator. There are many production field
operators on NCS.
· The transportation system operator. There are several transportation
system operators on the NCS. In this work only one operator is
considered, namely Statoil.285
· The treatment terminal operator
· The riser platform operator
· The shore terminal operator
· The gas storage operator
Shippers
· The shippers. There are many shipper groups and each partner is a
separate shipper in the shipper group.
Representatives
· The shippers’ representative. There is normally only one shippers’
representative appointed for each license; specified in the transportation
agreements. There are many shippers’ representatives on the NCS.
Statoil conducts this function on behalf of a number of shipper groups.
                                          
285 As previously noted, Statoil operates approximately 90 % of the dry gas transportation
network on the NCS.
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· The shippers’ dispatching representative.  The dispatching
representative performs the dispatching tasks on behalf of the shippers’
representative. In this work, there is only one shippers’ dispatching
representative considered, namely Statoil. Statoil conducts this function
centralized (at the Bygnes control center) on behalf of a number of
shipper groups.
· The sellers’ representative. There are a number of sellers’
representatives on the NCS. Statoil conducts this function on behalf of a
number of seller groups.
· The sellers’ dispatching representative. There is only one appointed
sellers’ dispatching representative for all licenses operated by Statoil.
Statoil conducts this function centralized (at the Forus gas sales center)
on behalf of a number of seller groups.
· The gas storage dispatching representative. Statoil conducts this
function on behalf of the gas storage owner group.
Gas buyers
· The gas buyers
Technical system facilities
In every systems engineering process it is imperative to accurately
define the systems boundaries. In this work the systems boundary is drawn
around the “Norwegian dry gas transportation system”. As explained earlier,
this is done due to simplicity and due to the assumption that much of the “rich
gas” system may fall outside the jurisdiction of the Gas Directive. The
following facilities are included in the work and thus comprise the dry gas
system:
· Pipelines:
Zeepipe, Europipe, Europipe II, FranPipe, Statpipe/Norpipe, Zeepipe
from Sleipner to Sleipner riser platform (Slr), Zeepipe from Draupner to
Slr, Statpipe from Kårstø to Draupner, Statpipe from Heimdal to
Draupner, Zeepipe 2B from Kollsnes to Draupner and Zeepipe 2A from
Kollsnes to Slr.
· Shore terminals:
Dunkerque, Emden ERF, Emden ED, Zeebrygge.
· Platforms:
Sleipner Riser Platform (Slr) and Draupner Riser Platform (Dr).
· Treatment terminals: Kårstø and Kollsnes.
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Communication system
In order to facilitate communication of oral, written and technical data
between the stakeholders, and the context system and the system facilities, a
communication and support system is developed. In this work, no further
classification is performed and the system is referred to as one entity only. 286
Context system
Given the definition of the systems boundaries, the facilities of the
context system are implicitly given. These facilities are defined to be the five
locations were gas is delivered into the system and the systems downstream
the five exit locations of the system. The gas storage is treated as a context
system.
· The dry gas productions system:
Sleipner field Platform, Heimdal Platform, Supply fields upstream
Kårstø including the “rich gas” pipelines, Supply fields upstream
Kollsnes including the “rich gas” pipelines, and the Ekofisk production
facilities. 287
· The gas buyers’ dry gas distribution and consumption systems:
Downstream Zeepipe Terminal, downstream Dunkerque Terminal,
downstream Emden ED Terminal and downstream Emden ERF
Terminal
· The gas storage:
Etzel gas storage
11.7.2 Assessment of main documents
Participants Agreements
 This agreement defines whom the parties are that constitutes the
transportation licensees. The documents specify two stakeholders:
· Transport system owners
· Shippers
Upstream Agreements
The author chooses to discuss these documents here as incorporated
documents of the transportation license. One may argue that these documents
                                          
286 For a detailed outline of the system see Dahl (1998-B)
287 Rich gas is natural gas containing natural gas liquids (NGL) in dense phase inside a
pipeline.
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could have been ordered into the documentation hierarchy elsewhere, as the
documents are relevant for the production field license as well. These
documents play an important role in order to achieve the resource
management effectiveness measure. The Upstream Agreements are
summarized into five types of agreements: 288
· Substitution Agreements
· Modulation Agreements
· Regularity Support Agreements
· Storage Agreements
· Supply Agreements
These five agreements are all negotiated and agreed upon between
owners of gas, whether these owners are field licensees or shippers. The five
documents are treated jointly in the model as they conceptually are much the
same. Each Upstream Agreement has been modelled to incorporate one leaf-
level requirement and one function. The five functions calculate the daily right
amount of gas to be shipped according to the given agreement. When all these
five calculations are done, a trade-off has to be done, as there are many
provisions of the agreements that simultaneously have to be considered.
Trade-offs and iterations are done so that the right aggregated delivery
instruction to the production field is found. All these tasks are allocated to the
shipper’s dispatching representative.
Interface Manuals 289
The Interface Manuals incorporate requirements regarding rules for
dispatching of gas. The requirements specify discrete functions and time
functions for a number of tasks:
· dispatching of availability instructions from gas production fields, riser
platforms, shore terminals, and treatment terminals, and pipelines
systems
· dispatching of gas delivery instructions and requests (nominations)
· rules for trade-off calculations in order to arrive at the right delivery
instructions
· rules for shortfall handling
                                          
288 In connection with the discussion of the behavior model in Section 5.5.4, the core
features of each of the five agreements above are elaborated.
289 See for example procedure H728-3 vol. 1 and vol. 2, sect. 1.2 (Statoil proprietary)
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A total number of 10 leaf-level requirements were identified. As
pointed out earlier, each of the leaf-level requirements specifies a function,
which subsequently has been allocated to a stakeholder. The only stakeholder
allocated here was the Transportation System Operator.
Measurement Manual
The Measurement Manual specifies rules for how to verify the exact
energy contents of the gas being delivered to customers. This has to be done in
order to calculate correct toll and conduct imbalance control. A number of
three leaf-level requirements and functions were identified. All activities are
“after the fact” activities which means that the stakeholder performs these
tasks on the day following the actual gas delivery. The only stakeholder
allocated to these tasks was the Transportation System Operator.
Operations Philosophy Manual
The Operations Philosophy Manual incorporates requirements on two
important aspects of natural gas transport operations, namely:
· rules for handling of physical gas in the pipelines
· rules for gas quality monitoring and control
This manual specifies the actions to be done in order to maintain the
integrity of the facilities. It also specifies the rules for how to blend different
gas streams correctly so that the gas deliveries meet the sales specifications.
The manual specifies how the Transportation System Operator shall set the
right pressure and flow at the systems’ control valves. The leaf level
requirements specify the following functions:
· read information on flow, pressure and gas quality at all locations
· perform trade-offs in order to calculate the right “set-point” at all input
and output valves.
· adjust the flow and pressure at all remotely controlled input and output
valves.
· instruct production field-, treatment terminal-, riser platform-, and shore
terminal- operators to adjust gas flows and outlet pressures if required.
Nine functions are identified and all functions are allocated to the
Transportation System Operator.
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Tariff Procedure
The Tariff Procedure incorporates rules for tariff (toll) calculations. The
Transportation system operator shall perform three main functions:
· allocate the correct gas volume shipped for each shipper
· calculate the energy contents of the shippers’ gas
· calculate the shippers’ tariff (toll)
· issue tariff (toll) to the shippers
Procedure for linepack arrangement between transportation systems
and operational flexibility arrangement between fields. 290
This is an important and quite specific procedure. The Transportation
system operator and the Shipper Dispatching Representative have developed
the document. The document incorporates rules for how to utilize the
transportation system and the production fields as compensating means in
order to optimize gas deliveries and daily resource management on the NCS.
The document gives no specific information on what type of superior
requirements it aims to fulfill. It is thus not strait forward to allocate the
procedure into the document hierarchy. The author has incorporated the
procedure to the Transportation Agreement as one possible solution. The
procedure gives rules for several specific topics, either directly or indirectly:
· rules for minimization of flaring
· rules for minimization of transients
· rules for optimization of oil production
· rules for optimization of NGL production
· rules for dispatching of operational flexibility
The transport operations must be optimized based on several conditions.
Such conditions consist of securing the pipelines integrity, minimizing gas
flaring, and optimizing oil and NGL production. In order for the
Transportation System Operator to do so, two specific methods can be applied,
termed Operational Flexibility (Opflex) and Line packing (Linepack).
The Procedure specifies a total number of ten functions. The
Transportation System Operator performs the functions (partly on behalf of
the Shippers’ Dispatching Representative). Nine of the functions consist of
calculating the gas volumes to be treated as “opflex” and “linepack” volumes.
                                          
290 Dated 27.06.94, Procedure no.: H727-19
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The last function is the dispatching of these volumes.
Shippers dispatching representative appointment procedure
This document authorizes a specific organization unit in Statoil 291 to
perform the shippers’ dispatching representative functions on behalf of several
shippers. Two types of requirements are identified and each requirement
specifies a function as follows:
· dispatch field imbalances
· dispatch the Upstream Agreements
Modelling of production field licensees’ documents
The production fields belong to the context; they are outside of the
systems boundary as defined in this work. The purpose for identifying
requirements incorporated in the production field licensees’ documents is to
understand the requirements exposed on the system by its surroundings. Three
relevant requirements were identified. First, the production field facilities are
specified as such in these documents. Secondly, these documents specify the
Field Participants and finally, the documents incorporate requirements related
to production field gas dispatching. The latter requirements are stated in the
Interface Manuals, developed jointly between the Transportation System
Operator and the Production Field Operators. As a summary of these
documents only two important requirements are relevant here:
· Rules for how the Production Field Operator shall issue field
availability
· Rules for how the Production Field Operator shall receive his delivery
instructions
Modelling of gas sales agreements
The gas sales agreements are briefly modelled, and the main purpose is
to identify the dispatching rules and specific gas delivery terms. Several types
of gas sales agreements exist. The first type identified here is termed Gas
Sales Agreements - GFU. This term refers to the “intermediate” stage in the
agreement’s life cycle, following the signing, but prior to the final assignment.
Secondly, the term Gas Sales agreement - Contractual Field is used to
identify the assigned agreements. Thirdly, the term Gas Sales Agreement –
Supply Field applies for those agreements that are assigned or allocated to the
                                          
291 Bygnes Control Center at Karmøy
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supply fields (including the old depletion contracts).
Gas Sales Agreements - GFU
The PUD and PAD processes and the GFU and FU processes are all
ingredients in the comprehensive approval processes resulting in final licenses
and assignments of gas sales contacts. These approval processes are all
conducted in the context systems. Therefore, in the RDD-100 printouts only
modest attention is given to these processes. The main interests here are the
assigned contracts because the execution of these contracts has a direct
influence on transport operations and dispatching processes.
Gas Sales Agreements - Contractual Fields, - Supply Fields
In the modelling work these two types of contracts are treated jointly.
They both belong to the context system, and the main issue of importance here
is to identify all interactions between these contracts and the transportation
system and its operations. Five documents are identified:
· Gas Sales Agreements’ Appendixes
· Identification Procedure
· Operating Agreements
· Invoicing Manual
· Seller and Shipper Administration Procedures
The Gas Sales Agreements contain references to Appendixes. These
Appendixes specify important parameters related to the gas quality
requirements and other essential delivery terms. The Gas Sellers’
Representative and Shippers’ Representative have developed several
Identification Procedures 292 based on the requirements specified in the Gas
Sales Agreements. The Identification Procedures specify rules for shortfall
handling and rules for how to prioritize gas deliveries between production
fields.
The Gas Seller Representative has developed several Operating
Agreements 293 based on the requirements specified in the Gas Sales
Agreements. These documents specify requirements for dispatching and
reporting. The Gas Sellers Representative and the Shipper Representatives
have developed several Seller and Shipper Administration Procedures 292 in
order to document the seller’s and shipper’s representative functions on behalf
                                          
292 See Statoil document “Orientering om Statoils Gass-Salgsadministrsasjon, 5.3.96”
293 See Statoil GSC archive, called “driftsavtaler” in Norwegian.
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of the other sellers and shippers.
11.7.3 Assessment of the upstream agreements
Upstream Agreements – Substitution
From time to time gas sales commitments are done between production
field licensees and gas buyers where no physical pipeline exists between them.
Or in other words, it is impossible for the seller to supply the customer with
his own physical gas. The Substitution Agreements are designed to correct this
situation and they typically take the form of a swap arrangement.
A typical situation is shown in the Figure 34 below. In this case, field A
has a contractual obligation with buyer 2, but his physical gas is delivered into
pipeline A and not into pipeline B. A Substitution Agreement (“swap”)
features a solution, as illustrated in the drawing. Field B delivers the gas on
behalf of field A. Substitution Agreements may last for many years and they
usually have extensive contractual provisions.
Figure 34.  Substitution Agreements
Upstream Agreements – Modulation
The Modulation Agreements are designed to allow a given field to
produce gas according to an optimized field reservoir production schedule.
Modulation Agreements are thus important tools to enhance resource
management. In connection with hydrocarbon production from a subsea
production field, many constraints must be considered. Issues like reservoir
depletions plans, gas or water injection plans, well maintenance and threshold
values in production facilities are considered by the operator when he
optimizes the fields’ production plans. Further, very often the production plans
at one field must be harmonized with production plans at a neighboring field.
Field A
Buyer 1
Field B
Buyer 2
Contractual 
gas stream
Physical 
gas stream
Physical 
gas stream
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The core issue here is that such optimized production plans seldom match the
gas sales commitments. If the gas sales commitments – and the buyers’
random requests – should set the daily production plan at the production
fields, the field reservoir may be deteriorated over time.
Modulation Agreements are therefore designed to let some production
fields deliver gas according to an optimized plan and let other fields fluctuate
on the former field’s behalf. In Figure 35 below two curves are shown – one
represents the optimized physical production curve and the other represents
the contractual obligation delivery curve. These two curves do not fit. In the
early years of the sales contract, the given field is in a need for borrowing gas.
Later, the field has a surplus of gas and finally the field provides too little gas
to meet the sales obligations. In the periods of too little gas, (marked with: “-“
in Figure 35) a Modulation Agreement can be entered into, allowing another
field to supply the gas. The opposite takes place when too much gas is
produced. These types of contracts may last for many years and they usually
have extensive contractual provisions.
Figure 35.  Modulation Agreements
Upstream Agreements – Regularity Support
The nature of this agreement is much the same as the modulation
agreements, except that this agreement usually has a much narrower time
frame or duration. Typically, such agreements are designed to enhance
regularity on a daily basis. The way this agreement works is illustrated in
Figure 36 below. If there is a surplus production from a given field, a defined
assisting field holds back his own production and thereby balances out the
commingled stream to match the buyer’s request for gas delivery.
Gas deliveries
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Physical optimal 
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-
+
-
Contractual 
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Figure 36.  Regularity Support Agreements
Upstream Agreements – Storage
The storage agreement is a specific variant of the modulation
agreement. If for instance, enhanced oil production creates associated gas that
for different reasons are not sold, an alternative gas allocation is needed. One
alternative is a storage agreement that allows the field to store its gas in
another field.
These agreements typically cause some characteristic operational
modes, worthy of note. The main principle for gas storage is illustrated in
Figure 37 below. Field A and field B have entered into a storage agreement,
allowing field B to store a gas volume c in field A. The dotted arrow illustrates
this agreement. Further, if we now assume that each field has entered into an
individual gas sales contract they will be commitment to deliver gas volumes
a and b, respectively. These arrangements will eventually cause the
Transportation System Operator to instruct a physical gas production (and
delivery) from the two fields equal to the gas volumes: (a-c) and (b+c),
respectively.
This fact causes some technical and commercial complications. First, if
the gas quality in the two fields are substantially different and the blending is
too unproportional, the gas quality of the commingled stream (downstream
point 2) may be off-specification according to requirements laid down in the
gas sales contracts. In other words, if the gas sales contracts have to narrow
quality terms, this effectively may hamper the possibilities for storing of gas
between fields.
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-
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Figure 37.  Storage Agreement
A second characteristic condition is that such agreements typically raise
difficult questions related to tolling, a condition sometimes referred to as
“backhaul” or “displacement of gas”. 294 This situation can easily be illustrated
by referring to Figure 37 and by asking the following question: what shall be
the correct gas volume subject for toll in the pipeline section located between
point 1 and point 2?
Two possible answers exist. First, the toll can be based on the
contractual gas stream, which in this case would be a. The second option is to
base the toll on the physical gas stream which in this case yields a-c. In the
special case of a=c, no physical gas stream is flowing in this pipeline section.
The IEA study report makes one interesting observation when it points
to this fact. It states that in a “bundled”, or vertically integrated regulatory
regime, these types of considerations have not fully been studied, but in a
liberalized regime, these issues will be increasingly important. 295
Upstream Agreements – Supply  
The last type of agreement to be mentioned here is the supply
                                          
294 See IEA (1994) page 132 and Madden (Financial Times) (1997) page 53.
295 These types of considerations have been carefully discussed among shippers on the
NCS.
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agreements. These agreements allow some fields to supply gas under a
specific gas sale contract held by another licensee group. These agreements
are crucial features that support the resource management effectiveness
measure. The nature of the agreement is shown in Figure 38.
Figure 38.  Supply Agreement
Two important expressions are worthy of note in this context, namely
the terms sellers’ share (SES) and suppliers’ share (SUS). These terms are
applied to distinguish between a gas seller’s different obligations under
different contracts. Based on the MPE’s assignment, a particular field will be
contractually responsible according to the contractual gas sales agreements
for a given percentage-share of the total gas sales. However, at the same time,
based on the MPE’s allocation, the same field may be responsible for the
physical supply of a given, albeit different percentage-share of the total sale.
So in other words, a specific field may be contractually responsible for X
percentage of the total sale, but on a given day is asked to supply Y percentage
of the sale. During a normal day the fields are asked to deliver according to
the SUS while shortfall situations requires delivery instructions based on the
SES calculations. The sellers- and shippers- dispatching representative
performs these calculations and issues delivery instructions accordingly.
Normally, there exists only one contractual field linked to one gas sales
agreement.
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11.7.4 The Operational Flexibility concept
Operational Flexibility (opflex) is a phrase used by the Transportation
System Operator and the Shippers’ Dispatching Representative and it refers to
a specific means for optimizing gas transportation and gas sales. In day-to-day
operations gas may be borrowed from a neighboring field or injected into a
neighboring field to solve urgent needs. Such needs may occur due to
production facility interruptions and shut-downs. In 1998 approximately 630
events 296 occurred. The clue here is that the Transportation System Operator
or the Shippers’ Dispatching Representative has been authorized to instruct
such operations on their own discretion, if there is a need to do so. Such
operations are done daily whenever there is a shortage or a surplus of gas
somewhere in the system.
Normally, no specific commercial conditions are specified for the
conduct of the Opflex, other than some specified maximum limits and
timeframes to balance unsettled accounts as soon as the situation causing the
problem has been resolved. This is in contrast to the Upstream Agreements
that all have commercial terms specified for the service offered.
11.7.5  The Linepack concept
The last operational optimization measure to be mentioned here is the
Linepack concept. Line packing (Linepack) means to store gas in a specific
pipeline, by increasing the pressure in the pipe and thus obtaining a larger
pipeline inventory of gas. In the Figure 39 below, the concept is illustrated.
The Transportation System Operator seeks to maintain the Linepack at a
“good average working pressure”. 297 The pipeline’s capability to store gas,
shall serve contradicting goals. If a production field, for example, experiences
problems with its gas injection facilities it must export excessive volumes of
gas. The goal is that the pipeline shall be able to receive these volumes. A
similar situation occurs if a buyer decreases his nominations faster than what
is a feasible production shut down rate.
The pipeline inventory capacity will also serve in an opposite situation,
namely as a “supplier” of gas. The Transportation System Operator seeks to
store some gas in the pipeline. This gas can be withdrawn from the pipeline, if
for example, the gas buyers increase their nominations faster than production
capabilities. Another aspect is the fact that the Norwegian pipelines are long in
distance and the delayed response at the outlet, to an increased production at
                                          
296 Source: Statoil
297 Soruce: Statoil
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the inlet, is significant. 298 The use of Linepack is at the Transportation System
Operators’ discretion and several detailed rules for its usage are specified in a
procedure.299
Figure 39. The Linepack concept
                                          
298 Dahl (1998-A)
299 “The Procedure for linepack arrangement between transportation systems and
operational flexibility arrangement between fields”
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11.8 Gantt chart of work
Below is a Gantt chart of the work, updated by October 2000.
ID Task Name Duration% Complete
1 Administration 4 wks 100%
2 Mentor co-ordination 1 wk 100%
3 Preparation for USA and visiting trip 3 wks 100%
4 A: Strategy development 13 wks 100%
7 A.2: Identification academic fields 3 wks 100%
8 A.3: Conceptual framework 3 wks 100%
5 A.1: Strategy breakdown 2 wks 100%
6 INCOSE 1999 Paper writing 1 wk 100%
9 B: System re-engingeering process 28 wks 100%
11 B.1: Assess information current regime5 wks 100%
10 B.2: Define effectiveness measures 3 wks 100%
12 Literature search and reading 4 wks 100%
13 B.3: Creat information models/RDD 8 wks 100%
14 B.4: Testing of model 2 wks 100%
15 B.5: Document and write dissertation 4 wks 100%
16 INCOSE 2000 paper writing 2 wks 100%
17 C: Systems engineering process 55 wks 74%
18 C.1: Assess information new regime 6 wks 100%
19 Literature search and reading 6 wks 100%
20 C.2: Redefine effectiveness measures 4 wks 90%
21 IAEE paper writing 4 wks 100%
22 C.3: Specify scenario 3 wks 100%
23 C.4: Develop new toll rules 10 wks 60%
24 C.5: GassOpt testing and analyzes 3 wks 80%
25 C.6: Modify information models 2 wks 0%
26 C.7: Test new modifications 2 wks 0%
27 C.8: Document and dissertation writing15 wks 65%
28 Paper milestones 93,2 wks 0%
29 Paper #1 (INCOSE 1999) 0 wks 100%
30 Paper #2 (INCOSE 2000) 0 wks 100%
31 Paper #3 (IAEE) 0 wks 100%
32 Paper #4 (draft) 0 wks 30%
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Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan
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12 Enclosure of papers
12.1 INCOSE 1999 Paper
“Systems engineering and Statoil natural gas transport operations”,
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual International Symposium of the International
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), (Brighton, UK, June 1999) vol.
II, pp 791-798.
12.2 INCOSE 2000 Paper
“Information modelling and systems re-engineering – an efficient
approach to assessing complex current Norwegian natural gas transport
operations”, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual International Symposium of the
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), (Minneapolis, USA,
July 2000) pp 49-56.
12.3 IAEE 2000 Paper
“A European Natural Gas Market in Transition: Is a New Tariff Regime
in Norwegian Dry Gas Transportation Needed? Overview of a Complex
Issue”, Annual European Energy Conference 2000  (IAEE), (Bergen, Norway,
August 31- September 1, 2000)
